Structured and unstructured bargaining with positive transaction costs: an experimental investigation by Spencer, Michael Andrew
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1995
Structured and unstructured bargaining with




Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Spencer, Michael Andrew, "Structured and unstructured bargaining with positive transaction costs: an experimental investigation"
(1995). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 17184.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/17184
Structured and unstructured bargaining with positive transaction costs: 
IS'U.. 
/CJ q :::> 
S07 
c.3 
An experimental investigation 
by 
Michael Andrew Spencer 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Department: Economics 
Major: Economics 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 




Dedicated to my parents, Martha Sarres and Ronald Spencer, and my 
grandmother, Thelma Whitesell. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER 2: BARGAINING SOLUTIONS 4 
2. 1 Nash's Axiomatic Approach 4 
2.2 The Strategic Approach 5 
2.3 The Coasian Approach 8 
CHAPTER 3: PREVIOUS STUDIES ON COASIAN BARGAINING 12 
CHAPTER 4: MAIN ISSUES IN BARGAINING EXPERIMENTS 21 
4.1 Equal Splits and the Fairman-Gamesman Debate 21 
4.2 Focal points 32 
4.3 Expectations in Negotiations 33 
4.4 Risk Aversion 38 
4.5 Cheap Talk 39 
CHAPTER 5: MEASURES OF COSTLY BARGAINING AND BASIC 
HYPOTHESES 44 
5.1 Coasian Bargaining in a Binary Lottery 45 
5.2 Efficiency, Distribution of Wealth, and Tim ing in Costly 
Bargains 46 
5.3 Potential Factors in Bargaining 54 
CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 60 
6.1 General Bargaining Framework 61 
6.2 The Nash Solution and Controller 62 
6.3 Treatments (Protocol Schemes) 67 
iv 
6.4 Transaction Costs 70 
6.5 A Completely Randomized Design 72 
6.6 The Subjects and Experimental Procedures 78 
6. 7 Additional Design Notes 83 
CHAPTER 7: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 85 
7.1 Summary Statistic Results 85 
7.2 Analysis of Variance Results 101 
7.3 Econometric Results 119 
7.4 Summary of Key Results and Economic Implications 130 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 1 33 
8.1 Overall Summary 134 
8.2 Limitations and Potential Shortcomings 135 
8.3 Future Research Ideas 138 
REFERENCES 142 
APPENDIX A: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND RELATED 
MATERIALS 149 
APPENDIX B: SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS 163 
APPENDIX C: DATA SET 179 
v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I wish to thank my major professor, Dr. Jason F. Shogren, for his guidance, 
patience, and friendship. Without his direction and motivation this endeavor would 
not have been possible. 
The advice I received, throughout this project, from Dr. John Stufken (my 
statistics minor advisor) regarding experimental design and analysis is greatly 
appreciated. I also appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions supplied by 
my committee member, Dr. Joseph A. Herriges. 
I gratefully thank Dr. Thomas F. Weaver and the Department of Resource 
Economics at the University of Rhode Island for much encouragement and support. 
Thanks also to Dr. Cathy R. Wessells for her help with indicator variables. 
Many thanks to Mark Spatz, Debbie Weisman, and Merith Weisman for 
serving as monitors during the experimental sessions. 
Additionally, I thank my friend, Dr. Yu-Ping Li, for helping me random ize my 
experiment and fielding numerous statistical questions. 
At this point, I would like to acknowledge the fact that my venture to graduate 
school would not have been possible without the love and support of my family. The 
many words of encouragement and support from my parents, Martha Sarres and 
Ronald Spencer, grandmother, Thelma Whitesell , stepfather, Timothy Sarres, sister, 
Jennifer Sarres, and stepmother, Judy Spencer kept (and still keep) me going at all 
times. Moreover, I wish to especially thank my wife, Hsianghui Liu-Spencer. She 
listened to my gripes, helped me recruit experimental subjects, gave me the idea for 
the memorization game used in the experiments, typed much of this thesis, and 
vi 
above all supported me every step of the way--1 truly am a very lucky man. I also 
appreciate my wife's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Liu, for believing in me. 
Lastly, financial support from the USAID-MUCIA-EPAT project is gratefully 
acknowledged. And I thank Lauren Reynolds at Iowa State University for solving my 
long distance logistical problems in obtaining several necessary signatures and 




Without the concept of transaction costs, which is largely 
absent from current economic theory, it is my contention 
that it is impossible to understand the working of the 
economic system, to analyze many of its problems in a 
useful way, or to have a basis for determining policy. 
Ronald H. Coase (1988, p.6) 
The primary motivation for this thesis comes from Shogren and Herriges 
(1994). Through (two-person) bilateral bargaining experiments, Shogren and 
Herriges find that Coasian bargaining [as in Coase (1960)] achieves inefficient 
results when positive transaction costs exist. This result contrasts the abundance of 
efficiency results reported in previous Coasian bargaining experiments [e.g., see 
Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) or Shogren (1992)]. The incorporation of transaction 
costs represents the fundamental difference between Shogren and Herriges's 
experiment and the previous experiments. This suggests that the so-called HCoase 
theorem" does not remain robust when bargaining is costly. The Coase theorem 
states: if the costs of bargaining are minimal and well-defined property rights exist, 
two disputing parties will reach a Pareto-efficient solution through a mutually 
advantageous bargain, and this efficient solution (i.e., optimal allocation of 
resources) remains independent of the initial assignment of property rights. Most 
negotiations, however, involve transaction costs. Fact finding, travel, and time costs 
represent a few of the possible expenses which bargainers might incur. Given the 
existence and importance of transaction costs, as the above quote from Coase 
{1988) highlights, and Shogren and Herriges's experimental results, the economics 
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discipline requires further research into costly bargaining. It may be that certain 
bargaining protocols (e.g., pre-bargaining communication, such as cheap talk) exist 
which help bargainers achieve efficient and mutually advantageous bargains when 
bargaining remains costly. This thesis builds on the idea of bargaining protocols. 
Specifically, the current study develops several protocol schemes (see 
Section 6.3) by utilizing various procedures found in both •structured• and 
"unstructured" bargaining models. Structured bargaining contains process 
restrictions, where bargainers are not free to make offers and counteroffers 
whenever they wish. Examples of structured bargaining include sequential offer 
structures, as in Rubinstein's (1982) strategic model, and simultaneous demand 
structures, as in Nash's (1953) negotiation model. Unstructured bargaining naturally 
remains the antonym of structured bargaining; and hence, it imposes no process 
restrictions--i.e., bargainers are free (usually within a time limit) to make offers and 
counteroffers whenever they wish. Given this freedom, unstructured bargaining is 
sometimes referred to as "free form" bargaining. Coasian bargaining and Nash's 
(1950a) axiomatic model both represent examples of unstructured bargaining. As 
later chapters will discuss, this study, through the use of bilateral bargaining 
experiments, tests the ability of the bargaining protocols to guide bargainers toward 
efficient and mutually advantageous bargains, when positive transaction costs exist. 
Given the above preview, the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews 
the literature on bargaining solutions. This chapter discusses, in more depth, ·the 
procedures found in various structured and unstructured bargaining models. 
Chapter 3 presents some previous theoretical and experimental investigations into 
Coasian bargaining. The studies reviewed in Chapter 3 investigate the robustness 
of the Coase theorem upon a relaxation of one or more of the theorem's 
3 
assumptions. Chapter 4 highlights some of the main issues found in bargaining 
experiments. This chapter reviews the lengthy fairman-gamesman debate; 
discusses the concept of focal points; addresses the role of expectations in 
bargaining; mentions the effect of risk aversion in bargains: and defines cheap talk. 
Most of the issues in Chapter 4 remain concerns for this papers experiment. 
Next, Chapter 5 presents three measures of costly bargaining, and states the 
basic hypotheses for this study. In particular, this study considers measures and 
hypotheses related to efficiency, distribution of wealth, and bargaining time. Chapter 
5, also, considers other factors (such as gender effects) which may affect bargaining 
behavior in this paper's experiment. Chapter 6 explains the entire experimental 
design. It describes the general bargaining framework which all the bargainers must 
follow, and it defines the bargaining protocols which separate the experiment into 
various treatments. [Note, throughout this thesis the terms "treatment" and 
"protocol" will be used synonymously.] Additionally, Chapter 6 recounts how the 
experimental subjects were recruited, and how the experiment was implemented. 
Chapter 7 presents the experimental results and discussion. Specifically, this 
chapter analyzes the experimental results in terms of the measures presented in 
Chapter 5, and it draws conclusions regarding the hypotheses developed in Chapter 
5. Lastly, Chapter 8 concludes this thesis. It offers an overall summary of this 
paper's analysis; states the limitations and potential shortcomings of this study; and 




Theorists wonder how people behave in bargains and what the outcome 
entails. These queries represent what is called the bargaining problem. Various 
theorists offer different solutions. One may classify the different solutions into three 
categories--axiomatic, strategic, and Coasian bargaining. Though this analysis 
mainly focuses on Coasian bargaining, much of the bargaining theory and 
experimental design presented in this analysis draws from the areas of axiomatic 
and strategic bargaining, too. Thus, one finds it necessary to briefly explain all three 
approaches. 
2.1 Nash's Axiomatic Approach 
First, the axiomatic approach, primarily pioneered by John Nash in 1950, 
offers a solution to the bargaining problem based on a set of assumptions, or 
axioms, regarding bargainer behavior and economic environment. Nash (1950a) 
begins by developing the utility theory of each individual based on several axioms 
which von Neuman and Morgenstern present in their 1944 book entitled Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior. Additionally, Nash assumes each individual wants 
to maximize his or her gain in bargaining. Thereupon, the analysis continues by 
defining a set, S, of feasible expected utility payoffs (Nash uses the concept 
anticipations instead of payoffs) from which two bargainers bargain for the 
obtainment of one point. If the bargainers fail to reach an agreement, then a 
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disagreement payoff, d, ensues. This disagreement payoff represents a point in S, 
or in mathematical terms d e S. For illustration purposes let d describe the point 
( d,.,, dB) where d,., and dB correspond to the disagreement payoffs for bargainer A 
and bargainer B, respectively (note that in Nash's original analysis he assigns the 
number zero to the disagreement payoff; thus, d,., = O and dB = 0 in terms of Nash's 
analysis). Finally, Nash shows that the fulfillment of all the axioms [Pareto 
optimality, symmetry, invariance of linear transformations of utility, and 
independence of irrelevant altematives--see pages 246-247 in Davis and Holt {1993) 
for a good explanation of these assumptions] requires the solution be a point in S 
where the product of each bargainer's utility is maximized beyond d. To illustrate, if 
one lets u,., and UB represent uti lity functions for bargainers A and B, respectively, 
the Nash solution occurs where (u,., -d,.,)(UB -dB), or in terms of Nash's {1950a) 
analysis u,.,uB, is maximized.I 
In sum, the axiomatic approach makes predictions regarding the outcome of a 
bargain based on certain assumptions. This approach does not address the use of 
independent strategies by bargainers. Hence, the axiomatic method remains in the 
domain of cooperative game theory. To address strategic considerations, one turns 
to noncooperative game theory. 
2.2 The Strategic Approach 
Much contemporary work regarding noncooperative game theory follows from 
Ariel Rubinstein's {1982) strategic model. But before one discusses Rubinstein's 
1 For good exa~ples of the Nash solution involving a duopoloy and a divide-the-dollar game see 
pages ~21 -222 in Henderson and Quandt (1980) and Section 5.2 in Davis and Holt (1993) , 
respectively. 
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work, one must, once again, recall earlier works by John Nash. In the realm of 
noncooperative game theory, Nash presents two prominent works--see Nash (1950b 
and 1953). At this point, one calls upon Roth (1985a, p. 2) to provide a concise 
explanation of Nash's efforts as follows: 
Nash (1953) ... extended his original analysis [recall the axiomatic model 
in Nash (1950a)] in several ways. Perhaps the most significant of 
these extensions was the proposal of a specific strategic model that 
supported the same conclusions as the general axiomatic model 
outlined earlier. His approach was to propose one very particular 
bargaining procedure embodied in a noncooperative game in extensive 
form .... Nash then argued that the predicted outcome of this 
noncooperative bargaining game would be the same as the outcome 
predicted by the axiomatic model. To show this, he called on the newly 
developing theory of noncooperative games to which he had made the 
seminal contribution of proposing the notion of equilibrium (Nash 
1950b) that today bears his name. Although the noncooperative game 
he proposed possessed a multitude (indeed, a continuum) of Nash 
equilibria, he argued that the one corresponding to the prediction of his 
axiomatic model had distinguishing characteristics. 
(Note, italics appear in original work but the first phrase in brackets is added for 
clarity.) Actually, Nash's (1953) noncooperative game {which he terms as the 
"negotiation game") consists of two basic moves. First, each player i (for i = 1, 2) 
chooses a mixed strategy or threat t ; which player i will use if bargaining ends in 
disagreement. Second, each player i simultaneously makes a demand d;. If each 
player accepts the other's demand, then player 1 receives d, and player 2 receives 
r4_ . Otherwise, each player's threat determines the disagreement payoffs. [See 
pages 130-131 in Nash ( 1953) for more details.] 
Alternatively, Rubinstein {1982) progresses beyond Nash's work and presents 
a strategic model which incorporates sequential or alternating offers. He presents 
his model as two players whom must reach an agreement on the partition of a pie of 
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size 1. The players make alternating offers. This essentially forces the players to 
wait their turn and waiting, as defined by the model, remains costly. Particularly, 
each player bears an exogeneously determined cost (Rubinstein considers two 
sources of delay costs which pertain to fixed bargaining costs and fixed discounting 
factors) for each period. Thus, if one assumes bargainers are cost minimizers or 
profit maximizers, then the bargainers maintain an incentive to settle sooner rather 
than later.2 For the longer bargaining continues, the smaller the proportion of the pie 
each player faces. •This illustrates that the key to bargaining power here, in 
Rubinstein's model, ... comes from the ability to put the onus of waiting entirely on the 
other party" [Kreps (1990), p.565). 
To continue, Rubinstein advocates that the Nash equilibrium is a weak 
concept. He illustrates, on page 102 of his 1982 paper, the inadequacy of the 
concept of a Nash equilibrium in the context of his analysis. Instead, he proposes 
using the concept of a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium as a remedy. In the end, 
Rubinstein proves that his model maintains a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. 
And this equilibrium occurs after the first offer.3 
2 Rubinstein's analysis relies on several assumptions regarding players' preferences.too. [See 
Rubinstein (1982), pp. 98-99 and 100-101 .] 
3 This equilibrium tends to give virtually all the pie to the first mover. However, the payoffs depend on 
each player's bargaining (delay) cost. Rubinstein (1982, pp. 107-109) proves the following: (1) in the 
case where both the players have fixed bargaining costs, c1 and c2 : (i) if c1> c2 , then the only P.E.P. 
(Perfect Equilibrium Partition) gives c2 to player 1 and (ii) if c1< c2 , then the only P.E.P. gives all the 
pie to player 1, and (2) in the case where both the players possess a fixed discounting factor ( o1 and 
02), if at least one of the oi is strictly less than 1 and at least one of them is strictly positive, then 
the only P.E.P. is M = (1- o2 )/(1 - 0102 ). (Note, when o2 = 0, player 1 maintains the ability to capture 
all the pie, M = 1.) [For a further explanation, with examples, of Rubinstein's model see Section 15.3 
in Kreps (1990) .) 
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2.3 The Coasian Approach 
In addition to the classifications of cooperative and noncooperative, Nash's 
axiomatic model depicts free form or unstructured bargaining, while Rubinstein's 
strategic model depicts structured bargaining. Recall , structured bargaining places 
restrictions on the bargaining process (e.g., alternating offers and counteroffers), 
whereas unstructured bargaining imposes no process restrictions. Coasian 
bargaining represents another example of unstructured bargaining. And although 
Coasian bargainers may utilize various strategies, any joint agreement between the 
bargainers requires cooperation; hence, the Coasian approach retains some 
noncooperative and cooperative game theory elements. This depicts the basic 
Coasian bargaining environment. The following discussion further elaborates on 
Coase•s (1960) approach towards bargaining and conflict resolution. 
In his innovative paper "The Problem of Social CostM Ronald Coase (1960) 
proposes an approach to resolve disputes concerning harmful effects (i.e., negative 
externalities). Coase (1960, pp. 2-8) illustrates that the initial assignment of liability 
rules over harmful effects remains immaterial for the final allocation of resources if 
the pricing system is costless. In other words, Coase asserts that regardless of who 
owns the unilateral property rights, under a costless (zero) transactions market, two 
bargainers will reach a Pareto-optimal or Pareto-efficient allocation of resources 
through a mutually advantageous agreement. This is the so-called Coase theorem. 
Note, one key requirement involves the assignment of property rights. If we could 
not assign property rights, then we face a commons problem. •The tragedy of the 
commons", as termed by Garrett Hardin {1968), leads to a misallocation and 
overexploitation of resources. Hence, one step towards a solution lies in the 
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assignment of property rights. As such, one finds the Cease theorem offers a 
potential remedy. Cease (1960, p.8) apparently recognizes the commons dilemma 
as he reiterates his case: 
It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not 
for damage caused since without the establishment of this initial 
delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions to transfer 
and recombine them. But the ultimate result (which maximises the 
value of production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing 
system is assumed to work without cost. 
Similar to most expositions concerning Coase•s (1960) work, the previous 
discussion focuses on the Cease theorem. Cease (1960), however, offers an entire 
proposal, not just a theorem. To start, he makes many arguments in the 
development of his proposal. Some of his arguments (for further explanations, note 
the given pages which pertain to Coase•s 1960 paper) include: 
1) if the externalities problem lies in terms of causation, one 
must recognize that causation rests with both parties and an optimal 
allocation of resources requires both parties to consider the costs of the 
harmful effect--for continuing the activity harms one (e.g., receptor) while 
legally restricting the activity harms the other (e.g., polluter) [p.13] 
2) the courts must consider economic issues (e.g., weigh the 
gains against the costs of alternative decisions) when making decisions 
[p.19) 
3) the assignment of property rights through government regulation [pp.17-18] 
or statutory degree [pp.23-24, and 28) may not always promote efficiency; 
in fact, these techniques may foster the inefficiency in some cases, and 
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4) the Pigovian tax system fails to achieve optimal conditions 
because it lacks accountability for all costs imposed on others (pp.41-42). 
Notice, all of these arguments rely on some form of benefit/cost analysis. For 
instance, argument (3) implies that if government regulation proves more costly than 
the market (or some other mechanism like the courts) in rearranging legal rights, 
then government regulation achieves suboptimal results; otherwise, government 
regulation achieves optimal results. Hence, Coase is not necessarily a devout 
laissez-faire supporter, but rather a strict believer in benefit/cost analysis. 
Additionally, in contrast to popular belief, Coase strongly acknowledges the 
existence of positive transaction costs. Coase ( 1960, p.15) declares, •The argument 
has proceeded up to this point on the assumption ... that there were no costs involved 
in carrying out market transactions. This is, of course, a very unrealistic assumption.• 
Further, Coase (1960, on p.16) warns that the initial assignment of unilateral 
property rights matters when positive transaction costs exist. Coase's proposal 
asserts that when costly transactions exist, we must choose the least costly method 
for rearranging legal rights. And only a thorough benefit/cost analysis will reveal 
whether the decisions of courts, governments, or markets achieve a socially optimal 
arrangement of resources under different situations.4 Specifically, Coase (1960, 
p.44) concludes: 
4 Similarly, Calabresi (1968, p.69) remarks, " ... since transactions do cost money, and since 
substitutes for transactions, be they taxation, liability rules, or structural rules, are also not costless, 
the 'optimal' result is not necessarily the same as if transactions were costless. Whatever device is 
used, the question must be asked: Are its costs worth the benefits in better resource allocations it 
brings about or have we instead approached a false optimum by a series of games which are not 
worth the candles used?" 
,, 
It would clearly be desirable if the only actions performed were those in 
which what was gained was worth more than what was lost. But in 
choosing between social arrangements within the context of which 
individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that a change 
in the existing system which will lead to an improvement in some 
decisions may well lead to a worsening of others. Furthermore we · 
have to take into account the costs involved in operating the various 
social arrangements (whether it be the working of a market or of a 
government department), as well as the costs involved in moving to a 
new system. In devising and choosing between social arrangements 
we should have regard for the total effect. This, above all, is the 
change in approach which I am advocating. 
Subsequently, one finds room for extending the Coasian bargaining situation 
to include transaction costs and the intricacies involved in assigning unilateral 
property rights. Later, this thesis builds on Coase's ideas and incorporates positive 
transaction costs into a bilateral bargaining experiment, which adheres to the 
Coasian ideology of assigning unilateral property rights and allowing for side 




PREVIOUS STUDIES ON COASIAN BARGAINING 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Coase (1960) posited regardless of the 
initial assignment of property rights, two people will strike a bargain which is both 
Pareto-efficient and mutually advantageous, if bargaining remains costless. This 
represents what George Stigler first coined the ·coase theorem. •s For over three 
decades legal scholars, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and 
economists have debated the validity and robustness of this theorem. Many of these 
philosophers presented theoretical arguments against the theorem. However, 
starting with Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) and Prudencio (1982), much experimental 
work has found empirical support for the Coase theorem. In fact, Harrison, Hoffman, 
Rutstr6m, and Spitzer (1987, p. 388) remarked, • ... the Coase Theorem (1960) is 
behaviorally 'alive and well' in relatively sterile and abstract bargaining 
environments.• This note further investigates some of the theoretical and 
experimental arguments directed at relaxing one or more of the assumptions in the 
Coase theorem. 
In addition to zero transaction costs, Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) assert that 
the Coase theorem depends on a set of assumptions. The assumptions are: •(a) 
two agents to each externality (and bargain). (b) perfect knowledge of one another's 
(convex) production and profit or utility functions, (c) competitive markets, (d) zero 
transactions costs, (e) costless court system, (~profit-maximizing producers and 
expected utility-maximizing consumers, (g) no wealth effects, (h) agents will strike 
5 Coase (1988, p.174) cites George Stigler as the coiner of the term the "Coase theorem.• 
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mutually advantageous bargains in the absence of transactions costs• [Hoffman and 
Spitzer (1982, p. 73)]. Given a bargaining situation fulfills assumptions (a) through 
(g), the Coase theorem implies that the bargainers will act in accordance with 
assumption (h). Assumption (h) suggests two behavioral outcomes: (1) a weak 
behavioral outcome: the bargainers will reach a Pareto-efficient agreement and (2) 
a strong behavioral outcome: Pareto-efficient bargains will occur through a mutually 
advantageous agreement between the bargainers. Various analyses support the 
weak, strong, or neither behavioral outcome. For example, Hoffman and Spitzer 
(1982) , Prudencio (1982), and Shogren (1992) support the weak outcome while 
Harrison and McKee (1985) and Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) support the strong 
outcome. Note, the latter two analyses support both behavioral outcomes, since the 
strong outcome embodies the weak outcome. In a theoretical argument Regan 
(1972) supports neither behavioral outcome. Many of these arguments result from 
an investigation which relaxes one or more of the Coase theorem's assumptions. 
Therefore, a brief examination of assumptions (a) through (g) reveals the arguments 
for and against this theorem. 
a) two agents to each extemality seemingly limits the scope of the Coase 
theorem's applicability. Baumol (1972) and Baumol and Oates (1988) argue that 
most environmental problems (e.g., air and water pollution) involve large numbers of 
people. And while Coase (1960) finds Pigou's solution prohibitive based on 
enormous data requirements, one finds the Coasian approach impractical when 
large numbers make bargaining too costly and complex. For instance, Baumol 
(1972, p.321) notes, " .. . trading fails to take place not because it is prohibited, but 
because (as seems characteristic of our most important externalities problems in 
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reality) large numbers make trading virtually impossible to arrange (where have we 
seen automobile drivers pay one another to cut down their exhaust?).• 
Despite Baumol and Oates's strong arguments against the applicability of the 
Coase theorem, laboratory experimentation and real life experience indicate the 
potential usefulness of the Coase theorem. Through experimentation Hoffman and 
Spitzer (1986) find support for the Coase theorem in cases which involve up to thirty-
eight people. This brings life to the Coase theorem beyond the two party scenario. 
In fact , Hoffman and Spitzer list various situations where the Coasian approach may 
remain practical as a dispute resolution technique. The list includes: • ... landowner 
disputes involving rights to light and air, small nuisances, such as dog kennels, 
neighborhood aesthetics, such as ugly houses and funeral parlors, and contractual 
claims involving a number of people" [Hoffman and Spitzer (1986, p.162)]. 
Furthermore, outside the laboratory setting, Sedjo (1992) reveals a real life 
situation where Coasian bargaining is helping to preserve wild genetic resources. 
Sedjo notes that by restricting access and collection countries rich in natural genetic 
resources can establish collection rights. Interested user groups, such as 
pharmaceutical companies, can negotiate collection agreements with an endowed 
country. Collection agreements enable the endowed country to capture a share of 
the potential resource rents through compensation and royalties [for example, see 
Sedjo's ( 1992, p.209-210) discussion of a collection agreement between Costa Rica 
and Merck pharmaceutical firm]. And as modern technology reduces transaction 
costs, Coasian bargaining becomes more practical as a means to negotiate 
collection agreements. 
15 
Overall, although many environmental problems are large scale and prohibit 
the use of Coasian bargaining, still numerous problems remain solvable through 
Coasian bargaining. 
b) perfect knowledge of one another's utility functions implies that bargainers 
contain full or complete information. In a theoretical argument Samuelson (1985) 
finds this assumption unrealistic and asserts that Coasian bargaining cannot achieve 
Pareto-efficient results under partial or incomplete information. Past experimental 
work, however, opposes this claim. Upon a relaxation of the perfect information 
assumption experiments by Prudencio {1982) and Hoffman and Spitzer {1982) still 
support the weak behavioral outcome. 
c) competitive markets represent the economically decentralized nature of the 
Coase theorem. Individuals left alone will reach efficient and mutually advantageous 
resolutions to their disputes through negotiation. Some speculation exists whether 
or not the Cease theorem remains consistent with the economic definition of 
competition. Competition usually implies many market participants whom taken 
individually maintain no control over the market. This makes assumptions (a) and 
(c) contradictory; and furthermore, bargaining agreements depict collusion which is 
prohibited in competitive markets [Daly (1974) raises these points]. Moreover, one 
questions whether most bargaining experiments really fulfill assumption (c). Two 
participant bargains appear more characteristic of bilateral monopolies. 
Nevertheless, several Coasian experiments capture a competitive 
environment. First, Harrison, Hoffman, Rutstrom, and Spitzer [1987] (hereafter, 
HHRS) test the Coase theorem in a double-oral auction environment. Their 
experiment extends Charles Plott's ( 1983) centralized policy experiments to include 
the decentralized Coasian approach. To explain, Plott (1983), first, establishes that 
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an externality problem exists in his experimental market, then he compares three 
(centralized) corrective policies--Pigouvian tax, standard, and pollution licenses. 
Plott (1983) finds the licenses approach most efficient with a range of efficiency from 
88.4% to 99.6% over experimental periods. Likewise, HHRS (1987), first, replicate 
Plott's (1983) externality experiments and establish that an extemality problem 
exists. Then HHRS use a Coasian approach to correct the externality problem. In 
the end, HHRS find that the Coasian approach yields highly efficient results which 
are comparable to Plott's (1983) results. Thus, the Coasian approach may remain 
useful in some competitive markets. 
Shogren (1989 and 1994), also, test the Coase theorem in a competitive 
situation. Although Shogren's experiments do not necessarily represent a market 
with many buyers and sellers, his experiments create a competitive game situation 
where many, not just two, people are involved. To expound, Shogren (1989) uses 
team style Coasian bargains and Shogren (1994) implements Coasian bargaining 
under a tournament structure. Both experiments yield a high frequency (greater than 
83%) of mutually advantageous agreements, but neither experiment yields a high 
frequency of Pareto-efficient agreements. 
In short, though the above discussion does not rectify the conflict between 
assumptions (a) and (c), it is apparent that Coasian bargaining can produce efficient 
or mutually advantageous bargains in compet itive environments. 
d) zero transactions costs remain the most controversial assumption. Most 
people, especially Ronald Coase [see Section VI in Coase (1960)], realize that 
positive transactions costs exist in the •real world." While experiments which adhere 
to assumption {d) overwhelmingly produce efficient bargains [for example, see 
Hoffman and Spitzer (1982, 1985), Harrison and McKee (1985), or Shogren {1992)], 
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this result apparently does not hold when experiments incorporate costly 
transactions [see Shogren and Herriges (1994)]. Shogren and Herriges's (1994) 
costly transactions experiment does not support the weak behavioral outcome. 
Though this preliminary result casts doubt over the Coase theorem's ability to yield 
efficient solutions in the real world, not all is lost for Coasian bargaining. Silberberg 
(1978, on p.497) emphasizes that room for negotiation still exists if the gains from 
transacting exceed the costs, and bargainers can choose among various contracts 
the one which maximizes mutual benefits. In other words, the maximization problem 
for bargainers reduces to a choice among contracts. Moreover, one might develop a 
process or protocol system which helps bargainers choose or create a contract that 
achieves an efficient solution. A replication of Shogren and Herriges's (1994) 
experiment with a protocol system might recapture some of the efficiency losses. 
The current analysis, later, builds on this idea and investigates various protocol 
schemes. 
Overall, although basic economic theory predicts an incomplete exhaustion of 
the gains from trade when positive transaction costs exist [and Shogren and 
Herriges's (1994) experiment supports this outcome], a complete loss in efficiency 
and gains from trade is not always eminent. Despite Shogren and Herriges's (1994) 
findings, Coasian bargaining may still yield highly (not perfectly) efficient results and 
some type of protocol system might move bargainers on this semi-optimal path. 
e) costless court system implies perfect contract enforcement. Theoretical 
and experimental investigations into this assumption remain sparse. Shogren and 
Kask (1992) perform the only, known, experiment which tests this assumption. Upon 
a relaxation of assumption (e) Shogren and Kask (1992) find only moderate support 
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for the weak behavioral outcome and find almost no support for the strong 
behavioral outcome. 
f) profit-maximizing producers and expected utility-maximizing consumers 
suggest that Coasian bargainers are economically rational. Rationality represents 
one of the most basic behavioral assumptions found in mainstream economic theory. 
It embodies the notion that people prefer more to less of a good (except for bad 
goods like pollution). But, for reasons discussed more clearly in Section 4.1 of the 
current paper, past experimental work yields mixed opinions regarding the validity of 
the rationality assumption for Coasian bargainers. Many experiments [e.g., Hoffman 
and Spitzer (1982) or Shogren (1992)) report irrational behavior where bargainers 
accept less than mutually advantageous offers (or income maximization offers) . Still 
other experiments [e.g., Shogren (1989; 1994) or Harrison and McKee (1985)) yield 
rational behavior. Thus, while some experimental results question the validity of 
assumption (f) , others signify its validity. (Section 4.1 will address this controversy in 
more detail.) 
g) no wealth effects brings some stability to the Coase theorem when a 
change in legal rule occurs. The assumption means, as Coase (1988) describes, 
" .. . in a regime of zero transaction costs, the allocation of resources remains the 
same whatever the legal position regarding liability for harmful effects• (p.170). 
Previous debate over assumption (g)'s validity focuses not so much on the short run 
but in the long run. Hence, the following discussion presents some of the long run 
arguments. 
Two notable arguments favor assumption (g). Calabresi (1968) offers the first 
argument as follows: 
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.. . if one assumes no transaction costs--including no costs of excluding from 
the benefits the free loaders, that is, those who would gain from a bargain but 
who are unwilling to pay to bring it about--and if one assumes, as one must, 
rationality and no legal impediments to bargaining, Coases's analysis [no 
wealth effects regardless of liability rule] must hold for the long run as well as 
the short run. The reason is simply that (on the given assumptions) the same 
type of transactions which cured the short run misallocation would also occur 
to cure the long run ones (p.67, note that statement in first brackets is added 
for clarity). 
Nutter (1968) presents another argument, which, unlike Calabresi's (1968) 
argument, relies on the prior existence of economic rents. Through an arithmetic 
example, Nutter (1968) illustrates that a change in liability rule causes a change in 
economic rents, not a change in the allocation of resources (or distribution of 
wealth). Thus, "The necessary prior existence of rent ensures, then, that the Coase 
theorem applies to the long as well as the short run" [Nutter (1968, p.507)]. 
On the other hand, Regan (1972) finds fault with Calabresi's and Nutter's 
arguments and concludes that a wealth effect will occur from a change in legal rule. 
Regan's (1972) argument begins by asserting that a change in liability rule will alter 
participants' profits. To explain, some will no longer be required to pay damages, 
while others will begin to make side payments which they previously did not pay. 
This causes a disequilibrium (assuming a perfectly competitive equilibrium existed 
before the change in liability rule) as the former participants start to earn positive 
profits and the latter negative profits. The disequilibrium, in turn, sparks a movement 
of resources from the negative profit sector to the positive profit sector. Thus, Regan 
(1972, p.432) concludes, "In the long run, then, the allocation of resources will 
change." 
In brief, many theorists accept assumption (g) in the short run, but debate 
exists over its validity in the long run. No, recent, experimental work directly 
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addresses this debate. Future research might gain more insight through an 
experimental test of this assumption. 
Lastly, one might add an additional assumption: harmful threats are 
prohibited. Given Coasian bargaining requires cooperation, unrestricted threats 
could undermind the negotiation process and lead to a misallocation of resources. 
In fact, Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) assert that the Coase theorem fails once a threat 
is carried out. Another concern for threats in Coasian bargaining comes from 
Mumey (1971) who points out that threats are potential bribe (and hence, revenue) 
generators. And although a zero transactions costs world can communicate threats 
without costs and adverse effects on the allocation of resources, Mumey warns that 
the revenue generating power of threats could entice some bargainers to expend 
resources on the development of credible threats. This expenditure, in itself, 
represents a misuse of resources. Thus, one can see how the Coase theorem, 
without legal restrictions against threats, remains vulnerable. Partly for these 
reasons most Coasian experiments, including the current paper's experiments in 
Chapter 6, explicity warn experimental subjects that no physical threats are allowed. 
In sum , this chapter presented some of the theoretical and experimental work 
directed at the Coase theorem. Through a relaxation of one or more of the 
theorem's assumptions, each work investigated the ability of Coasian bargaining to 
achieve Pareto-efficient and mutually advantageous bargains. Aside from the 
inconclusive non-experimental debate, most of the experimental work supported at 
least one of the behavioral outcomes. In particular, the experimental results 
overwhelmingly supported the efficiency outcome, except in the case of positive 
transactions costs [see Shogren and Herriges (1994)). 
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CHAPTER 4: 
MAIN ISSUES IN BARGAINING EXPERIMENTS 
Game-theoretic models of bargaining predict solutions based on assumptions. 
Typically, the fulfillment of the assumptions leads to a particular outcome, or if many 
equilibriums (outcomes) exist then the most rational and economically efficient 
outcome prevails. Many experiments which try to test these normative theories, 
however, report anomalous results. For instance, contrary to the rational predictions 
of game theory, many experiments on ultimatum games yield equal splits [Thaler 
(1988)). Such results seem to either signal the •unrealistic• nature of the theory's 
assumptions or simply remain products of incorrectly designed experiments. 
Overall, this chapter does not attempt to support or oppose the predictions of 
game theory, rather it reviews some of the issues which persist in many bargaining 
experiments. Section 4.1 reviews the lengthy debate over why equal splits dominate 
many bargaining experiments. Focal points remain the subject of Section 4.2 . 
Next, a discussion of expectations follows in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 discusses how 
risk aversion affects bargains. Lastly, Section 4.5 digresses and presents a less 
common issue, called cheap talk, which exhibits promising qualities as a bargaining 
protocol. 
4.1 Equal Splits and the Fairman-Gamesman Debate 
Mainstream economic theory assumes that individuals are income 
maximizers and as such any rational individual prefers more income to less income. 
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In light of this rationality assumption, game theory predicts that individuals will 
bargain to a mutually advantageous agreement. To illustrate, in terms of ultimatum 
games, theory predicts that the proposer will offer a minimal amount to the receiver 
who, in turn, will accept.6 More precisely, if we assume the disagreement outcome 
pays nothing to both players, then surely the receiver (if rational) will accept any 
offer, c, greater than nothing. Moreover, the proposer realizes this situation; and 
hence, rationalizes that he or she can obtain virtually all of the distribution (say $1) 
as long as c > $0. This yields a perfect equilibrium outcome. Similarly, in bilateral 
Coasian bargains, if a unilateral property rights (UPR) holder (called the controller) 
can obtain a certain payoff (known as an outside option), without consent from the 
noncontroller; then theory predicts that the controller will not settle for any agreement 
which leaves him or her worse off than the outside option [see Hoffman and Spitzer 
{1982)).7 Nevertheless, past experimental results deviate from these predictions. 
Players tend to settle for equal splits which typically leaves one player worse off. In 
the ultimatum game, an equal split leaves the proposer worse off than the perfect 
equilibrium outcome, and in the Coasian bargain, this leaves the controller worse off 
than the outside option, assuming the outside option pays more than the equal split 
outcome. Thus, in contrast to theoretical predictions, bargainers fail to achieve 
mutually advantageous agreements. 
6 Typically, the ultimatum game entails two players whom try to divide an amount of money, say M. 
One player (the proposer) offers an amount, c, to the other player (the receiver) . If the receiver 
accepts this offer, then the proposer receives M-c and the receiver acquires c. But if the receiver 
rejects the offer then both players get nothing. 
7 Note, Hoff~an and Spitzer (1982) design their experiment so that the outside option pays $11 or 
$12 ~epen?rng on whether player A or player B, respectively, is the controller. Additionally, the 
outside option le~ve~ ~Oto th~ noncontroller in both cases. However, through side payments the 
players can obtain a 1ornt-rnax1mum of $14. Thus, an equal split , which is Pareto-efficient, pays $7 to 
both players. 
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At the center of th is paradoxical result looms a question of fairness. In 
particular, some researchers conclude that equal splits represent a clear preference 
for fairness while other researchers refute the fairness explanation and, instead, 
offer other explanations. Hence, a diversity of opinion exists, and it remains prudent 
to discuss these opinions. This discussion begins with the supporting arguments for 
fairness. Secondly, a discussion of dissenting views follows. Lastly, the discussion 
investigates views which neither reject nor accept the fairness theory. 
The fairness explanation primarily retains its origin in the work •An 
Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining" by Guth, Schmittberger, and 
Schwarze [1982] (hereafter, GSS). GSS compare the results of "easy• games and 
"complicated" games. The easy game essentially represents a 2-person ultimatum 
game where player 1 (the proposer or allocator) declares an amount, a1, for 
him/herself. This leaves an amount M-a1• where M > O is the amount to be divided 
among the two players, for player 2 (the receiver). If player 2 accepts then player 1 
receives a1 and player 2 receives M-a1; otherwise, both players receive nothing. 
Similarly, the complicated game retains the same basic structure as the easy games; 
except, the calculation of demands (and hence, the rational decision behavior) 
remains more compl icated. Player 1 must decide how to divide 5 black and 9 white 
chips where each chip is worth DM2 (OM stands for the German currency, deutsche 
mark) for player 1, for player 2 each black chip and white chip is worth DM2 and 
OM 1, respectively. Moreover, player 1 's decision requires the proposal of two 
bundles, I and II. Player 2 chooses between bundle I and II which leaves the 
unchosen bundle for player 1. 
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The results of these experiments show a clear deviation from rational 
behavior. In the easy games players tend to settle towards an equal split. Further, 
player 2 tends to reject high demands by player 1. GSS ( 1982, p.384) state that, 
• ... subjects often rely on what they consider a fair or justified result. Furthermore, the 
ultimatum aspect cannot be completely exploited since subjects do not hesitate to 
punish if their opponent asks for too much.•s Additionally, the authors find that 
player 1 exhibits more rational behavior in complicated games than in easy games. 
They reason that this result adds further support to their fairness claim. GSS 
(1982, pp. 381-382) conclude, •This indicates that the subjects did not deviate from 
the optimal behavior because of their difficulties in solving the game. The main 
reason seems to be that the rational solution is not considered as socially acceptable 
or fair." Thaler ( 1988, p.197) upon reviewing the GSS paper among several other 
papers, offers additional insight as follows: 
Both the Allocators and the recipients take actions inconsistent with the 
theory ... When a Recipient declines a positive offer, he signals that his 
utility function has non-monetary arguments ... The actions of the 
Allocators could be explained by either of two motives (or some 
combination of both). Allocators who make significantly positive offers 
could either have a taste for fairness, and /or could be worried that 
unfair offers will be (rationally or mistakenly) rejected. Further 
experiments reveal that both explanations have some validity. 
8 In the realm of public goods provision, one finds some similarities. Van Dijk and Grodzka (1992) 
conduct an experiment involving asymmetric endowments and information levels. They find that 
subjects informed about the asymmetry consider it fair for High Endowment members to contribute 
more than Low Endowment members. This treatment shows some similarities with GSS's easy game 
experiments. GSS's experiments incorporate complete information which resembles van Dijk and 
Grodzka's informed situation. Additionally, the proposer, in ultimatum (easy) games, maintains a 
higher endowment than the receiver since the proposer commands a favorable position. This 
illustrates a similarity between the proposer and the High Endowment member. Given these 
situational similarities, one draws an analogous conclusion. Both appear willing to forego high 
amounts, and fairness seems to explain this willingness. Though these experiments maintain some 
similarities, a direct analogy remains dangerous because both rely on different theories. 
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Therefore, one sees the possible importance of nonmonetary influences (such 
as fairness) on bargaining environments. Indeed, Roth (1988, p.988) notes: • ... the 
uniformity, with which 'disadvantageous counterproposals' have appeared in the 
experiments to date, in contrast to their otherwise quite varied results, suggests that 
bargaining may be an activity that systematically gives bargainers motivations 
distinct from simple income maximisation.• 
Although many researchers acknowledge the importance of nonmonetary 
influences, many remain skeptical that fairness explains the phenomenon of equal 
splits. This skepticism ranges from a partial to complete rejection of the significance 
of fairness. In regards to partial rejection, Kravitz and Gunto (1992) hypothesize that 
a fear of rejection remains more influential than fairness in determining offers in 
ultimatum bargains. Kravitz and Gunto assert that bargainers perceive equal splits 
as fair.9 Thereupon, bargainers realize extreme offers, as predicted by game 
theory, will be rejected. This leads to two nonexcludable results. First, proposers 
find that their expected value reaches a maximum near more equitable offers. 
Secondly, proposers make more equitable offers because they fear rejection, not 
because they adhere to a strict social norm of fairness. 
Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), however, displace the fairness explanation. They 
attribute equal splits to a lack of earned and morally justified property rights. 
Specifically, the authors expand their earlier work, Hoffman and Spitzer (1982), on 
Coasian bargaining where the authors report 89.5% of the bargains exhibit Pareto-
optimality but approximately 60.8% of these bargains are either equal splits or within 
9 Note, t~e. wo~d "perceive• does not imply "believe.• For instance, the proposer may not believe an 
equal split 1s fair; but nevertheless, the proposer may perceive that his or her opponent believes an 
equal split is fair. 
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$1 from an equal split. to Subsequently, Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) seek to explain 
why this non-rational (or non-self-regarding) behavior occurs.11 First, the authors call 
for more competitive methods than a coin-flip in designating the UPR holder.12 In 
response, they posit that a game-trigger (in particular, the authors use a hash mark 
game) creates a heighten notion of earned property rights. Moreover, the authors 
call for moral justification in assigning property rights. They assert that the use of 
moral authority instructions (for instance, they use the words •earns the right• 
instead of •is designated• in the experimental instructions) conveys the notion of a 
morally justified UPR holder. Ultimately, the authors find that the game-trigger/moral 
authority experiments yield more rational behavior than the coin-flip/no moral 
authority experiments [the latter situation replicates Hoffman and Spitzer (1982)). 
The game-trigger/moral authority experiments give the UPR holder at least his 
individual maximum in 68% of the bargains whereas the coin-flip/no moral authority 
experiments yield approximately 27%. This implies that the former treatment 
stimulates controllers to make more self-regarding offers, while the latter treatment 
produces controllers whom make relatively higher offers than game theory would 
predict. Consequently, Hoffman and Spitzer (1985, p.261) conclude that: "The 
results suggest that subjects behaved in accord neither with the self-regarding 
10 These results represent irrational behavior. Recall, Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) design their 
experiment so that the controller (if player B) can take an outside option which pays him or her $12. 
But the equal split payoff only yields $7 to the controller. Thus, the controller irrationally foregoes 
($12 - $7=) $5 when he or she agrees to an equal split . 
~ 1 ~ltematively._ Harrison and McKee (1985) offer another response to Hoffman and Spitzers (1982) 
1rrat1onal behavioral results. For example, Harrison and McKee (1985, p.656) state, "we find that the 
comparable Hoffman-Spitzer results that are inconsistent with individual rationality are attributable to 
a lack of understanding by certain subjects of the meaning of UPR. • 
12 In .Hoffman and .~Pitzer (1982) the controller was determined by a coin flip. Clearly, this procedure 
remains uncompet1t1ve. 
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utilitarian theory nor with the egalitarian theory of distributive justice, but rather in 
accord with the Lockean theory of earned desert.•13 
To continue, Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith [1994] (hereafter, 
HMSS) combine the UPR ideas of Coasian bargaining with anonymity. Many 
ultimatum game experiments employ between-subject anonymity. The hypothesis is 
that anonymity controls for nonmonetary factors, such as fairness and subjects' 
preferences. Though between-subject anonymity helps control subjects' 
preferences, the proposer, still, maintains strategic expectations about his/her 
opponent's reservation value. t4 Subsequently, proposers might find that they can 
maximize their expected value if they make more equitable offers [for example, see 
Kravitz and Gunto (1992)]. Given this complication, HMSS, following the lead of 
Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton (1994] (hereafter, FHSS), look towards 
dictator games as a remedy. In theory, dictator games should control for strategic 
expectations since the receiver cannot reject any offer. Nonetheless, HMSS, in 
accordance with FHSS, report the occurrence of equal splits. At this point, HMSS 
posit that additional nonmonetary factors influence the bargains. First, in connection 
13 Another interpretation arises if one draws an analogy between this experiment and another 
experiment conducted by van Dijk and Wilke (1993) . Van Oijk and Wilke study the effects of 
asymmetric interest on the provision of public goods. Participants have either a high or low interest in 
a public good. These levels of interest are either Justified or Not Justified. Justification requires an 
asymmetry of effort or input, while the Not Justified condition results from a symmetry of effort or 
input. The experimental results show that High-interest members only contribute more than Low-
interest members in Not Justified conditions, for no differences occur in Justified conditions. These 
results parallel Hoffman and Spitzer's (1985) findings. To explain, the game-trigger/moral authority 
treatment (Treat 1} might emphasize an asymmetry of effort or knowledge and the coin flip/no moral 
authority treatment (Treat 2) might imply a symmetry of effort (for each participant has a 50% chance 
of being controller}. Thus, the controller-noncontroller relationship seems justified in Treat 1 and it 
appears not justified in Treat 2. This means the controller's action (make a small offer} in Treat 1 
parallels the High-interest member's action (contribute less} in the Justified condition. Likewise, the 
controller's action (make a high offer} in Treat 2 parallels the High-interest member's action 
(contribute more} in the Not Justified condition. Therefore, we might reinterpret Hoffman and Spitzer's 
(1985} results as follows: self-regarding behavior occurs only when UPR assignments are justified. 
14 The reservation value represents an amount for which the opponent (receiver} bases his or her 
decisio.ns. To illustrate, if an offer exceeds the reservation value then the opponent accepts; 
otherwise, the opponent rejects the offer. 
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with Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), HMSS propose the inclusion of earned, morally 
justified unilateral property rights. The authors use a knowledge quiz whereupon the 
subject with the highest score obtains the UPR, and the experimental instructions 
emphasize the rights of the UPR holder. Additionally, the authors hypothesize that 
the subject-experimenter relationship indirectly places expectational considerations 
on the subjects. For instance, subjects •may be concerned about appearing greedy 
and being judged so by the experimenter• [HMSS, p.349] In response, the authors 
suggest the use of Double Blind dictator experiments which ensure subject-
experimenter, as well as between-subject, anonymity. In sum, HMSS primarily study 
two types of experiments--an anonymous dictator experiment with contest UPR 
assignment and a Double Blind dictator experiment. These experiments illustrate 
the fact that the authors refute the fairness hypothesis; and instead, attribute equal 
splits to a lack of: (1) anonymity, (2) properly justified property rights, and (3) control 
over subjects' expectations. 
Overall, the results of these experiments refute the fairness hypothesis. Both 
the anonymous dictator experiment with contest UPR assignment and the Double 
Blind dictator experiment show a significant occurrence of self-regarding (rational) 
behavior. Moreover, the Double Blind dictator experiment yields a high frequency of 
self-regarding offers; it yields 67% $0 offers and 84% $0 or $1 offers. As a result, 
HMSS (1994, pp. 371) conclude: 
These Double Blind dictator results (which, so far, are robust), imply 
that the outcomes in both dictator and ultimatum games should be 
modeled not primarily in terms of other-regarding preferences (or 
'fairness') but primarily in terms of expectations--either explicit strategic 
expectations as in ultimatum games, or implicit concern for what the 
experimenter (or others) might think or do in dictator games. These 
Double Blind experimental results are inconsistent with any notion that 
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the key to understanding experimental bargaining outcomes is to be 
found in subjects' autonomous, private, other-regarding preferences. 
Thus far, the discussion illustrates experiments which either advocate fairness 
or refute fairness. Some experiments imply that bargainers act more like •fairmen· 
than •gamesmen." In contrast, other experiments attempt to disprove the fairmens 
claim in favor of the gamesmen explanation, as theory predicts. Thaler ( 1988, 
p.205), however, sees this as the wrong approach and states: 
In some experiments most Allocators choose even splits, in others 
most choose the game-theoretic allocation. Future research should 
investigate the factors that produce each kind of behavior, rather than 
attempt to demonstrate that one type of behavior or the other 
predominates. 
Shogren (1989, p.320) answers Thaler's plea: "Realistically, the majority of 
individuals will have a threshold of loyalty which separates the fairman from the 
gamesman, in each of us. Explaining this threshold will improve the correspondence 
between theory and observed phenomena." To expound, Shogren uses team 
Coasian Bargains where each team contains seven members. Each team member 
bargains individually with an opponent from another team. During each bilateral 
bargain, each player tries to score points for his/her team. In the end, the team with 
the most points wins a large reward, while the losing team wins a small reward. ts 
Overall, this experimental design attempts to control for loyalty. It allows one to 
examine whether the bargainer's loyalty resides with the opponent or with the team. 
The experimental results, overwhelmingly, support the latter. 85.7% of the 
15 For a further explanation on experimental design, see Shogren (1989). 
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agreements are mutually advantageous while only 4.8% are equal splits. 
Subsequently,. Shogren (1989, p.322) concludes that 
... by explicitly defining a group with which the individual can attach his 
loyalties, experimental evidence is considerably more consistent with 
theory. The individual is fair not to the opposing player, but to his 
team. Clearly, fairness requires a context based on a definition of 
loyalty. 
Moreover, the institutional structure within which bargains take place may 
explain why some bargains yield equal splits while others produce more rational 
outcomes [Shogren (1994) motivates this argument]. For instance, Roth (1988) 
notes that equal splits occur more frequently in face-to-face bargains than in 
anonymous bargains. He offers two possible hypotheses for this difference. One 
hypothesis suggests that the difference occurs because nonmonetary incentives 
affect face-to-face bargains more than anonymous bargains. The second 
hypothesis is as follows: "Face-to-face bargaining also allows many more channels 
of communication (e.g. tone of voice and facial expression) than does anonymous 
bargaining in which subjects may be restricted to written messages, and perhaps the 
differences are due to this" (p. 990). Though both hypotheses contain some truths 
about face-to-face bargains, several experiments illustrate situations where face-to-
face bargains yield a low frequency of equal splits [e.g., see Harrison and McKee 
(1985), Shogren (1989; 1994), and Shogren and Herriges (1994)). 
In one experiment, Shogren and Herriges (1994) report a low frequency of 
equal splits in an experiment which incorporates greater monetary incentives than 
previous face-to-face bargaining experiments. To explain, subjects bargain face-to-
face in pairs over the chances to win a 1 o token reward (valued at $0.50 per token) 
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in a binary lottery. And similar to other Coasian bargaining experiments one of the 
subjects (the controller) maintains an outside option. The experimental design 
creates a heighten awareness for monetary incentives by requiring the subjects to 
contribute to the reward--the controller, noncontroller, and house (experimental 
monitor) must contribute 5, 1, and 4 tokens, respectively. Additionally, bargaining 
remains costly. The 1 O token reward shrinks as bargaining time elapses. In the 
end, Shogren and Herriges's results show that only 22% (50 out of 228) of all 
bargains were either a 50-50 split or within 50-50 by +/- 10%. 
Another experiment which reports a low frequency of equal splits in face-to-
face bargains is by Shogren (1994). Similar to Shogren's (1989) team style 
bargains, Shogren (1994) creates a highly competitive atmosphere. Specifically, 
subjects bargain under a tournament structure. The tournament contains five rounds 
and begins with 32 subjects divided equally into two draws. Through an elimination 
process, the sole survivor from each draw meet in the fifth round to decide the 
overall winner. t6 The results of the experiment indicate an overwhelming tendency 
for rational self-interested bargains. 84% of the bargaining agreements were rational 
while equal splits comprised only 4% of all agreements.11 Thus, one sees the 
importance of institutional structure in bargaining. It may explain why certain 
bargains end in equal splits while others achieve more mutually advantageous 
outcomes. And for the case of face-to-face bargains, Shogren (1994, p. 5) argues, 
"Rationality in face-to-face bargains exists in institutional structures that support 
rather than punish such behavior." 
16 Consult Shogren {1994) for details on the experimental design. 
17 Note, t.hese results conincide with Shogren's (1989) team experiments, where rational behavior 
occurred in 85.7% of all bargains and equal splits comprised only 4.8% of the bargains. 
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To summarize, this section reviews the fairman-gamesman debate in 
bargaining experiments. The review indicates that many experiments report equal 
splits, but still others yield mutually advantageous agreements. The former 
experiments do not prove bargainers are strict fairmen any more than do the latter 
experiments prove that people strictly behave as gamesmen. Clearly, people exhibit 
both behaviors and a more descriptive approach might explain the conditions which 
produce one or the other behavior. is 
4.2 Focal Points 
"Focal points" describe another issue in bargaining experiments. They 
represent any identifiable solution which coordinates bargainers' behavior or 
expectations [Roth (1985b} and Schelling (1960)). Focal points can significantly 
affect the outcome in bargaining [Roth (1985b}]. For example, Ashenfelter, Currie, 
Farber, and Spiegel [1992] (hereafter, ACFS) find that when bargainers are pushed 
off an established focal point, the number of disagreements increases. Additionally, 
one might argue that the high frequency of equal splits in bargaining experiments 
illustrates a focalness for 50-50 splits. And though a 50-50 split usually remains 
unfavorable for one of the bargainers (recall section 4.1 ), it coordinates the 
bargainers' decisions. In general, Schelling (1960, p.60) notes," ... among all the 
available options, some particular one usually seems to be the focal point for 
coordinated choice, and the party to whom it is a relatively unfavorable choice quite 
often takes it simply because he knows that the other will expect him to.• This is not 
18 Sh.ogren. and Herriges (1994) and Shogren and Kask (1992) also note that bargaining experiments 
can yield middle ground agreements, called contrained self-interest agreements, where neither equal 
splits nor rational behavior dominates. 
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to say that a focal point guides all bargaining behavior nor does it advocate that all 
bargainers with a favorable position (e.g., the controller in Coasian bargains) 
concede to a less favorable outcome. Any particular type of bargaining (e.g., 
unstructured or structured) may yield various results when it is conducted under 
different conditions. In brief, the main point of this section notes the potential role of 
focal points in bargaining experiments; not that noticeable focal points always exist 
and explain bargaining outcomes. 
4.3 Expectations in Negotiations 
Different views exist over the importance of expectations in bargaining. And 
this section briefly reviews some of the supporting and opposing arguments. 
Ashenfelter and Currie (1990) offer divergent expectations as one cause of 
disputes in bargaining. Indeed, Schelling (1960, p. 70) proposes that " .. . explicit 
bargaining requires, for an ultimate agreement, some coordination of the 
participants' expectations." Such conjectures represent the heart of the expectations 
argument. They suggest that participants typically enter bargains with different 
expectations. The diversity might range from different expected strategies to 
different expected outcomes. Whatever the source, successful negotiation requires 
management of participants' expectations [Miller and Colosi (1989)]. Thus far, the 
argument establishes convergent expectations as a prerequisite for agreement in 
bargains. Several economic experiments expand this argument to include 
expectations as a significant variable in determining the outcome of bargains. 
First, Roth and Schoumaker (1983) conducted an experiment where the 
participants' expectations were manipulated through experience and reputation. To 
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explain, subjects bargained over the chances to win a reward in a binary lottery. The 
subjects were divided into three groups: subjects in group 1 initially bargained with a 
computer which was programmed to promote a 20-80 division of lottery tickets, 
subjects in group 2 initially bargained with a computer which was programmed to 
promote a 50-50 split, and subjects in group 3 (the control group) never bargained 
with a commuter.19 After 15 trials participants in groups 1 and 2 bargained, for 10 
more trials, with various people from their group. Additionally, each player's 
performance (i.e., reputation) from trials 11 through 15 was displayed in the 15th 
tria1.20 Overall , the experimenters theorized that expectations maintained no impact 
on bargaining outcomes if the bargains from all three groups converged over time, 
after trial 15. This hypothesis was rejected. The experimental results showed a 
divergence in bargaining agreements--agreements in group 1 consistently produced 
20-80 splits, agreements in group 2 clustered around 50-50 splits, and agreements 
in the control group consistently fell between the results in groups 1 and 2. Thus, 
the experimenters concluded that expectations influenced the outcomes. 
Furthermore, Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith [1993] (hereafter, HMS) offer 
experimental evidence which supports the importance of expectations in bargaining. 
In particular, they replicate HMSS's (1994) dictator experiments with one minor 
difference.21 Unlike the HMSS experiment, HMS add the following two lines to the 
proposer's experimental instructions: "Before making your choice consider what 
choice you expect the buyer to make. Also consider what you think the buyer 
expects you to choose." Note, the statements attempt to directly affect the 
19 The subjects in groups 1 and 2 were never told that they bargained with a computer program. 
20 Note, subjects did not know, a priori, that their reputations would be displayed in trial 15. 
21 Recall the discuss of HMSS {1994) in Section 4.1. 
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proposer's strategic expectations about his or her opponent's behavior (i:e., 
reservation value). In contrast to HMSS's results which report a high percentage of 
economically rational outcomes, the HMS results show a high tendency for equal 
splits. HMS (1993, p.12) conclude, •These results shed further light on our 
hypothesis that the Nash equilibrium in the ultimatum game is a function of the 
expectations of proposers regarding the behavior of counterparts. •22 
Although the previous discussion advocates the importance of expectations in 
bargaining, an opposing view exists. Specifically, in bargaining models with private 
information, Kennan and Wilson (1993) refute the importance of expectations in 
bargaining. They state, • ... divergent expectations are predicted and explained by 
private information--and found to be inconsequential, ... • (p. 91 ). To explain, this view 
asserts that divergent expectations arise not from a direct difference between 
expected and actual payoffs, but from a difference in information which bargainers, 
in turn, use to calculate their expectations. Hence, the key to bargaining agreements 
lies in a convergence of bargainers' private information, not a convergence of 
bargainers' expectations. This raises the question of how can bargainers reduce the 
information disparity. 
As a preliminary note, Plott and Sunder (1988, p. 1116) assert that Msome sort 
of knowledge of others' preferences appears to be a necessary condition for 
aggregation of diverse information." This adds another dimension: how do 
participants reveal their preferences to one another? Actually, it does not matter 
whether bargainers try to convey preferences or information, most communication 
techniques apply to both. For instance, if a buyer only owns $1 .00 and a seller 
22 Note, also, H~SS ~1994) att~ibute .their rational b~havior results to expectations. Specifically, they 
assert_ t~at barga!ners expectations, if left unconstrained, explain the phenomenon of 50-50 splits in 
bargaining experiments. 
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desires $1.15, explicit communication could reveal either the seller's preference for 
$1.15, the buyers private information of $1 .00, or both. Thus, the following 
discussion of communication techniques does not remain excludable to either 
preferences or information disclosure. 
To continue, several methods exist for disseminating information. Kennan 
and Wilson (1993) advocate the use of delays as a credible method for 
communicating private information. Indeed, many real life negotiators use delays as 
a means to convey their bargaining positions (e.g., reservation values). Some of the 
more visible examples of bargaining delays include teacher union strikes, holdouts 
by professional football players in contract disputes, and the walkout by United 
States air traffic controllers in the early 1980's. Though delays are widely used in 
many real life negotiations, many times delay proves too costly and inefficient. For 
example, some holdouts end in a loss of jobs without mutual gains from bargaining 
realized, as in the case when President Ronald Reagan fired the United States air 
traffic controllers in 1981. 
Actually, this issue remains central to the experiment which the current paper 
analyzes. As discussed in chapter 6, subjects bargain over the chances (i.e., 
probabilities) to win a reward in a binary lottery. The bargainers are given a time 
limit of five minutes and as the bargaining time elapses the reward shrinks. In fact, 
the reward shrinks to nothing within five minutes. Thus, in situations like this where 
transaction costs remain high, delay may not remain an efficient way to 
communicate private information.23 Instead, bargainers may want to disseminate 
information more directly through explicit communication. Explicit communication of 
23 As a theoretical note, Hessel (1981) develops a bargaining model which describes when delay is 
and is not beneficial. Specifically, delay remains disadvantageous if continued bargaining causes 
strong payo!f _deterioration. (i.e.! hig~ bargaining costs}. Alternatively, delay may be advantageous if 
payoffs exhibit weak deterioration (1.e., low bargaining costs) over time. 
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each other's reservation value or preferences may prove less costly than delays in 
converging information. 
In sum, two opposing views exist over the importance of expectations in 
bargaining. One view maintains that bargaining agreements occur through a 
convergence of expectations. On the other hand, the second view suggests that 
expectations arise from information; and thus, bargaining agreements require a 
convergence of private information, not expectations. Both theories remain 
plausible. For example, one might arguably explain Roth and Schoumaker's (1983) 
experimental results as a product of diverse information. Participants in each 
treatment apparently formed their expectations through experience and information 
about each other's reputation. Conversely, HMS's (1993) experimental design 
shows how expectations can change without private information. Through a minor 
change in the wording of the experimental instructions, HMS observed a change in 
bargaining outcomes. Thus, both private information and expectations seem to 
affect bargainers' behavior.24 
Moreover, at a higher level, information and expectations may combine to 
shape bargainers' perceptions. In turn, bargainers' perceptions might represent the 
final link to bargaining agreements. Thompson (1990, p.518) notes: "The 
perception process is constructive and selective; that is, perception is influenced by 
the salience of information and the order in which information is presented, as well 
as by perceivers' expectations, knowledge, and experience. Finally, people's 
perceptions influence their behavior." Subsequently, bargainers, more likely than 
24 
An experime_nt which impliments the ideas of Kennan and Wilson (1993} and HMS (1993) might 
prove co~s!ructlve., here. ~pecifically, one could design an experiment (e.g., a factorial design) which 
~ave p~rt1c1pants different. information about their opponent's payoffs and included different "thought" 
~nstruct1ons to each b~rga1ner. In the end, this experiment's results might offer more insight into the 
influences of expectations and private information in bargaining. 
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not, make decisions on the basis of a multitude of factors, not just expectations and 
private information. 
4.4 Risk Aversion 
Risk aversion plays a potential role in bargaining. Axiomatic and strategic 
models of bargaining predict that risk aversion remains disadvantageous [Roth 
(1985c)]. Specifically, an inverse relationship exists between a bargainer's degree of 
risk aversion and rewards earned in negotiated agreements. Roth {1985c) proves 
this conjecture and formally offers the following theorem: • ... more risk averse 
bargainers get a smaller share at equilibrium than do less risk averse bargainers in 
the same situation" (p. 208). 
As a test of this theorem, Murnighan, Roth, and Schoumaker (1 987) conduct 
experiments where a more risk averse person anonymously bargains, via a 
computer, with a less risk averse person. The experimental results support the 
game-theoretic predictions which Roth's theorem embodies. In general, it may be 
reasonable to assume that people make choices in the Nreal world• based on their 
attitudes towards risk. Steven N.S. Cheung {1969) shows that attitudes towards risk 
help explain the observed contractual choices made between landowners and non-
landowners (such as tenants and farm hands) in China's agricultural sector.25 
Moreover, in so far as face-to-face bargains depict real world bargaining 
environments more accurately than do anonymous bargains, Farber, Neale, and 
Bazerman (1990) find, through face-to-face bargaining experiments, that bargainers' 
25 Additionally, Cheung (1969) adds transaction costs to the argument. He states, " ... the choice of 
contrac!ual arrange~ent is made so as to maximize the gain from risk dispersion subject to the 
constraint of transaction costs• (p. 25). Thus, transaction costs (if present) and risk preferences 
interact to shape bargaining behavior. 
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risk levels affect negotiated settlements-· ... the outcome tends to favor the less risk-
averse party• (p. 380). 
Thus, each bargainer's attitude towards risk may help shape his or her 
decisions. For example, rather than strive for a higher payoff with uncertain 
success, a risk averse person may seek a lower payoff with greater certainty. 
4.5 Cheap Talk 
The previous four sections discuss issues which arise in many bargaining 
experiments. The issues do not always represent an artifact of the experimental 
design. Some of them enter through social factors [e.g., focal points, as Roth (1987) 
notes] while others represent individual attitudes (e.g., risk aversion). Now, the 
discussion digresses somewhat and presents a less common issue, called cheap 
talk, which is an artifact of bargaining experiments by design. Recent theoretical and 
experimental work shows that cheap talk can offer an effective way to help 
bargainers reach agreements. Hence, the current analysis remains interested in 
cheap talk as a viable bargaining protocol. Chapter 6 explains how this paper 
incorporates cheap talk into its experiment. But for now the exposition defines 
cheap talk, explains its role in bargaining, and discusses some theoretical and 
procedural notes on cheap talk. 
By definition cheap talk is a form of explicit communication which allows 
bargainers to send costless, nonbinding, payoff irrelevant, nonverifiable messages 
[see Farrell (1987) or Gibbons (1992)]. Such messages can play two roles in 
bargaining--a signaling and coordination role [Crawford (1990) and Farrell (1987)]. 
When bargainers have private information, cheap talk can help signal this 
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information in a costless manner. Here, cheap talk is costless in the sense that it 
does not directly affect the bargainers' payoffs. Whereas costly signals (e.g., costly 
delays or payoff relevant actions) directly affect the bargainers' payoffs, cheap talk 
messages (signals) are simply talk which can (only) directly affect the bargainers' 
beliefs; however, if these beliefs (in tum) affect the bargainers' actions, then cheap 
talk can indirectly affect payoffs [see Gibbons (1992, Chapter 4)]. As for the 
coordination role, cheap talk can help coordinate bargainers' actions in games of 
complete information. Recent experimental work by Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and 
Ross (1989) shows that cheap talk helps resolve the coordination problem in the 
"Battle of the Sexes" game. Additionally, Farrell (1987) illustrates how cheap talk 
can coordinate the actions of potential entrants into a natural-monopoly industry. 
Following the works of Farrell (1987), Farrell and Gibbons (1989), and 
Cooper, De Jong, Forsythe, and Ross (1989), the current paper treats cheap talk as: 
(i) costless, pre-bargaining communication where (ii) the communication enters via 
one or more rounds of simultaneous announcements by the bargainers.26 The 
announcements might reveal the bargainers' strategies, reservation prices, 
preferences, or other demands. Once the last round of costless communication 
ends, the bargainers engage in serious, binding negotiations. 
Given cheap talk represents a costless mode of communication, one sees a 
potential usefulness for cheap talk in costly bargains. To explain, first, specify formal 
bargaining as being costly over time. This is not an unreasonable specification since 
many "real life" bargainers encounter real time transaction costs, such as lawyer's 
fees and child care expenses. Second, specify preplay (informal) bargaining as 
being nonbinding and free (i.e., cheap talk). Informal bargaining (specified as cheap 
26 Kreps (1990, ~hapter 12). also, treats cheap talk as costless, pre-bargaining communication, but 
he does not specify how the communication takes place. 
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talk, here) illustrates the situation where future bargainers meet, under informal 
conditions without their lawyers and other financial obligations, prior to formal 
negotiation proceedings. For example, if two future bargainers plan to start formal 
negotiations three weeks from today, then an informal meeting, within three weeks 
from today, can allow the bargainers to send costless, nonbinding, nonverifiable 
messages. These cheap talk messages might, in some cases, lead the bargainers 
to a settlement before the formal negotiations begin. In other cases, the cheap talk 
messages may elicit a priori information and coordination which leads bargainers to 
a quick (and hence, less costly) settlement once formal negotiations begin. 
Naturally, it may also be the case that cheap talk exerts no effect on the bargaining 
process. The former two scenarios make cheap talk a potentially useful protocol 
scheme for costly bargains. If cheap talk can reduce transaction costs (e.g., reduce 
time consuming fact finding activities and coordination costs), then maybe cheap talk 
can stimulate more efficient bargains. Subsequently, the current paper seeks to take 
the game theoretic concept of cheap talk and experimentally test its usefulness in 
stimulating efficient bargains when formal negotiations contain positive transaction 
costs. 27 But before one proceeds with a cheap talk bargaining experiment, a brief 
review of two articles helps clarify the mechanics of cheap talk. 
To start, Farrell and Gibbons (1989) derive a bargaining model which uses 
one round of cheap talk. In the model cheap talk is restricted to a simultaneous 
announcement of "keen" or "not keenM by each bargainer. "Keen" implies that a 
bargainer is willing to participate in serious and meaningful negotiations. And •not 
keen" implies the opposite of "keen". Overall, Farrell and Gibbons claim that 
27 ~?reover, it may not ~emain unreasonable to assume that cheap talk bargainers will make rational 
dec1s1ons. Fa~rell an~ _G1_bbo~s (1989)_ and Gibbons (1992, Chapter 4) show that cheap talk leads to a 
perfect Bayesian equihbnum m dynamic games of incomplete information. 
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announcements of •not keen• by both bargainers precludes serious negotiations. 
Cheap talk is meaningful and leads to serious negotiations only if one or both parties 
claims to be •keen•. Additionally, one might add the argument: the effectiveness of 
cheap talk relies on whether bargainers perceive cheap talk messages as credible or 
not credible. For credible cheap talk leads to successful negotiations while non-
credible cheap talk may hinder the negotiation process. 
Another article which helps clarify the mechanics of cheap talk is the paper by 
Cooper, De Jong, Forsythe, and Ross (1989) [hereafter, CDFR]. CDFR conduct 
experiments which implement multiple rounds of cheap talk prior to serious 
bargaining. Several interesting design notes exist in the experiments. First, the 
experiments limit cheap talk to simple announcements about players• intended 
actions. This prohibits uncontrolled communication which can lead to threats. 
Threats, in turn, (the authors warn) change the bargaining environment and alter 
payoffs. Secondly, the experimental design gives the participants the right to remain 
silent during cheap talk. CDFR consider silence as a viable strategy which signals a 
bargainer's intentions. For example, the authors state that silence might represent a 
blatant intention to ignore an opponent's announcement or it might signal a player's 
intention to choose an action (after cheap talk) which obtains a pure-strategy 
equilibrium, given what his or her opponent announces.2s Also, bargainers may 
remain silent because they do not want to reveal information which their opponent 
can exploit [Ausubel and Deneckere (1992)]. Lastly, it is noteworthy to mention 
CDFR's results. They find that cheap talk helps coordinate players' behavior and 
2~ Note, i~ C~asi.an bargaining experiments, where one player (the controller) has an outside option, 
silence might 1nd1cate the controller's intention to take the outside option, regardless of the other 
player's announcement(s) . 
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this coordination ability improves with additional rounds of cheap talk [Farrell (1987) 
also supports this result]. 
In brief, cheap talk can yield a significant impact on bargaining. It may offer a 




MEASURES OF COSTLY BARGAINING AND BASIC HYPOTHESES 
As mentioned earlier, the current analysis investigates bargaining behavior in 
a positive transaction costs environment. In response to Shogren and Herriges's 
( 1994) costly transactions experiments, where the efficiency proposition of the 
Coase theorem was strongly rejected, the current analysis tests the ability of various 
bargaining protocols to improve efficiency while simultaneously promoting rational 
behavior. Through a combination of arguments found in structured (e.g., ultimatum 
games) and free form (e.g., Coasian bargaining) bargaining, the analysis defines five 
protocols plus a base group--see Section 6.3 for a description of each protocol. The 
base group attempts to emulate Shogren and Herriges's (1994) linear transaction 
costs treatment. Then, through pairwise comparisons between the base group and 
each protocol, the current experiment will be able to determine whether or not any 
protocol achieves higher efficiency results than the base group. But before the 
analysis presents any formal hypotheses regarding the protocols, one must develop 
measures or indicators of costly bargaining. 
Given this, the current chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.1 begins the 
discussion with an explanation of Coasian bargaining in a binary lottery framework. 
Section 5.2 examines three indicators--efficiency, distribution of wealth, and timing--
of costly bargaining, then it develops several hypotheses which utilize the 
indicators.29 Lastly, Section 5.3 discusses several factors which may remain 
influencial in the bargaining experiments. 
29 Note, much of Sections 5.1 and 5.2 will follow Section 2 in Shogren and Herriges (1994}. 
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5.1 Coasian Bargaining in a Binary Lottery 
The experiments, discussed further in Chapter 6, employ costly bargaining 
between two participants (A and B) over the likel ihood of winning a large reward, Z , 
in a binary lottery. Bargaining remains costly in that the large reward shrinks as 
bargaining time, t , elapses. To capture this functional relationship, the analysis 
denotes the large (remaining) reward as Z(t) , where Z(tmax) represents the 
maximum (initial) reward and, for no time remain ing ( t = 0), Z(O) = O denotes the 
disagreement outcome. Let L = [P;Z(t);(1- P; )z], where P;e [O, 1 ), represent a binary 
lottery which gives player i (i =A, B) a P; probability of winning a large reward, Z(t ), 
and a (1-P;) probability of winning a small reward, z. where Z (t) > z = 0 {for 
tma:x ~ t > O }. [Note, since the disagreement outcome equals Z(O) = O = z, no 
incentive exists for a risk averse person to hold out for Z(O); thus, setting z = O 
controls for risk posturing--see Shogren (1992).) Upon normalizing each 
participant's utility so that U(Z ) = 1 and U(z) = 0, participant i 's expected utility from 
participating in the binary lottery reduces from 
to 
E[U;(L )] = P;U;[Z(t)] + (1- P;)(O) 
~ E[U;(L)] = P;U;[Z(t)]. 
Thus, participant i 's expected utility from bargaining equals the expected value of 
the utility of the large reward, P;U;[Z(t)] . 
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Furthermore, in accordance with Coasian ideology, the present experiment 
gives one participant (the controller) unilateral property rights over the lottery. The 
property rights entitle the controller to an •outside option• which, if the controller 
chooses not to bargain with the noncontroller, guarantees the controller a specified 
probability, defined as P 0 , of winning the large reward. Notice that the outside 
option represents a threat point for the controller. The controller, at any time, can 
threaten to unilaterally end bargaining without consent from the noncontroller and 
take the outside option. If participant i is the controller, i's expected utility from 
taking the outside option, with ta minutes remaining, equals P 0 U;[Z(ta)]. And given 
the economic assumption that people prefer more to less and the fact that 
transaction costs decrease Z(t) as time elapses, the utility of Z(t ), U;[Z(t)J--and 
hence, the expected value of the utility from taking the outside option, P0 U;[Z(t)]--
must decrease as time elapses. For example, if ta > tb then P0 U;[Z(ta )] > 
P 0 U;[Z(tb)]. 
5.2 Efficiency, Distribution of Wealth, and Timing in Costly Bargains 
Given the binary lottery structure presented in Section 5.1, this paper 
analyzes costly bargaining in terms of efficiency, distribution of wealth, and timing. 
The following discussion, first, explains these measures and then develops several 
hypotheses which utilize the measures. 
To start, the discussion shows how transaction costs compromise the 
traditional measure of efficiency; and instead, presents a more accurate measure. ff 
bargaining is costless, one simply defines efficiency as the maximization of the joint 
probability of winning a reward. This traditional definition of efficiency asserts that 
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bargainers reach agreements which assure a 100 percent chance that one bargainer 
will win the reward. For example, if player A bargains with player B in a lottery 
structure, the result remains traditionally efficient if 'P = (P,.. +PB)= 100%, where P,.. 
and PB , respectively, denote player A's and player B's probability of winning the 
reward. Such a definition, however, remains compromised when positive transaction 
costs exist. To explain, since transaction costs diminish the reward over time, 
traditionally efficient bargains (if achieved too late) may guarantee with 100% 
certainty that all players will win nothing. In other words, the time-independent 
nature of traditional efficiency can make this measure misleading when transactions 
are costly over time. 
Alternatively, the analysis needs a time-dependent measure of efficiency. 
Shogren and Herriges (1994) develop such a measure which they call "reward 
efficiency" and denote as R. R is defined, in Shogren and Herriges (1994, p. 3), as 
" ... the improvement in actual expected gain as a percentage of the potential gain due 
to bargaining." Symbolically, 
R = {[P,.. + PB]Z(t)- P0 Z} 
Z-P0 Z ' 
(1) 
where P;. and PB denote the final lottery allotment of players A and B , z is the 
maximum (initial) reward [i.e., Z = Z(tma.t)], Z(t) represents the remaining reward, 
and P0 Z depicts the initial expected value of the outside option. The numerator in 
equation (1) denotes the actual expected gains in efficiency over the initial expected 
value of the controller's outside option, and the denominator represents the potential 
gains from bargaining. Several observations emerge from equation (1 ). First, if the 
bargainers do not reach a traditionally efficient bargain, then P,.. +PB< 1 and a 
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p N = 1- (PA + P 
8
) probability exists that neither player will win. Higher values of P N 
correspond to lower values of R . On the other hand, if traditional efficiency, PA + P8 
= 1, is achieved immediately at t'"'1X, reward efficiency remains maximized at R = 1. 
In general, note that R can be negative as well as positive (i.e. , Rs; 1 ). R becomes 
negative whenever the expected value of the remaining reward at time t fails to 
exceed the initial expected value of the controller's outside option; mathematically, 
R < O when [PA+ P8 ]Z(t) < P
0 Z. 
Another way to analyze bargaining results is through the distribution of 
wealth. The distribution of wealth indicates how rational the bargainers behave. A 
rational controller, who owns unilateral property rights over the lottery, should not 
settle for any agreement which gives him or her a probability, Pc, of winning less 
than the outside option probability, P 0 • In terms of expected wealth, this means that 
a rational, self-interested controller should acquire a level of expected wealth which 
equals or exceeds the initial expected wealth from the outside option; symbolically, 
rational behavior occurs if Pc[Z(t)] ~ P0 Z. Nonetheless, contrary to th is game-
theoretic prediction, many previous experiments (as mentioned in Section 4.1) report 
a high frequency of equal splits, even though P0 > 50%. Controllers tend to 
relinquish their favorable bargaining positions in favor of more equitable agreements. 
This apparent taste for fairness has sparked the fairman-gamesman debate 
discussed in Section 4.1. The fairman theorists contend that bargainers are driven 
by nonmonetary factors, such as socially acceptable focal points and social norms of 
distributive justice. In contrast, the gamesman theorists explain 50-50 splits as 
products of the experimental design, not the bargainers' •true• behavior. 
Although much of the gamesman-fairman debate remains bipolar, recent 
research shows that bargainers can exhibit a combination of both behaviors. 
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Specifically, Shogren and Kask (1992) and, later, Shogren and Herriges (1994) find 
that many controllers take only partial advantage of their bargaining position. They 
explain this behavior as self-interest constrained by fairness. Assuming the outside 
option grants a 90 percent chance of victory, probability splits of 60-40, 80-15, and 
70-30 depict examples of constrained self-interest behavior. 
Shogren and Kask {1992, p.156) interpret the occurrence of constra ined self-
interest as follows: •Realistically, we all possess a threshold that separates the 
gamesperson from the fairperson. Constrained self-interest suggests this threshold 
is not a point, but rather a continuum in which the individual weights the polar cases 
of strict profit seeking and equity." Another explanation for constrained self-interest 
may arise from Roth's (1985b) "coordination model" which states, •1f both players 
acquiesce to their less favored focal point, some sort of compromise between the 
two focal points is the final agreement" (p. 265). For example, if the outside option 
yields a 90-0 split, a 50-50 split remains a favorable focal point for the noncontroller 
but not the controller. Likewise, the outside option remains a favorable focal point 
for the controller but not for the noncontroller. Thus, if both players acquiesce to 
their less favored focal point, then some solution (a la constrained self-interest) 
between the outside option and equal split will arise. Either way both explanations 
suggest that constrained self-interest results from a balance between pure self-
interest and equity. 
Given the arguments for constrained self-interest, one looks for a way to 
gauge it. Following Shogren and Herriges (1994), the first step is to define the 
controller's observed probability of winning, Pc. Mathematically, the controller 
chooses Pc such that 
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PcV[Z(t)] = aP0 U(Z)+ (1- a{ o. s- (P~)]u(Z(t)], (2) 
where a denotes the weight which the controller places on his or her expected utility 
from the outside option, and (1- a) represents the weight which the controller places 
on his or her expected utility from an equal split, [o.5-{P,.../2)]V(Z(t)]. Note, 
equation (2) writes equal splits as [o.5-{PN/2)] to capture those bargains where 
some probability exists that neither bargainer will win (i.e., PN > 0), and PN is shared 
equally, PN/2 . For example, if the bargainers agree to a 45-45 split, then PN= 10% 
= 0.1 O; and hence, [o.5 -(PN/2)] = 0.45. To continue, if one lets EQ = [o.5-(PN/2)] 
and solves equation (2) for a, one obtains 
a = -Pc~V~[_Z(~t)~]_-~(E~Q~)U~[~Z~(t~)] 
P0 U(Z) - (EQ)U[Z(t)] 
(3). 
Equation (3) gauges the magnitude of constrained self-interest behavior. If a ~ 1, 
the controller is a strict gamesman driven by pure self-interest as he or she seeks a 
level of expected util ity at least as great as the expected utility from the outside 
option. If a= 0, the controller is a strict fairman who only derives utility from 
equitable splits; symbolically, this means PcU[Z(t)] = (EQ)V[Z(t)] or dividing through 
by V [Z(t)] yields Pc = EQ. If 0< a<1, the controller remains a constrained self-
interested bargainer, striving to weight pure self-interest with equity. Lastly, if a<O, 
the controller exhibits a high amount of concern for the noncontroller--one might call 
this •opponent loyalty." Opponent loyalty is most noticeable when a controller 
accepts a probability of victory less than EQ; i.e. , Pc < EQ .3o [As a final note, 
30 Alt~ough a-::o. seems highly irrational, 8.3% (5 out of 60) of the bargains in the current paper's 
experiment exh1b1t opponent loyalty. See Chapter 7. 
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equations (1) through (3) and much of their interpretation come from Shogren and 
Herriges (1994).) 
Given the above discussion, two measures of rationality, strict and weak 
rationality, arise [once again, this follows Shogren and Herriges (1994)). Strict 
rationality is a time-dependent measure and as such requires bargainers to consider 
transaction costs. Since equation (3) incorporates transaction costs, it represents a 
measure of strict rationality.JI Bargains depict strict rationality if the controller 
obtains a level of expected utility at least as great as the initial expected utility from 
the outside option. Mathematically, this occurs when PcU[Z(t)] ~ P 0 U (Z ) and a~ 1. 
Weak rationality is time-independent; and hence, ignores transaction costs. 
Equation (3) becomes a weak measure of rationality (denoted as a 1) if one drops 
the utility terms such that 
a - _P~c_-_E_Q_ 
I - p o -EQ (4). 
Weak rationality exists when the controller secures a probability of victory such that 
Pc ~ P0 and a~ 1. Note, given equations (3) and (4) differ, it remains possible to 
simultaneously obtain a ~ 1 for equation (4) and a < 1 for equation (3). •1f we reject 
strict rationality, weak rationality tests if players ignore the transaction costs and 
simply bargained over the chances of winning" [Shogren and Herriges {1994, p. 5)). 
Lastly, the analysis investigates timing (denoted as TIME) in negotiations. A 
binding time constraint (or "deadlineM) can remain a significant factor in bargaining 
[Coursey {1982)). From a lawyer's perspective, Miller and Colosi {1989, p. 32) make 
31 E.q~ation (3) incorporates transaction costs through Z(t) . Recall, Z(t) shrinks over time; or more 
~xphcitly, Z(t) = Z - c(r) where Z is the maximum reward and c(t) represents the transaction costs over 
trme. 
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two remarks about time management: (1) •unmanaged negotiations tend to drag on 
forever,• and (2) •deadlines energize the negotiation process.· In line with remark 
(2), Roth, Murnighan, and Schoumaker [1988] (hereafter, RMS) find that many 
negotiations exhibit a •deadline effect• where bargainers strike an agreement just 
moments before the deadline ends. For example, in a comparison of four 
experiments, RMS {1988, p. 808) report , • .. .41 percent of the observed agreements 
were reached in the last 30 seconds of bargaining, and 53 percent of these were 
reached in the last 5 seconds." Though RMS conclude that the deadline effect 
appears robust across various bargaining environments, the robustness remains 
questionable when delay is costly {i.e., positive transaction costs exist). If delay is 
costly, bargainers can potentially capture higher payoffs from an early agreement as 
opposed to a late agreement [for example, see Rubinstein (1982)]. This gives 
bargainers an incentive to reach an early agreement. In fact, unlike RMS, Shogren 
and Herriges (1994) test the deadline effect in costly bargaining and find a high 
frequency of early agreements which allows the experimenters to reject the deadline 
effect hypothesis.32 The current experiment (see Chapter 6) extends Shogren and 
Herriges's (1994) costly bargaining experiments and investigates how various 
bargaining protocols, such as cheap talk and an alternating offer-counteroffer 
structure, affect the agreement time. 
Overall, this paper uses the three measures--- R, a , and T!ME--to test 
several hypotheses regarding bargaining protocols in costly bargains. The first 
hypothesis addresses reward efficiency, R . Given Shogren and Herriges {1994) find 
32 As a side note, face-to-face bargaining may contribute to the rejection of a deadline effect. To 
explain, Harrison and McKee (1985), like Shogren and Herriges (1994), conduct face-to-face bargains 
and find no evidence for a deadline effect. However, unlike Shogren and Herriges (1994) but similar 
to RMS {1988) , the Harrison and McKee (1985) experiment uses costless bargaining. Subsequently, 
one c~nnot ru.le out face-to-face bargaini.ng as a potential factor. Future research might investigate 
what impact (if any) face-to-face bargaining has on agreement time. 
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that Coasian bargaining yields inefficient results in the presence of transaction costs 
(especially, linear transaction costs), the current paper tests whether or not this 
result can be reversed with bargaining protocols. In other words, this paper 
hypothesizes that at least one of the protocols will show an improvement in 
efficiency over the base group. Next, this paper investigates rationality. It is 
hypothesized that bargaining protocols will improve R through mutually 
advantageous (rational) agreements. This means one expects values of a close to 
or above 1 across all protocol schemes. Lastly, this paper tests a timing hypothesis. 
Based on Shogren and Herriges's (1994) rejection of the deadline effect in costly 
bargaining, the current analysis hypothesizes that no deadline effect will exist across 
all protocol schemes. Moreover, it is hypothesized that the time of agreement will 
remain independent of protocol scheme. In summary, the three basic hypotheses 
are: 
Efficiency Hypothesis: Given linear transaction costs, at least one bargaining 
protocol achieves a higher reward efficiency than the 
base group. 
Rationality Hypothesis: Rational bargainers will secure pure self-interested 
agreements across all protocol schemes. 
Timing Hypothesis: Time of agreement remains independent of protocol 
scheme, and does not occur near the deadline. 
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5.3 Potential Factors in Bargaining 
Various factors may affect the bargaining outcomes, especially R, a,Pc, and 
TIME . This section briefly examines four potential factors. 
First. the analysis considers treatment effects. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 6, the experiment uses six treatments ( q = 6 ), where Treatment 1 
represents the base (Coasian bargaining) group and Treatments 2 through 6 
correspond to the five different protocol schemes. This paper will address two 
questions regarding the treatments. 
Q(1 ): Does the average bargaining outcome (response) remain constant 
across treatments? 
0(2): Does at least one treatment significantly affect the bargaining 
outcome? 
To investigate question (1), the analysis will use an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) approach based on the following "single-factor" model: 
Y .. =µ + r .+£ .. IJ I IJ { 
i=1.2.3 •...• q=6 
j: l .2,J ... .,r I (4) 
where y ii represents the j th observation in treatment i, µ is a parameter common 
to all treatments called the "overall" mean, r ; represents the i th treatment effect, 
and £ ii is the random error term. If one takes the expected value of equation (4), 
one obtains the mean of the ith treatment, µ;. Formally, the operation yields 
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{i = 1,2,3, ... ,6 
where E ( Eii ) = o. From this result, one can derive a formal hypothesis test for 
question 0(1 ). Given 0(1) questions the equality of the average outcome across 
treatments, this inquiry seeks to test the null hypothesis H 0 of equality among the six 
treatment means versus the alternative hypothesis H,.. that not all treatment means 
are the same. Symbolically, the hypothesis test is 
Ho: µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = µ4 = µs = µs 
H,..: µ i :;;µk for at least one pair {i,k) . 
Alternatively, one can write the above hypothesis in terms of treatment effects 't'; as 
follows 
H,..: 't'i * O for at least one i. 
[In general, see Montogmery (1991, pp. 50-55) for a full explanation of the above 
procedures.] If the overall F-statistic (or F-value) from the ANOVA is statistically 
significant, then one can reject H0 and support the claim that not all treatment 
effects are the same. That is, an acceptance of H,.. implies that not all treatments 
yield the same average bargaining response. 
To address question 0(2), the analysis will include the treatments as 
regressor variables in a multiple regression model. Since the multiple regression 
model will include other regressors besides the treatments, the analysis defers the 
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model specification until after the other regressors are explained. For now, the main 
point is that the analysis seeks to discover which treatments (if any) influence the 
bargaining behavior, given the presence of the other regressor variables. Formally, 
one tests 
H0 : /3; = 0 
H,.,: /3; :;e 0 
where /3; represents the regression coefficient for Treatment i, H0 implies that 
Treatment i maintains no effect on the bargaining outcome, and H,., implies that 
Treatment i affects the bargaining outcome. If the analysis rejects H0 for one or 
more of the treatments, then the analysis can investigate what impact (holding all 
other regressor variables constant) the significant treatment(s) has (have) on 
bargaining behavior. For instance, if we consider the response variable a 
(constrained self-interest weight), a significant and positive /3; coefficient suggests 
that a increases when individuals bargain under Treatment (Protocol) i. Likewise, a 
significant and negative /3; coefficient suggests that Treatment (Protocol) i produces 
a negative impact on a. The same reasoning applies to the other response 
variables, R , Pc , and TIME , too.33 
Second, the analysis considers a gender effect. The experiment in Chapter 6 
investigates one-shot, bilateral bargaining between two individuals where each pair 
may consist of a male-male, female-male, or female-female dyad.34 Given 
33 Note, since the analysis investigates bargaining outcomes in terms of R, Pc, a , and TIME (recall 
Section.5.2), four response variables exist; and hence, the analysis requires four separate 
regressions. Chapter 7 discusses this further. 
34 Experimental subjects were recruited and paired without regard for gender. 
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experimental psychology research shows that men and women maintain different 
perceptions of the bargaining situation, opponent, and self, gender may be related to 
bargaining behavior [Thompson (1990).) Also, Mason, Phillips, and Redington 
[1991] (hereafter, MPR) find that men and women tend to behave differently at the 
beginning of repeated game experiments. This finding remains relevant to the 
current paper's one-shot bargaining experiments where each dyad bargains only 
once. That is, the initial stage of MPR's experiments parallel the short run aspect of 
this paper's one-shot experiments. Therefore. based on perception differences 
between the sexes [Thompson (1990)) and MPR's (1991) finding of a short run 
gender effect, this paper considers a gender effect. 
Third, this paper tests for a loyalty effect. As discussed in Section 4.1, 
Shogren (1989) finds that if loyalties between bargainers are well-defined, this may 
explain the difference between equitable and pure self-interest behavior. This 
suggests that loyalty may represent an important source of explanatory power in 
bargains, if one knows where each bargainer's loyalty resides. To test this 
hypothesis, the current analysis explicitly asks the bargainers, through a post 
experimental questionnaire, who they felt loyal to during the bargaining session. 
Specifically, the question (see the Post Experimental Questionnaire in Appendix A) 
reads: 
During the bargaining session I felt loyal to __ _ 
a) myself 
b) the other player 
c) the monitor 
d) someone or something else (please indicate) __ _ 
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A response of a) implies pure self-interest while a response of b) implies opponent 
loyalty. Choice c) addresses HMSS's (1994) concern for a subject-experimenter 
effect [recall the discussion of HMSS (1994) in Section 4.1.]. The last choice, d), 
allows for open-ended responses. Given the bargainers' responses to the above 
question, the analysis econometrically tests for a loyalty effect. Chapter 7 contains 
the results. 
Lastly, the analysis considers an initial wealth effect. To explain, before 
bargaining begins participants in each bargaining pair earn tokens (valued at $2 per 
token) by competing in a memorization game. The participant who wins the most 
tokens becomes the controller for that bargaining pair (for a further explanation see 
Chapter 6). The analysis investigates what effect (if any) the difference in initial 
wealth (tokens) between the controller and noncontroller exerts on bargaining 
behavior. For example, greater differences in initial wealth may make controllers 
more sympathetic towards noncontrollers; and subsequently, yield a negative impact 
on the controller's observed probability of winning, Pc . Alternatively, greater 
differences in initial wealth may provoke greater incentives for profit seeking, and 
hence, produce a positive effect on Pc . Through the use of an econometric model 
which regresses Pc on several predictor variables. including the difference in initial 
wealth, this paper will determine which of the above examples (if any) seems 
plausible. 
Overall, this analysis considers four factors--treatments, gender, loyalty, and 
differences in initial wealth--which may affect bargaining behavior. To test which 




y = {30 + {3/)TOK + 2,f3;'t'; + /3,GFM + {38GMF + {39GFF + {310LOYA + £ (5) 
i c2 
y =one of the response variables, either R, a, Pc , or TIME 
DTOK = difference in initial wealth between the controller and 
noncontrol ler 
't';= 1 if the current treatment is Treatment i (i=2,3,4,5,6) and 
= O otherwise (note that Treatment 1 is the base level) 
GiJ: = 1 if the genders of the current bargaining pair consist of a j 
(j= M for male and= F tor female) controller and a k ( k= 
M for male and= F for female) noncontroller, and Git = 0 
otherwise 
LOYA = 1 if the controller's loyalty response from the Post 
Experimental Questionnaire is •a•, and= 0 otherwise (note, 
Chapter 7 considers another variation of the loyalty 
variable) 
and £ denotes the random error term.35 Note, since the analysis considers four 
response variables, the analysis will run four separate regressions with each 
pertain ing to one of the four response variables--either R , a , Pc , or TIME. 
35 Additionally, in Chapter 7, the analysis partitions the treatments into groups and defines another 




Several key elements highlighted the experimental design. First, the basic 
structure of the experimental design involved face-to-face, one-shot bargaining 
between two people. Each dyad bargained over the chances to win a reward in a 
binary lottery. Additionally, not all participants bargained under the same conditions. 
Six different bargaining treatments existed. For instance, some dyads bargained 
under a free form framework while others bargained under a structured framework. 
The assignment of any dyad to a treatment remained completely random. Moreover, 
each participant bargained only once. This eliminated any learning or reputation 
effects.36 Lastly, similar to Shogren and Herriges (1994), th is experiment 
incorporated real-time transaction costs. The transaction costs shrunk the reward 
over time. 
Overall, the above description summarizes the experimental design. The 
remainder of this section presents the details. Section 6.1 explains the general 
bargaining framework. Section 6.2 investigates the Nash solution and the controller. 
Section 6.3 describes the six treatments and Section 6.4 elaborates on transaction 
costs. Next, Section 6.5 explains the choice of experimental design, a completely 
randomized design. Section 6.6 mentions several aspects about the experimental 
36 The use of repeated decision-making experiments may or may not offer more insight than one-
shot decision-making experiments. For instance, Thaler (1987, pp. 121-122} states, "There is every 
reason to believe that an initial response in the laboratory will most likely be the one a subject will 
make in a similar real-life problem. The response after several learning trials may be no more general 
tha!l the response students give on exam questions.• Moreover, he argues, "Is there any reason to 
beheve that the real world teaches people to choose and judge rationally? Unfortunately, one must 
be skeptical about this prospect. First, many decisions are made infrequently ... Second, even for 
re~eated decisions, the quality of the learning depends crucially on the quality of the feedback ... 
Third, even studies of expert decision making have revealed numerous biases" (p. 122). 
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subjects and it recounts the experimental procedures. Finally, Section 6.7 
concludes with a few additional design notes. 
6.1 General Bargaining Framework 
Each bargaining session involved the following two choices: 
(1) picking a number which establishes an initial allocation of lottery 
tickets, and 
(2) deciding how to allocate the lottery tickets. 
In essence, these choices represented two types of agreements or contracts. 
Choice {1) depicted a number contract while choice (2) represented a transfer 
contract.37 A brief overview explains both contracts. 
First, the number contract required each bargaining dyad to select a number 
from 1 to 6 on a Lottery Distribution Schedule. This number specified the initial 
allocation of lottery tickets. In other words, the bargainers decided how to allocate 
their initial chances of winning a large reward, Z(r).38 For example, consider the 
Lottery Distribution Schedule on page 160 in Appendix A. If the bargainers select 
number 5, then bargainer A owns 80 out of 100 lottery tickets which gives A an 80% 
chance to win Z(t ) , bargainer B owns 15 lottery tickets which gives him or her a 15% 
37 This terminology follows Shogren and Herriges (1994). 
38 Z(r) implies that t~e large reward, Z, remains a function of time, t. As bargaining time decreases, 
the large reward shrinks. For more explanation, see Section 6 .4. 
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chance to win Z (t ). Additionally, note that 5 lottery tickets belong neither to A nor to 
B ; thus, a 5% chance exists that neither bargainer will win the large reward. 39 
Secondly, the transfer contract specified how to allocate the chances of 
winning Z(t ). Once the bargainers chose a number from the Lottery Distribution 
Schedule, they could decide how to transfer their lottery tickets. To illustrate, 
suppose the bargainers selected number 5, as in the above example. If A agreed to 
transfer 75 lottery tickets to B, then A retained a 5% chance to win Z(t) while B 's 
chance to win Z (r ) increased to 90%. Upon any joint agreement, the bargainers 
were required to sign a contract (or known as an •Agreement Form•). The contract 
stated which number was chosen and how many lottery tickets would be transferred 
from one bargainer to the other bargainer. 40 Only those joint agreements which 
were signed remained binding and enforceable. Throughout the experiments all 
contracts were enforced with 100 percent certainty. 
In short, this defines the basic bargaining framework which remains common 
to all bargains in this experiment. Later, Section 6.3 describes how the bargaining 
framework differs among the experimental treatments. 
6.2 The Nash Solution and Controller 
Before a discussion of the treatments ensues, it behooves the writer to 
explain the Nash Solution and Controller. Section 2. 1 discusses the Nash solution to 
the bargaining problem. Now one attempts to apply this concept in light of this 
experiment. The solution is not a 50-50 split of 100 lottery tickets. This remains true 
39 Following the terminology of Shogren and Herriges (1994), one says that the house maintains a 
5% chance to retain the large reward , Z(t). 
40 The experimental instructions in Appendix A contain a copy of the Agreement Form. 
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when one bargainer maintains a unilateral property right over the distribution of 
lottery tickets. To explain, the discussion introduces the concept of a •controller". 
Prior to bargaining, each experimental unit {dyad} plays a matching game (a 
type of memorization game) with cards. The person who finds the most matches 
wins the game and earns the right to be the controller. This yields a situation where 
each experimental unit consists of a controller and noncontroller. The controller 
maintains the right to unilaterally pick a number off the Lottery Distribution Schedule 
and end the session. No consent from the noncontroller or signatures are required if 
the controller chooses this option.41 Assuming the controller is a rational income 
maximizing individual and faces the Lottery Distribution Schedule in Appendix A, the 
controller will not settle for any allocation which gives him or her less than 90% of the 
lottery tickets--this represents the controller's so-called outside option. If bargainer A 
is the controller, number 6 yields the controller's outside option while number 1 yields 
the controller's outside option when bargainer Bis the controller.42 Moreover, the 
allowance of side payments, as in a Coasian bargain, enables the noncontroller to 
influence the controller to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. For instance, the 
noncontroller may offer to give some of his or her lottery tickets to the controller. 
This returns the discussion back to the bargaining problem and the Nash 
solution. Note, if the controller takes the 90% outside option, the noncontroller 
receives 0% and the outcome is inefficient. Inefficiency results because not all 
lottery tickets (resources) are used.43 Instead, the Nash solution offers an efficient 
41 The experimental instructions in Appendix A contain a further explanation of the matching game 
and the controller's rights. 
42 Note _that all bargains throughtout this experiment use the Lottery Distribution Schedule in 
Appendix A; thus, the 90% outside option remains common over all treatments. 
43 Note, t~is explanation of inefficiency is time independent. The level of inefficiency associated with 
a 90-0 split may be greater if one considers a time dependent explanation of inefficiency (see Section 
5.2). 
64 
and rat ional solution. It requires the bargainers to split the remaining 10% of lottery 
tickets so that the controller receives 95% and the noncontroller 5%. This result 
depicts a Pareto-optimal improvement over the outside option. Figure 1 illustrates 
the argument.44 
Figures 1 a and 1 b highlight the bargaining problem when players B and A , 
respectively, are the controller. For each figure, let the outside option represent an 
outcome dsuch that d = (dA,d8 ). The downward sloping line in each figure 
illustrates an efficient allotment (of lottery tickets) frontier. Every point, defined as 
(UA ,U 8 ) , on the front ier depicts an efficient improvement over any point within the 
frontier. A Nash solution maximizes the product of A and B's allotment, VA and U8 , 
beyond d [mathematically one expresses this as maximum (VA - dA)(U8 -d8 ) ] . 
This occurs at the m idpoint of either figure's allotment frontier where ( VA - dA )( U8 - d8 } 
= 25. For instance, suppose A is the controller as in Figure 1 b. At point E, (VA -
dA)(V8 - d8 } = (98-90)(2-0) = 16 and at point F, (UA- dA}(V8 - d8 } = (91 -90)(9-0) = 9. 
Clearly, no point other than the midpoint (95,5) yields a higher value than 25. 
To complete the analysis, one transposes figures 1 a and 1 b into figure 1 c. 
The solid lines at either end of f igure 1 e's allotment frontier portray efficient and 
rational outcomes depending on whether A or B is the controller. The dashed line 
represents only efficient outcomes. Points marked as asterisks (*) plot the allotment 
possibilit ies for the lottery schedule in Appendix A. Note, all but one asterisk lies 
inside the frontier. Since every point within the frontier remains inefficient, one finds 
that the allowance of side payments enables the bargainers to achieve efficient 
improvements. Hence, the efficient allotment frontier rel ies on side payments. 
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Figure 1. The Nash Solution to the Bargaining Problem 
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Up to this point, the discussion illustrates how the controller is chosen and 
how the controller's unilateral property rights over the lottery distribution schedule 
affect the Nash solution. Another, more psychological issue persists here. The 
experimental design must instill a belief in the controller that he or she maintains this 
unilateral property right. This issue falls back to the subject matter of Section 4. 1. 
Section 4.1 addresses experimental techniques which help induce such beliefs. 
Among the various techniques presented, this experiment utilizes three--competitive 
methods (i.e., game-triggers), moral justification, and a monetary incentive. 
Similar to game-triggers found in Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) and Shogren 
(1992) or the knowledge quiz as in HMSS (1994), the matching game offers a 
competitive way to determine the controller. Unlike a simple coin flip or an arbitrary 
designation, the matching game requires a certain level of memorization skills; and 
hence, may induce an earned or warranted feeling of achievement. Additionally, this 
experiment implements morally justified wording. As in Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), 
the experimental instructions state "earns the right" instead of •is designated" 
whenever a reference exists towards the determination of the controller. Lastly, 
following Shogren and Herriges (1994), the design uses a monetary incentive. To 
explain, the maximum reward, Z, consists of 1 O tokens valued at $2 per token. z is 
derived from contributions by the controller, noncontroller, and the house (monitor). 
The controller must contribute 5 tokens, the noncontroller 1 token, and the house 
provides the remaining 4 tokens (5+ 1+4=10). This develops a situation where the 
controller potentially stands more to lose than the noncontroller. Participants earn 
tokens during the matching game. Each time a participant finds a match he or she 
earns one token valued at $2. The matching game maintains a design which yields 
67 
the controller (the winner of the game) at least 5 tokens.45 Overall, the monetary 
incentive technique, in combination with the matching game and moral justification 
wording, tries to el icit rational, self-regarding behavior from the controller. 
In summary, the Coasian nature of the experiment, which defines a unilateral 
property right holder and allows side payments, yields a Nash solution consisting of 
a 95-5 split. Such a solution is rational and efficient. Indeed, any split which gives 
the controller 90% or more of the lottery tickets while utilizing all i 00 lottery tickets 
remains rational and efficient. 46 Moreover, the experiment attempts to induce 
rational behavior through the use of competitive methods, moral justification, and a 
monetary incentive. 
6.3 Treatments (Protocol Schemes) 
This experiment examines bilateral bargaining under six different situations, 
known as treatments or protocols. Treatment i represents the baseline group where 
participants bargain in a costly Coasian environment. Treatments 2 through 6 
incorporate some type of protocol scheme where bargainers must follow more rules 
than in pure Coasian bargaining. Given this, the following discussion begins with a 
further explanation of Treatment i and continues by explaining the protocol scheme 
in Treatments 2 through 6. 
45 The matiching game uses ordinary playing cards. The game contains nine matches (or pairs) . 
Thus, the winner will always obtain at least 5 matches which yields 5 tokens. For further details, see 
Experimental Instructions in Appendix A. [In the advent that a player finds zero matches (this implies 
a noncontroller with zero tokens), the house contributes 5 tokens. This occurred once during the 
experiment.] 
46 
The argument ignores transaction costs; and hence, discusses efficiency in the traditional sense. 
As noted in Section 5.2, transaction costs can compromise this definition of efficiency. 
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Treatment 1 {T1) employs free form (Coasian) bargaining. This represents 
the control or baseline group. The term free form arises because the bargains 
remain unstructured. Bargainers are free to make offers and counteroffers 
whenever they wish, within the specified time limit for bargaining. This lies in 
contrast to a Rubinstein model where the bargainers must take turns in a sequential 
manner. Moreover, T1 allows verbal communication between the two bargainers; 
however, any verbal offers remain nonbinding. The creation of any obligations must 
occur through written offers. This facet exists in all treatments. 
Similarly, Treatment 2 (T2) uses the free form format, except T2 allows 
nonverbal pre-bargain communication. The experiment employs •cheap talk• as the 
pre-bargain communication. Recall, cheap talk remains nonbinding and costless. 
The bargainers participate in two rounds of cheap talk. In each round, the 
bargainers have ten seconds to write a response (in terms of lottery tickets) on a 
piece of paper which reads: 
uThe minimum I am willing to accept is ___ N 
"The maximum I am willing to offer is II 
When ten seconds elapse, the bargainers simultaneously exchange papers. This 
format allows each bargainer to simultaneously announce their reservation prices or 
strategy. If a participant chooses not to respond, then he or she must write "NA" in 
the spaces. This requirement eliminates the potential revalation of a no response 
strategy before the round ends. To explain, since the bargains occur face-to-face, 
writing nothing might reveal a no response strategy. This, in turn, may influence the 
other bargainer's response. Thus, writing nothing undermines the simultaneous 
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nature of the cheap talk rounds. Finally, bargaining begins immediately after the 
second round. 
While Treatments 1 and 2 use free form bargaining, Treatments 3 through 6 
employ structured bargaining. The structured format entails alternating offers. As in 
a Rubinstein model, bargainers must wait their tum to make offers and counteroffers 
and waiting remains costly. No restrictions, other than the bargaining session time 
limit of five minutes, exist on the number of offer and counteroffers allowable and on 
the amount of time for making an offer. However, unlike the Rubinstein model but 
similar to Coasian ideology, the controller at any time (whether in turn or out of tum) 
maintains the right to unilaterally pick a number and end the session. 
To continue, structured bargaining includes several other components. All 
treatments with structured bargaining do not allow verbal communication between 
bargainers. This represents another difference between free form bargains and 
structured bargains. The allowance of verbal communication does not give an 
experimenter control over a sequential offer structure. Moreover, given the controller 
maintains a bargaining advantage (the outside option) over the noncontroller, one 
finds an interest in the potential effects of who moves first--the controller or 
noncontroller. Baik and Shogren ( 1992) show that it is advantageous for the 
"underdog" to move first. Although the current experimental design presents no true 
test of Baik and Shogren's theory, the design draws on their results and investigates 
the effects of the controller (nonconiroller) moving first. Specifically, here lies the 
difference between Treatments 3 and 5 and Treatments 4 and 6. 
Treatment 3 (T3) represents structured bargaining with the controller as the 
first mover. In contrast, Treatment 4 (T4) gives the first move to the noncontroller. 
Thus, T3 and T 4 differ only in who. moves first. 
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Treatments sand 6 mirror Treatments 3 and 4, respectively, except the 
former two treatments incorporate two rounds of pre-bargain cheap talk as does T2. 
Specifically, Treatment S (TS) uses structured bargaining with cheap talk and the 
controller as first mover. Treatment 6 (T6) utilizes the same bargaining format as 
TS, but T6 yields the first move to the noncontroller. Thus, the difference between 
Treatments 3 and 4 and Treatments S and 6 is that Treatments S and 6 embody 
cheap talk. 
In brief, this experiment uses three protocols- cheap talk, a formal offer-
counteroffer structure, and specific first-move restrictions where either the controller 
or noncontroller moves first. Each protocol appears in at least one treatment. Table 
1 summarizes the treatments.47 Note, three major comparisons exist. First, 
Treatments 1 and 2 use free form bargaining while Treatments 3 through 6 employ 
structured bargaining. Second, Treatments 2, S, and 6 utilize cheap talk whereas 
Treatments 1, 3, and 4 do not. Thirdly, Treatments 3 and s allow the controller to 
move first while Treatments 4 and 6 restrict the first move to the noncontroller. 
These comparisons yield treatment contrasts which remain testable in an analysis of 
variance. Chapter 7 presents the results. 
6.4 Transaction Costs 
All bargains maintain a S minute time limit. The large reward, Z(t ), remains a 
function of time. Z (t ) shrinks as bargaining time elapses, where Z(S) = 1 O tokens 
represents the maximum reward. The rate at which Z(t ) shrinks remains constant; 
thus, the experimental design uses linear transaction costs. This continuous time 
47 For a further explanation of the treatments. see the Specific Instructions in Appendix B. 
Table 1. Summary of Treatments (Protocols) 
Protocol I Cheap Talk I Bargaining Structure I First Mover 
1 No Free Form N/Aa 
2 Yes Free Form N/A 
3 No Alternating Offers Controller 
4 No Alternating Offers Noncontroller 
5 Yes Alternating Offers Controller 
6 Yes Alternating Offers Noncontroller ....., ...... 
a N/A implies •not applicable· which means that the given description remains irrelevant. 
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framework appears in Table 2 and Figure 2. Table 2 lists the •Reward Schedule• 
while Figure 2 plots this schedule. Note, if 2 minutes elapse, then 3 minutes remain 
and the reward is worth 6 tokens [ Z (3) = 6 tokens]. If 2.25 minutes elapse, then the 
reward shrinks to 5.5 tokens [ Z(2. 75) = 5.5 tokens]. And if 5 minutes elapse without 
an agreement, Z(O) = O tokens--this defines the disagreement outcome. 
Prior to bargaining each subject was given a Reward Schedule. Additionally, 
each bargaining dyad had a digital timer which showed the time remaining (th is 
meant the timers were designed to count down from 5 minutes). In the advent of a 
joint agreement, both parties were required to sign the Agreement Form before their 
timer could be stopped. If the controller chose to unilaterally end the session, he or 
she could push the stop button without the noncontroller's consent. In either case, 
the time remaining and the remaining reward was noted by the monitor after the 
timer stopped. 
6.5 A Completely Randomized Design 
Overall, the experimental design remains a completely randomized (CR) 
design. Three distinct properties characterize a CR design: (1) the experimental 
units or materials are homogeneous, (2) each experimental unit maintains an equal 
chance of being assigned to any part icular treatment, and (3) the experiment 
proceeds in a random order. The present experiment contains these properties. 
First, the present experiment satisfied the homogeneity condition. The 
subject pool (which made up the experimental units) remained fa irly homogeneous. 
94.17% of the 120 subjects were college students, at the University of Rhode Island 
(URI}, between the ages of 17 and 23 years old. The majority of the remaining 
Table 2. Listing of the Reward Schedule 















































Time (minutes) Remaining 
Figure 2. Graph of Reward Schedule 
1.5 0 .5 0 
74 
5.83% were, also, URI students, but these students' ages exceeded 23 years old. 
Furthermore, the subjects used the same, basic experimental materials throughout 
the experiment. Each bargaining dyad kept time with a digital timer, all matching 
games utilized ordinary playing cards, all tokens were standard poker chips, and all 
bargaining pairs used the same reward schedule. The experimental units 
maintained similar characteristics--student status and common school-- and used 
the same basic materials. 
As mentioned earlier, the experiment employs six treatments. Since the 
researcher remains equally interested in all treatments, each treatment is equally 
replicated. In fact, the experiment replicates each treatment 1 O times (r =10 for each 
treatment) . Replication offers an important element in any experimenl "It allows the 
experimenter to obtain an estimate of the experimental error" [Montgomery (1991 ), 
p.8]. Thus, large r values remain desirable. But many times feasibility and budget 
constraints restrict one's choice of r. This experiment represents no exception, for 
the choice of r = 10 appears reasonable under the experiment's time and budget 
constraints. Given six treatments (q = 6) and the choice of r = 10, the total number 
of observations, N, is 60 [i.e., N =qr= (6)(1 O) = 60]. Each observation represents a 
bargaining outcome between two people, where every bargaining dyad depicts an 
experimental unit. This information leads to a discussion of the second 
characteristic of CR designs. 
At this point, most CR designs would number the experimental units from 1 to 
60, then obtain a random order of these numbers and assign the first r numbers to 
treatment 1, the second r numbers to treatment 2, and so on. This randomization 
scheme ensures that the experimental units are allotted to the treatments by chance. 
Unfortunately, such a randomization scheme remains implausible for the current 
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experiment. To explain, the experiment requires nine experimental sessions, three 
per day for three days.48 Since the experimenter cannot force subjects to attend 
specific experimental sessions, the time constraint prohibits a priori assignments of 
experimental units to treatments. Thus, the experiment needs a different 
randomization plan. 
Specifically, the alternative randomization plan entailed several steps. Step 
one involved the randomization of treatments among bargaining pairs. The 
Statistical Analysis System (SAS) was used to randomly assign the six treatments to 
pairs 1 through 60 (recall, N = 60). Step two was performed before each 
experimental session. This step randomly assigned subjects to a bargaining pair 
number. To explain, after the subjects entered the laboratory and seated 
themselves, a bag which contained slips of paper was passed among the subjects. 
Each subject withdrew a slip of paper from the bag. This paper contained one of two 
letters, "A" or "B", and a number. The number matched subjects into pairs and the 
letter identified subjects in each pair. For example, subjects A22 and B22 
represented bargainers A and B for the 22nd. bargaining pair. Table 3 summarizes 
the randomization plan. Each "T" followed by a number represented the treatment 
assigned to the bargaining pair number in parentheses. For instance, treatment 6 
(T6) was randomly assigned to bargaining pair 22. 
Lastly, the present experiment fulfilled the third property of CR designs. In 
accordance with Table 3, the experimental sessions followed the bargaining pair 
numbers. To explain, the first two experimental sessions observed pairs 1 through 
12 and the last session observed pairs 50 through 60. Though the experiment 
48 Sessions were held at 9 a.m., 12 noon, and 2:30 p.m. each of the three days. The 9 a.m. sessions 
co~tained an average of 3 ~airs while the 12 noon and 2:30 p.m. sessions contained an average of a 
pairs: Due to the comparatrvely low attendance at 9 a.m., future experiments might avoid morning 
sessions. 
Table 3. Summary of Randomization Plan 
T1 T4 T3 T1 T6 T4 T2 T4 T2 T1 
( 1) {2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) ( 10) 
T4 T3 T6 T3 T1 T5 T4 T2 T1 T2 
( 11) (12) ( 13) {14) ( 15) ( 16) {17) (18) ( 19) (20) 
T5 T6 T3 T5 T2 T5 T5 T6 T4 T3 
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
TS T4 T5 T6 TS TS T1 T2 T2 T6 
{31) (32) (33) (34) (3S) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) 
T6 T4 T4 T6 T2 T3 T2 T3 T3 T2 
(41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) 
T3 TS T6 T1 T3 T1 T1 T6 T4 T1 
(S 1) (S2) (53) (54) (SS) (56) (S7) (S8) (59) (60) 
Note: the top element in each box indicates the treatment and the numbers in parentheses 
represent the bargaining pair number. 
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observed the pairs in numerical order, the treatments were randomly assigned to the 
bargaining pairs. This meant that none of the experimental sessions employed only 
one treatment. For instance, the first ten observations (or bargaining pairs) did not 
solely utilize treatment 1, observations 11 to 20 did not solely use treatment 2, and 
so on. The treatments were used in a random order; and thus, the experiment 
proceeded in a random order. 
To recap, the experimental design remains a completely randomized design. 
The experimental units appear homogeneous; each experimental unit maintains an 
equal chance of bargaining under any particular treatment; and the experiment 
proceeds in a random order. 
As a final note, it remains noteworthy to mention the importance of 
randomizat ion in all experimental designs, not just CR designs. Randomization 
ensures against those biases caused by extraneous factors or sources of variation. 
It usually validates the statistical assumption which requires the observations or 
experimental errors to be independently distributed random variables [Montgomery 
(1991 , p. 9)]. Furthermore, Cochran and Cox (1957, p. 8) note, 
Randomization is somewhat analogous to insurance, in that it is a 
precaution against disturbances that may or may not occur and that 
may or may not be serious if they do occur. It is generally advisable to 
take the trouble to randomize even when it is not expected that there 
will be any serious bias from fa ilure to randomize. The experimenter is 
thus protected against unusual events that upset his expectations .... It 
should be realized ... that failure to randomize at any stage may 
introduce bias unless either the variation introduced in that stage is 
negligible or the experiment effectively randomizes itself. 
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6.6 The Subjects and Experimental Procedures 
Sections 6. 1 to 6.5 explain the operational components of the experimental 
design. This section (6.6) discusses how the experimental subjects were recruited, 
who the subjects were, and it recounts the experimental procedures. 
120 subjects were recruited campus-wide at the University of Rhode Island. 
The recruitment methods involved advertisements in the school newspaper, 
distribution of a flyer, visits to various classrooms, and a sign-up booth located in a 
popular meeting place (the Memorial Union) on campus. During the recruitment 
process, special care was taken not to divulge detailed information about the 
experiments. 49 Potential recruits were told nothing beyond what appeared on the 
flyer (see page 162 in Appendix A for a copy of the flyer). In other words, the 
information on the flyer served as standard information given to potential recruits 
regardless of recruitment method. 
Since the recru itment methods covered the entire campus, the subject pool 
represented a mixture of undergraduate and graduate students from a variety of 
academic disciplines. Moreover, as mentioned in Section 6.5, 94.17% of the 120 
subjects were between 17 and 23 years old while the remaining 5.83% were older 
than 23. Overall, this experiment tried to obtain a sample which remained 
representative of the URl's population. 
Given a description of how the subjects were recruited and who the subjects 
were, the discussion, now, turns to an outline of the experimental procedures. The 
experimental procedures follow sixteen steps. Table 4 summarizes these steps. 
49 Any pre-experimental disclosure about experimental design or theoretical expectations can 
introduce bias into experiments. Davis and Holt (1993, pp. 58-60) offer suggestions on how to recruit 
subjects without introducing biased expectations. 
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Table 4. Summary of Experimental Procedures 
Step Description of Event 
1 Randomly assign l.D. numbers to subjects. 
2 Read •General Instructions• aloud to subjects. 
3 Complete the "Pre-Experimental Questionnaire.• 
4 Move subjects to bargaining tables. 
5 Play the matching game to determine the controller. 
6 Distribute tokens to each subject. 
7 Let subjects silently read their "Specific Instructions". 
8 Explain the "Offer Sheet". 
9 Distribute the "Agreement Forms". 
1 O Setup reward--controller, noncontroller, and house contribute 5, 1, 
and 4 tokens, respectively. 
11 Ask if everyone understands. 
12 Distribute Lottery Schedules to cheap talk pairs and start the 
cheap talk phase. 
13 Distribute Lottery Schedules to all other pairs and start bargaining 
time for every pair. 
14 Monitors note remaining time and reward, plus they randomly 
determine, based on the distribution of lottery tickets, who wins 
the reward. 
15 Complete the "Post-Experimental Questionnaire." 
16 Pay subjects--hourly payment ($2/hour), the reward (if won), and 
any tokens (valued at $2/token) left over. 
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Though many of the steps in Table 4 remain self explanatory, the following 
discussion recounts the procedures and offers explanatory notes for each step. 
After the subjects entered the laboratory and seated themselves, step 1 
began. The subjects were randomly assigned an identification number which 
consisted of either an •A• or a ·s· letter followed by a number. As explained in 
section 6.5, the letter identified each subject as either an A or a B player and the 
number matched subjects into bargaining pairs--for example, subject A 17 was the A 
player for bargaining pair 17.50 In step 2, the experimenter read the General 
Instructions (see Appendix A) aloud. This method (reading the instructions aloud) 
was used to create common knowledge among the subjects. Next, step 3 tested the 
subjects' understanding of the instructions through the use of a pre-experimental 
questionnaire (see questionnaire in Appendix A). When the subjects completed the 
questionnaire, the experimenter went over the answers and clarified any remaining 
questions from the subjects. Once the subjects understood the general instructions, 
the subjects moved to the bargaining tables (step 4)51 and played the matching 
game to determine the controller (step 5).52 Based on the results of the matching 
game, the monitors, in step 6, distributed the tokens to each subject. 
In contrast to step 2, step 7 let the subjects read their Specific Instructions in 
silence. Since each experimental session involved three to twelve pairs which 
bargained under different treatments, no particular set of instructions could be 
50 Refer back to Section 6 .5 for details on how the identification numbers were randomly assigned. 
51 Prior to step 4 the subjects sat in chairs at the front of the laboratory. In step 4, the subjects not 
only ~oved to the b~rgaining tables, they discovered who their partner was. At this point, the 
exper~menter aske_d 1f anyone was paired with a friend. If so, the pair(s) was split-up and each 
bargainer was assigned a new partner. 
52 Refer to Appendix A for the logistics of the matching game. 
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anonymously read aloud.53 Each subject was given a set of specific instructions and 
a questionnaire followed by an answer key. The questionnaire elicited each 
subject's understanding of their specific instructions. After the subjects checked their 
answers, the experimenter and monitors visited each bargaining table to make sure 
that no remaining questions existed. 
To continue, the experimenter, in step 8, verbally explained the Offer Sheet. 
The subjects made offers and counteroffers through the Offer Sheet (see Appendix 
A for a copy of the Offer Sheet). After a player wrote an offer, the other player could 
either accept (circle "Yes") or reject (circle "No") it. If the player rejected the offer, he 
or she could make a counteroffer, and so on. The Offer Sheet remained the only 
mode of communicating offers and counteroffers in the structured treatments. In the 
free form treatments, players could make both verbal and written offers, but only 
written offers remained binding. Following step 8, the monitors distributed the 
Agreement Forms (see Appendix A for a copy of th is form). Next, step 10 setup the 
1 O token reward. The controller, noncontroller, and house contributed 5, 1, and 4 
tokens, respectively. 54 
At this point (step 11 ), the experimenter asked if everyone understood the 
instructions. The subjects were told, "This is it. You're only going to do this once. 
Are there anymore questions?" Upon the exhaustion of all questions, the 
experiment proceeded to step 12. The monitors distributed, face-down, the Lottery 
Schedule to each player in the cheap talk pairs.55 Then the bargainers turned over 
53 Appendix B contains the Specific Instructions for all the treatments. 
54 
See Section 6 .2 and the General Instructions in Appendix A for more details on the reward. 
55 
Note that the Reward Schedule appeared with the Lottery Schedule on the same sheet of paper--
see Appendix A. 
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their Lottery Schedules as they simultaneously began the cheap talk phase.56 While 
the cheap talk phase ensued, the monitors gave out, face-down, the Lottery 
Schedule to each player in all of the other pairs. The moment the cheap talk phase 
ended, the experimenter and monitors started the bargaining times for all groups. 
This marked the start of step 13. 
As each experimental unit finished bargaining, they were instructed to remain 
seated and quite. When all bargains were completed or the five minute time limit 
expired, step 13 ended and step 14 began.57 In step 14, the monitors noted the 
remaining time and calculated the remaining reward, for each experimental unit. 
Additionally, the monitors, based on the distribution of lottery tickets, randomly 
determined who won the reward. To explain, the monitors had a bag which 
contained 100 pieces of paper numbered 1 to 100. If, for example, a bargaining pair 
agreed to a 30-65 split (where player A owned 30 tickets and player B owned 65 
tickets), player A won if the monitor drew any number from 1 to 30, player B won if 
any number from 31 to 95 was drawn, and the house retained the reward if a 
number from 96 to 100 was withdrawn. At the completion of all lottery draws, the 
final two steps followed. 
Step 15 involved the completion of a post-experimental questionnaire (see the 
Post-Experimental Questionnaire in Appendix A). This questionnaire elicited 
personal traits, such as sex, age, and major, and it directly asked where each 
56 One cannot say enough for the importance of giving out the lottery Schedule just before 
b~rgaining begin~. If the monitors distribute this schedule too soon (say around step 7) , many players 
will start to bargain before the bargaining time begins. (Actually, this problem was discovered in a 
practice sess!on_.) However, the experimenter maintains more control over the experimental session 
if he or she d1stnbutes the lottery Schedule just before bargaining begins. 
57 Actually, ~ experimental unit exhausted the entire five minute limit. All experimental units either 
settled on a Joint agreement or the controller took the outside option. See Chapter 7 for more details 
on the experimental results. 
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subject's loyalty lied. Given Shogren's (1989) loyalty argument, the experimenter 
implemented the loyalty question in an attempt to help explain each subject's 
bargaining behavior.58 Once the subjects completed a post-experimental 
questionnaire, the final step occurred. Each subject received a cash payment which 
consisted of an hourly payment ($2 per hour), the reward (if won), and any tokens 
(valued at $2 per token) left over. 
6. 7 Additional Design Notes 
This section concludes chapter 6 with four additional notes. Specifically, this 
section includes a discussion of: (1) the laboratory, (2) the prohibition of physical 
threats, (3) the exclusion of cueing words, and (4) the justification for face-to-face 
bargains. 
First, the size and location of the laboratory helped simplify several logistical 
concerns. A large room in the URl's Memorial Union (MU) served as the laboratory. 
The lab was spacious enough to allow twelve pairs to bargain without the pairs 
disturbing one another.59 Additionally, since the lab remained situated in the MU, 
most subjects had no trouble finding it. 60 
Another facet of the experimental design was the prohibition of physical 
threats. Like other cooperative models (such as cartels), negotiations remain 
crippled when threats exist. In fact, Hoffman and Spitzer (1982, footnote 8, p. 75) 
58 Section 5 .3 addresses this question in more detail. 
59 Twelve individual tables were setup and dispersed throughout the lab. This meant that the pairs 
could be separated and alloted to individual tables. 
60 The MU is a common gathering place on campus at the URI. It contains food services, a mini-
market, a ~ank, an ATM machine, a video arcade, a hair salon, the URI bookstore, and a host of 
other services. 
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note, •once a threat is carried out the Cease Theorem has failed.• Subsequently, 
the current experiment's general and specific instructions clearly stated that •no 
physical threats are allowed•. Thirdly, the experimental design excluded any words 
which might have suggested how the subjects were expected to behave.61 For 
example, the experimental instructions avoided the words •partner• and "opponent• 
and instead used the neutral phrase •other player-. Also, no technical terminology, 
such as income maximizer, fairman, or gamesman, was used. 
Lastly, the experimental design used face-to-face bargains. Unlike the 
anonymity experiments conducted by HMSS {1994) , this experiment strived for a 
more realistic environment. To explain, many (if not most) negotiations, from the 
environmental talks at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil during June 1992 
to the haggling over souvenir prices in Taipei, Taiwan, occur face-to-face. And 
though it may be argued that face-to-face bargains retain less control over 
nonmonetary incentives than anonymous bargains, bargaining models should be 
robust enough to capture many aspects of reality [see footnote 12 in Shogren and 
Herriges {1994)]. 
61 9· Sh · in~ore , aked, and Sutton (1988) discuss how the use of such cues can bias the subjects' 
behavior towards theoretical expectations. 
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CHAPTER7: 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Recall, Chapter 5 develops the response variables and hypotheses which 
remain applicable for the experiment presented in Chapter 6. The current chapter 
utilizes this information to analyze the experimental results (Appendix C contains a 
list of the data set). As a preliminary analysis, Section 7.1 begins this chapter by 
summarizing and discussing the descriptive statistics which result from the 
experiment. Several observational implications regarding reward efficiency, 
distribution of wealth, and timing emerge from the descriptive statistics. Next, 
Section 7.2 presents a test procedure, called the analysis of variance, and uses this 
procedure to statistically test for differences among the treatment means. Section 
7.3 analyzes the experimental results from an econometric perspective. Lastly, 
Section 7.4 summarizes the key results and discusses the economic implications. 
7. 1 Summary Statistic Results 
As a preliminary analysis, this section analyzes the descriptive statistics from 
the experiment. Table 5 summarizes these statistics. Several implications regarding 
efficiency, distribution of wealth, and timing emerge from Table 5. 
In regards to reward efficiency, R, Table 5 shows low levels of efficiency 
across all treatments. Every treatment contains a negative mean R and the overall 
mean R is -1 .370. This implies that, on average, bargainers let the expected value 
Table 5. Summary Statistics of Experimental Results 
Efficiency Distribution of Wealth Timing 
Ra IJI b (risk neutral measure, a,v )C (seconds remaining) 
Ave. Pure Constrain· 
Treatment PayoH, Sell· Pure ed Self· Opponent 
(Protocol Std. Std. Z(t) Interest Equity Interest Loyalty Std. Range Range 
Scheme) r Mean Median Dev. Mean Median Dev. (tokens) (a~ 1) (a = O) (O < a < 1) (a < O) Mean Dev. Min. Max. 
1 10 -1.525 -1 175 1.303 0.970 1.000 0.063 7.70 0 3 7 0 232.5 37.79 181 .0 275.0 
2 10 -0.528 0 .000 1 188 0.985 1.000 0 .024 8.60 0 4 4 2 256.5 34.74 177.0 286.0 
3 10 ·1.400 -0.750 1.482 0.985 1.000 0 .034 7 .70 0 5 5 0 229.2 44.05 145.0 267.0 
4 10 -1.563 ·1.688 1.198 0.975 1.000 0 .035 7.65 0 1 8 1 229.9 39.90 180.0 282.0 
5 10 -2.330 ·3.000 1.494 0.930 0.950 0 .054 7.20 1 1 6 2 216.3 46.39 157.0 293.0 
6 10 -0.873 ·0.500 1.589 0.985 1.000 0 .034 8 .25 1 4 5 0 246.9 49.24 128.0 298.0 
Overall 
Values 60 ·1.370 -0.963 1.443 0.972 1.000 0 .045 7.85 2 18 35 5 235.2 42.57 128.0 298.0 
a Reward Efficiency: R = II P,. + P, IZ (I) - P11 Z I I ( z - P'' z). where P .. and P, , denote the final lottery allotment of players A and B. Z 1s the maximum reward ( 1 O tokens), 
Z(1) represen ts the remaining reward, and P0 Z depicts the initial expected value of the outside option. Reward efficiency is maximized when R 2 1. 
b Traditional Measure of Efficiency: 'I' = ( P,. + P,) , where P,. and P, denote the final lottery allotment for players A and 8. Traditional efficiency is maximized when 
'Y = 100%: 1. 
c Distribution of Wealth: ai'I "' {PclZ(t) l - (EQ)f Z(1 ))) I I p0 z-(EQ)IZ(t)ll , where EQ = j0.5 - (Pi'/ I 2)). Pc represents the controller's observed probablity of winning, and 




of the remaining reward fall below the expected value of the outside option at rffllU 
minutes remaining; i.e., [PA+ P8 ]Z(t) < P
0 Z . Figure 3 highlights the difference in 
mean reward efficiency across treatments. The figure shows that Treatment 5 
contains the lowest mean R at -2.330 while Treatment 2 contains the highest mean 
R at -0.528. Though all treatments indicate negative reward efficiency, several 
protocols report higher reward efficiency results than the base group, Coasian 
bargaining with linear transaction costs, which yields Ri = -1.525. 62 [Note, R, 
(i=1,2,3, .. . 6) denotes the mean reward efficiency for Treatment i.] Protocol 
schemes (Treatments) 2,3, and 6 apparently maintain higher mean R values than 
Treatment 1. 
As a side note, Table 5 shows that a high level of efficiency exists if one 
considers the traditional measure of efficiency, 'P = (P,., + P8 ). The overall mean 'P 
is 0.972. Protocols 2, 3, and 6 contain the highest mean 'P equal to 0.985 and 
Protocol 5 contains the lowest mean 'Pat 0.930. These results suggest that 
bargainers may have ignored transaction costs; and instead, strove for an efficient 
distribution of lottery tickets which left little to no chance for a house victory. This 
explanation, however, implies that bargainers do not value the remaining reward. In 
other words, the bargainers maintain minimal concern for the opportunity cost of 
time. If this remains true, one might not expect a high frequency of early 
agreements. 
62 Note, the directional sign of this result remains consistent with the result of Shogren and Herriges's 
(1994) linear costs experiment which reports a negative mean R of -0.331 . Although -0.331 > -1 .525 
impli~s a magnitudinal inconsistency, this inconsistency may not remain significant when one 
co~s1ders how the two experiments differ. For instance, Shogren and Herriges's (1994) experiment, 
unhke the current one, uses each participant in more than one bargain (thus, the experiment is not 
immune to a potential learning effect), and obtains a larger sample size (the current experiment 
obtains 10 observations for the base group while Shogren and Herriges's experiment obtains 61 
observations for their linear transaction costs treatment) . Thus, the above magnitudinal difference 
may or may not render the two results completely inconsistent. 
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To cont inue, several implications arise from Table 5 with regards to the 
distribution of wealth.63 First, neither pure equity nor pure self-interest dominates the 
bargains. Table 5 shows that only 3.3% (2 out of 60) of the bargains exhibit pure 
self-interest and only 30% (18 out of 60) exhibit pure equity. Instead, constrained 
self-interest dominates the bargains. 58.3% (35 out of 60) of the bargainers 
balanced the two extremes of pure self-interest and equity.64 Figure 4 illustrates the 
distribution of wealth by treatment. This figure reveals that constrained self-interest 
strongly dominates Treatments 1, 4, and 5 and captures exactly 50% of the bargains 
in Treatments 3 and 6. In general, these results remain consistent with Shogren and 
Kask {1992) and Shogren and Herriges (1994) where constrained self-interest 
dominates 52.3% and 80.8%, respectively, of the bargains. Both investigations, 
along with the current one, offer substantial empirical support for the existence of 
constrained self-interest behavior. This suggests that bargainers, more realistically, 
are driven by both monetary and nonmonetary incentives. 
Another interesting observation from Table 5 is that 8.3% (5 out of 60) of the 
bargainers remained extremely loyal to their opponent. 5 out of 60 controllers 
accepted a probability of victory, Pc , less than the equal split outcome; i.e., Pc < EQ 
results in a<O. Several reasons might have explained this behavior. One possible 
reason may have been that the controller knew the noncontroller. The experimenter, 
however, tried to avoid this possibility by asking all dyads if they were paired with a 
friend or someone they knew. If so, the dyad was separated and each bargainer 
was assigned a new partner. Another reason may have involved some type of 
"chivalry effect" . A closer look reveals that 3 out of the 5 opponent loyalty bargains 
63 Note, Table 5 uses a risk neutral measure of rationality. The discussion will ellaborate on risk 
neutrality, shortly. 
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involved a male controller and a female noncontroller. 65 The current analysis cannot 
infer either of the above reasons. Perhaps a more inquisitive post experimental 
questionnaire might have revealed the •true• reason behind the occurrence of 
opponent loyalty. 
To further analyze the distribution of wealth , the discussion considers strict 
and weak rationality. Initially, consider strict rationality which is a time-dependent 
measure. Recall equation (3) represents a measure of strict rationality. Given the 
outside option and an equal split leave the controller with a 10% and 50%, 
respectively, chance to lose the lottery, the discussion considers three specifications 
for the bargainer's utility function in equation (3)--risk neutrality, •1ow" risk aversion 
where the controller is willing to pay a 10% risk premium, and "highM risk aversion 
where the controller is willing to pay a 50% risk premium. For risk neutrality 
V[Z(t)] = Z(t) and one defines a as 
a _ Pc[Z(t )]- (EQ)[Z(t )] 
N - P0 (Z ) - ( EQ)[Z(t )] 
(6) 
For the risk averse specifications, the discussion assumes that each bargainer's 
preferences toward risk follow a CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) utility 
function of the form V[Z(r)] = 1- e-AIZ<l)J , where A is the CARA coefficient. Following 
Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman [1993) (hereafter, BCF), one defines A as 
A = ln[(1+2p) I (1-2p)] 
z (7) 
65 
The other two cases involved 1) a female controller and male noncontroller and 2) a female-female 
dyad. 
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where z is the maximum potential gain from bargaining, p denotes the probability 
premium, and ln[-] =log..[·]. By using Table 2 {to find values of probability premiums, 
p, associated with risk premiums, 8) in BCF (1993, p.22) and equation (7) above, 
one can calculate values for A . For instance, in the case of low risk aversion, Table 
2 in BCF associates e = 10% with p = 0.050167 and given z = 10 tokens= $20, 
one calculates A as follows 
A = ln{[1+2(0.050167)] I (1-2(0.050167)]} 
20 
= 0.01. 
Thus, for low risk aversion one defines a as 
p {1 - e-0.0 l(Z{t)]} - (EQ){1 - e -0.0l[Z(t )) } 
a - __.._c=---....,,.-,,.~--=.;._;.__---:-~~ 
10% - Po[1- e-o.01cz>]- (EQ){1- e-o.011zc1>J } 
(8) 
Similarly, for high risk aversion, e = 50% is associated with p = 0.271844; and 
subsequently, equation (7) yields A = 0.06. Given this, one defines a for high risk 
aversion as 
a = Pcf1 - e-o oorzci>J}-(EQ){1 - e-o.oorzcr>J} 
S0<1- P o[1-e-o.oocz> ] -(EQ){1- e-o.oorz11>J} . (9) 
Finally, weak rationality is a time-independent measure and is defined in equation 
(4). 
Table 6 gives the mean, median, and standard deviation for the four a 
measures by treatment. For weak rationality, Table 6 shows that Treatment 1 
Table 6. Constrained Self-Interest Weight, a 
Weak Rationality High Risk Aversion Low Risk Aversion Risk Neutral 
(lime-independent, a 1) (50% risk premium, aSO'\) 
(10% risk premium, a,~) (a,,. ) 
Treatment 
(Protocol Standard Standard Standard Standard 
Scheme) r Mean Median Deviation Mean Median Deviation Mean Median Deviation Mean Median Deviation 
1 10 0.5068 0.4651 0.4449 0.3536 0.378 1 0.3094 0.3266 0.3419 0 .2862 0.3211 0.3348 0.28 15 
2 10 -0.0074 0.0000 0.3945 -0.0204 0.0000 0.3311 -0.0213 0 .0000 0.3176 -0.0215 0.0000 0.3148 
3 10 0.1720 0.0294 0.2846 0.1166 0 .0115 0.2125 0. 1079 0.0098 0 .1991 0.1061 0.0094 0.1963 
4 10 0.4750 0.3934 0.4446 0.3385 0 .2245 0.3628 0.3155 0.2005 0.3473 0.3109 0.1957 0.3442 
5 10 0.3191 0.2132 0.4547 0.2292 0. 1222 0.3508 0.2167 0.1105 0.3400 0.2143 0.1082 0.3380 
6 10 0.4640 0.5074 0 .4462 0.3686 0.2277 0.3988 0.3548 0 .2012 0.3938 0.3520 0.1960 0.3928 
Note: a1 is a time-independent measure while a 50'k, a 10'l.o and a ,v are time-dependent measures. Also, in accordance with theoretical 




maintains the highest mean a (a) at 0.5068 and Treatment 2 reports the lowest at 
a= -0.007 4. For the time-dependent (strict) measures of rationality, Treatment 6 
contains the highest a and Treatment 2, once again, holds the lowest a .66 By and 
large, whether one considers the mean or median, one major observation emerges 
from Table 6. Except for Treatment 2, constrained self-interest (i.e., 0< a<1) clearly 
dominates the treatments across all measures of rationality. That is, constrained 
self-interest appears robust across both time-independent and time-dependent 
measures of rationality. This means that neither strict nor weak rationality (where 
a~ 1 for both) explains the bargainers' behavior. These results remain consistent 
with the observations from Table 5 where the risk neutral measure indicates that 
58.3% of the bargainers weight the two extremes of pure self-interest and equity. 
Figure 5 further illustrates the dominance of constrained self-interest behavior. This 
figure shows the cumulative frequency distribution of the risk neutral measure of 
rationality ( aN) for each treatment. Similar to Figure 4, the cumulative frequency 
distributions indicate that at least 50% of the bargains, in each treatment [excluding 
Treatment 2's {T2) 40%), fall within the range of constrained self-interest (0< a <1 ). 
So far, the discussion uses R and a to describe how the bargainers behaved 
in the experiment. Since the discussion maintains a special interest in the 
controller's behavior, the controller's observed probability of winning the lottery, 
Pr (controller wins) = Pc, naturally offers another way to analyze this experiment. 
Table 7 summarizes the descriptive statistics for Pc by treatment. This table reveals 
that only 11 .7% (7 out of 60) of the controllers obtained a probability of victory at 
66 
Recall, when Pc<EQ , a<O (see Section 5 .2). The negative mean a values under Treatment 
(Protocol) 2 result from the fact that two controllers accepted an extremely low probability of victory 
where Pc< EQ . In fact, one controller accepted Pc=15% (see Table 7). Further comments regarding 
these Pc values will occur, shortly, when the discussion analyzes Table 7. 
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Table 7. Controller's Observed Probability of Winning, Pc 
# of controllers 
Treatment who obtained a 
(Protocol Pr(win) such 
Scheme) r that Pc~ P0 . Mean Median 
1 10 2 0.692 0.660 
2 10 0 0.490 0.500 
3 10 0 0.562 0.500 
4 10 2 0.685 0.650 
5 10 2 0.605 0 .550 




























least as great as the outside option ( P0 ) . The base group (T1) holds the highest 
mean Pc at 0.692. Protocols 4 and 6 closely follow with a mean Pc value of 0.685. 
Protocol 2 contains the lowest mean value at 0.490. A mean Pc < EQ = 0.500 is not 
surprising for Protocol 2 given this protocol reports a negative mean a as seen in 
Table 6. An explanation for Protocol 2's highly irrational results rests in the fact that 
not only did two controllers accept a Pc < 50% (refer back to Table 5) but one of 
them accepted an extremely low Pc equal to 15% (see Table 7). From an 
observation of the latter controller's post experimental questionnaire, one finds that 
this controller (a male) did not know his opponent (a female), but for the loyalty 
question he marked "b" which indicates he felt loyal to the noncontroller. A response 
of "b" supports the controller's observed opponent loyalty behavior. 67 Overall, aside 
from Protocol 2, it appears that most controllers only take partial advantage of their 
bargaining position, such that 50% < Pc < P0 = 90%. 
Lastly, several implications emerge from Table 5 with respect to time. First, 
no deadline effect exists. The overall mean time remaining is 235.2 seconds. Note, 
since this analysis measures time in terms of seconds remaining, a mean time of 
235.2 seconds implies that bargainers, on average, reached an agreement after 64.8 
seconds (recall rmax = 5 minutes= 300 seconds, so that 300 - 235.2 = 64.8) of 
bargaining. Moreover, an inspection of the mean time remaining by treatment 
reveals no apparent deadline effect. Figure 6 charts the mean times by treatment. 
This figure implies that Treatment 2, on average, yields the quickest bargains at 
256.5 seconds remaining and Treatment 5 yields the slowest bargains at 216.3 
67 One might simply tag this observattion (Pc =15%) as an outlier and throw it out. However, given 
this controller's responses to the post experimental questionnaire, one cannot find any meaningful 
~~asons for throwing it out. The controller acknowledges his loyalty to the other player and he acts on 
260 -"' "C c: 250 0 . 
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Figure 6. Average Time Remaining in Each Treatment 
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seconds remaining. Neither of these results lies close to the deadline of 0 seconds 
remaining. Generally speaking, the timing results of this experiment remain 
consistent with Shogren and Herriges's (1994) timing results which report an overall 
mean time of 255.2 (i.e. , 300 - 44.8) seconds remaining. Thus, when bargainers 
face costly transactions, RMS's ( 1988) deadline effect does not hold. 
Second, this experiment's timing results imply that delay, in general, is not a 
preferred strategy among the bargainers. This implication remains more visible 
through an inspection of Figure 7 which illustrates the relative frequency distribution 
of times remaining for each treatment. Note, Figure 7 reveals that early bargains 
dominate. The majority of agreement times fall within the range of 211 to 300 
seconds remaining. This means that most bargainers took only Oto 89 seconds to 
reach a decision. Thus, bargainers did not, in general, use bargaining delays to 
signal information, such as reservation prices and preferences. 
Finally, the above timing results suggest that most bargainers maintain some 
appreciation for the opportunity cost of time. The relatively high frequency of early 
decisions seems to indicate that bargainers associated an earlier bargain with a 
higher Z (t ) value. Thus, although the bargainers obtained, approximately, 
traditionally efficient bargains (recall the overall mean 'l' = 0.972) and not reward 
efficient bargains (recall the overall mean R = -1.370), the bargainers did not 
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Figure 7. The Relative Frequency Distribution of the Time Remaining in Each Treatment 
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7.2 Analysis of Variance Results 
Section 7.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics which emerge from this 
experiment. Though an observation of these statistics sparks several economic 
implications regarding R , a, Pc , and TIME one cannot make statistical inferences 
from these observations alone. For example, although Section 7.1 implies that the 
mean time remaining may vary by treatment (recall Figure 6), the observed 
differences may not be statistically significant. To statistically infer that differences 
exist among the six treatments, one must use an appropriate test procedure. The 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) remains an appropriate procedure for the task at 
hand, which is to determine whether or not the observed differences in treatment 
means, as seen in Section 7.1, remain statistically significant. With this, the 
discussion proceeds as follows. First, the discussion defines the basic ANOV A for 
this experiment. Next, the discussion defines two additional techniques, the least 
significant difference method and treatment contrasts, which compl iment the basic 
ANOV A Lastly, the discussion presents the experimental results from all of these 
techniques. 
Given th is experiment uses a completely randomized design, one bases the 
ANOVA on the single factor model depicted in equation (4) of Section 5.3. But since 
the discussion analyzes the experimental results in terms of four response variables, 
one redefines equation (4) as 
Y(iilk) = µ1c + i-(ilk) + t:(iilk) l; = 1.2, .... 6 ~= 1,2, ... ,10 k - 1,2,3,4 
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where y (ijlk) represents the jth observation for treatment i given the response 
variable k (= 1 for R, = 2 for a,= 3 for Pc , and= 4 for TIME), µ", -rc;i1:i • and s (ijll:) are 
as defined in Section 5.3 [for equation (4)] given response variable k. This means 
that the discussion, separately, applies the ANOVA to the following four models: 
v( ."12) = a .. = µ + -r. + £ .. / , IJ I) I I) 
Y(ij13) = P c(ij> = µ + -r; + sij 





for i=1,2,3, ... ,6 and j=1,2,3,. .. , 10. Table 8 illustrates the structure for the data sets 
which the above models describe. Note, Y;. equals the total sum of the observations 
in Treatment i (Y;. = I..~:1 Y;i ), Y.. = I.,~=1 Y; .. Y;. =(I.~:, yij ) 110, and y_ = y_ I 60 [where 
N =qr= (6)(10) = 60]. Table 9 presents the basic structure of the ANOVA for 
models of the type Y;i = µ + -r; + sij . 
Following the discussion in Section 5.3, for each of the models depicted in 
equations (1 0) through (13) the ANOVA tests 
Ha: µ1 =µ2 =µ3 =µ4 = µs =µs 
HA: µ ; * µ j for at least one pair ( i, J). 
If the overall F-statistic [= MS(Tr) I MSE ] is sufficiently large, then one can reject H0 
and support the claim that not all treatment means (or effects) are the same. A 
rejection of H 0 , however, infers nothing about which µ; 's differ. To find which 
treatment means differ, one can apply the least significant difference (LSD) method. 
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Table 8. Basic Structure of Data Sets 
Treatment Replications (Observations) Totals Averages 
1 Y1.1 Y1.2 Yt3 Y1.10 Ylo 5;,. 
2 Y2.1 .Y2.2 Y2.3 Y2.10 Y2 .Y2 
3 .Y3.1 .Y3.2 Y3.3 YJ.10 YJ J3 
4 Y4.1 Y4.2 _Y4 3 Y4.10 Y4. Y4 
5 Ys.1 Ys.2 Ys.3 Ys.10 Ys Ys 
6 Ys.1 .Ys.2 Ys.3 .Ys.10 Ys. .Ys. 
Y .. y 
Table 9. Structure of ANOVA for Models of the Type yij = µ + r, + £ 11 
Degrees of Mean 
Source Freedom Sum of Squares Square F·Statistic 
q 2 2 
MS(Tr) =SS( Tr) F= MS(Tr) 
Treatments SS(Tr) = L .Y;. _2'.::_ q-1 
1= 1 r N (q -1) MSE 
Error N-q SSE= SST - SS( Tr) 
MSE= SSE 
(N-q) 
q r 2 
SST= LLY,~ _L_ ~ Corrected Total N-1 0 
i=1 i= 1 N ~ 
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That is, given a rejection of the above null hypothesis for equality of the µ; 's, LSD 
tests H
0
: µ; = µi for all i ~ j . To explain, one develops the LSD test criterion from 
the following test statistic 
where Y;. = [1; =fl+ i ; is a point estimator for the ith treatment mean (µ; ), 
y j · =fl j =fl + :r, is a point estimator for the jth treatment mean ( µ j ), MSE is the 
mean square error from the ANOVA, and r, and r, are the number of observations 
in Treatments i and j, respectively. [Notice, since the current experiment replicates 
all treatments the same amount (r =IO) of times, r; = ri = r and the denominator in 
t
0 
reduces to '12CMSE)lr.] If H0 : µ, =µi istrue,then t0 followsar-distribut ionwith 
N-q degrees of freedom. Within this framework, one defines the LSD test criteria for 
H0 : µ , = µ1 V i ~ j as follows 
. H ·t 1- -1 ~2(MSE) LSD reject 0 1 Y;. - Yi- > ta12.N- q r = 
where a . here, denotes the level of significance, not the constrained self-interest 
weight. 
Though the LSD method allows one to determine (given a rejection of H0 : 
µ, = µ2 = · · · = µ 9 from an ANOVA F-test) which treatment means differ, it is limited to 
pairwise comparisons. Another statistical technique, called treatment contrasts, 
enables one to compare groups of treatment means. This latter technique remains 
especially useful for th is experiment because it allows one to compare the mean (or 
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effects) of : (1) cheap talk versus no cheap talk, (2) free form versus structured 
bargaining, and (3) controller moves first versus noncontroller moves first. 68 
To help facil itate an explanation of treatment contrasts consider comparison 
(2), above. Here one wishes to test the equality of the average of Treatments 1 and 
2 versus the average of Treatments 3,4,5, and 6. In terms of formal hypotheses, this 
comparison tests 
Ho: i(µ, + µ2) = -;}(µ3 + µ4 + µ5 + µ6) 
HA: i(µ,+µ2):1:- -;} (µ3+ µ4+µ5+ µ6) 
or multiplying through by 4 one writes 
Ho: 2(µ, + µ2) = (µ3 + µ4 + µ5 + µ6) 
HA: 2(µ, + µ2) :I: (µ3 + µ4 + µ5 + µ6). 
One can state the null hypothesis in terms of a linear combination, L;_ , of treatment 
sample means, where 
If one denotes the coefficients on the Y;. terms as c; , 4_ is a treatment contrast if 
r:=,c; = 0. Since r :=1 C; = 2 + 2 - 1- 1-1-1=0, 4. is a treatment contrast. In 
general, if 






L = ""' c.y-£..J l , . 
•=1 
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is a treatment contrast. 69 Given this definition, it follows that comparison (1 ), which 
corresponds to H0 : (µ2 + µ5 + µ6 ) = (µ, + µ 3 + µ4 ), and comparison (3), which 
corresponds to H0 : (µ3 + µ 5 ) = (µ4 + µ6 ) , are treatment contrasts, too. 
One can test the hypotheses based on the treatment contrasts through the 
ANOV A. The procedure is as follows. Assign 1 degree of freedom to each treatment 
contrast and calculate a sum of squares for each treatment contrast, SSLn, as follows 
(1 4) 
where n = 1 , ... , h denotes h different treatment contrast sum of squares. Next, use 
the SSLn 's to partition the treatment sum of squares, SS(Tr), in the ANOVA. But 
note, since each SSLn is associated with 1 degree of freedom, there can be no more 
than q - 1 (which equals the degrees of freedom for treatments in the ANOVA) 
69 As a technical note, if one defines L in terms of treatment totals such that C = I,;.,,c;y,. , then L" 
is a treatment constrast if I,; .. 
1 
c;r; = 0 ; or if the experiment equally replicates all the treatments (i.e. , 
r1 = ··· = rq = r) then this condition reduces to ""' q c. = 0. 
k.ii::1 I 
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treatment contrasts; i.e., h s (q-1) . Additionally, in order to establish and conduct 
independent tests on each of the treatment contrasts, the contrasts must be mutually 
orthogonal. In general, if two treatment contrasts, L0 and 4 , contain the set of 
coefficients { c;} and { d;}, respectively, then L
0 
and 4 are orthogonal if 
or if the treatments are equally replicated then the orthogonality condition reduces to 
q 
L c,d, = o .7o 
i=1 
For this experiment the treatment contrasts are: 
70 Alternatively , if one defines L in terms of treatment totals such that L. = L:=, c,y,. , then L: and 
L~ are orthogonal if L:=
1
c;d;r; = 0 , or given equally replicated treatments the condition reduces to 
L:=,c;d; = O. Whether one defines L in terms of Y;. or Y;. makes no difference because both yield 
equivalent results. However, one point of caution remains here: if the treatments are not equally 
replicated (e.g., r, :1: r, for Treatments iand j) then the coefficients in Land L. will be different, so 
that L = L:=
1 
c,y;. and L• = L:=/.Y; .. This difference remains important for estimation purposes 
because some statistical packages, like SAS, calculate SSL in terms of )i;. [i.e., SAS uses equation 
(14) , above]. Thus, plugging in coefficients related to L will yield incorrect estimates in SAS. To 
calculate the sum of squares tor L. , one must use the equation: 
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L, - - - - +- +-= -y,. + Y2. - YJ. - Y4. Ys. Ys. 
Lz = 2y,. + 2:Y2. - YJ. - J4. - Ys. - Ys. 
1-:J= 
If one defines the set of coefficients for each treatment contrast as 
{ ci }={-1, 1,-1,-1,1,1} for L,. {dJ ={2,2,-1,-1,-1,-1} for Lz, and {!i}={0.0,1,-1,1,-1} 
for ~, then one sees that 
6 
L, cA = O => L, and Lz are orthogonal, 
i =1 
6 
L, cJi = 0 => L, and ~ are orthogonal, and 
•=1 
6 
L, d,fi = O => 4 and 1-:J are orthogonal. 
i= l 
Thus, L,. Lz, and 1-:J are mutually orthogonal contrasts. Table 1 O illustrates the 
structure of the ANOVA given these contrasts. If F,, is sufficiently large, then one 
rejects H 0 for L,,, where n = 1.2,3. And note, if the number of contrasts h< (q -1), 
one completes the partition of the SS(Tr) with a category called "Others" , where the 
sum of squares for Others ( SSO) equals the remainder of SS( Tr ) - :L:=
1
SSL,,. 
Although a F-test on Others may yield valuable information in some instances, this 
experiment finds no meaningful interpretation for Others; and hence, excludes this 
test. In sum, the ANOVA provides a F-test for hypotheses involving group 
comparisons (contrasts) of treatments. 
Based on the preceding discussion, the analysis, now, turns to a presentation 
of the results. The presentation begins with the results for the response variables R, 
Table 10. Structure of ANOVA Given Orthogonal Treatment Contrasts 
Source Degrees of Freedom Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Statistic 
Treatments q -1 SS( Tr ) MS( Tr ) F= MS(Tr )/MSE 
OrthogonalContrasts: 
L, SSL, MSL, = SSL,/1 F1 = MSL,/MSE 
4 1 ss4 MS4 =SS4/1 F2 = MS4/MS£ 
....... 
~ 1 SS~ MS~ =SS~/1 F3 = MS~/MSE ....... 0 
Others (q - 1)- 3 sso MSO = sso/(q-1)- 3 
Error N-q SSE MS£ 
Corrected Total N- 1 SST 
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Pc, and TIME . Afterwards, a presentation for the constrained self-interest weight, 
a, follows. 
Table 11 contains the ANOVA results for R, Pc, and TIME. The overall F-
value ( = MS(Tr)/ MSE) for R (F = 2.03) and Pc (F = 2.28) remains moderately 
significant given that 0.05 < p-value <0.10 in both cases. For TIME the overall F-
value equals 1.14 and remains statistically insignificant since the p-value = 0.3516 
>> 0.1 O. This means that one can reject the null hypothesis of equality of treatment 
means (i.e., reject H0 : µ 1 = µ2 = · · · = µ 6 } for R and Pc, but not for TIME . These test 
results suggest that the observed differences in average times remaining across 
treatments, as seen in Figure 6, remain statistically insignificant, while the observed 
differences in mean R and mean Pc across treatments, as seen in Tables 5 and 7, 
respectively, remain statistically significant for at least one pair ( i, j} of treatments. 
As mentioned earlier, the LSD method allows one to determine which 
treatment (protocol) pairs differ, given a rejection of H0 for the equality of treatment 
means. Figure 8 summarizes the LSD results (at a 5% level of significance) for R 
and Pc- (Note, since one cannot reject H0 : µ 1 = µ 2 = · · · = µ 6 for TIME, one cannot 
remain confident about LSD results for TIME ; thus, th is analysis excludes the LSD 
approach for TIME.) The figure presents the treatment means in descending order. 
Treatment pairs not connected by a line remain statistically different. Given th is, 
Figure 8 illustrates that µ2 and µ5 differ and µ5 and µ6 differ in terms of R . For Pc , 
µ, and µ2 differ, µ2 and µ4 differ, and µ2 and µ6 differ. Since ~>Rs and Rs> R5 , 
the LSD results suggest that, on average, free form/cheap talk bargaining (Protocol 
2) and structured/cheap talk bargaining with the noncontroller as first mover 
(Protocol 6) both yield more efficient bargains than structured/cheap talk bargaining 
with the controller as first mover (Protocol 5) . These results indicate that pairwise 
Table 11 . Analysis of Variance for Three Response Variables, R. Pc. TIME 
Reward Efficiency Pr(controller wins) Time Remaining 
(R) (Pc) (TIME) 
Degrees 
of Sumot Mean Pr > F Sum of Mean Pr > F Sum ol Mean Pr > F 
Source of Variation Freedom Squares Square F-value {p-value) Squares Square F-vatue (p-value) Squares Square F-value (p-value) 
Trealmenls 5 19 4089 38818 2.03 00896 0 3412 00682 2 28 00590 1019 1 68 2038.34 I 14 03516 
Orthooonal Confrasls: 
(T2. TS. T6) vs. (T 1, T3. T 4)a 1 09563 09563 050 0.4830 00421 0.0421 I 41 0 2402 13 1602 131602 0.73 03951 
(Tl . T2) vs. (T3, T4 , TS, T6)b 1 3.5363 35363 1 85 0 1800 0 0249 0.0249 083 03650 2585 41 2585.41 1.44 02348 
(T3. TS) vs. (T4, T6)c 1 4 1926 4 1926 2 19 0.1449 0.1000 0 1000 3 45 00688 2449 23 2449 23 I 37 0 2474 
Olhers 2 107237 5.3619 2 80 0 1712 0.0856 286 3841 02 1920.5 1 1 07 
En or 54 103 4799 1 9163 1 6135 00299 96704 so 1790 82 
Correcled TOia! 59 122.8889 I 9S47 106896 18 
a (T2, TS, T6) vs. (Tl, T3, T4) s L, = cheap talk versus no cheap talk. 
b (Tl , T2) vs. (T3, T4, TS, T6) ,. Lz= free form bargaining versus structured bargaining. 
c (T3, TS) vs. (T4, T6) ,. /'3 =controller moves first versus noncontroller moves first. 
Treatment (Protocol) 2 6 
Mean, Ii; -0.528 -0.873 
Treatment (Protocol) 1 4 
Mean, Pcc;> 0.692 0.685 
Figure 8. LSD Results for R and Pc 
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efficiency differences only exist among the cheap talk protocols, not between cheap 
talk and non-cheap talk protocols, and not among non-cheap talk protocols. Based 
on this information, one may reject the Efficiency Hypothesis (as stated in Section 
5.2), since no pairwise comparisons between the base group (Protocol 1) and the 
other protocols remains statistically significant (i.e., no protocol scheme exhibits a 
significantly higher efficiency level than Protocol 1 ). Finally, since 
Pcc2 ><Pcc6>=Pcc4><Pcc1>, the LSD results for Pc suggest that controllers, on average, 
secure higher probabilities of victory under Protocols 1, 4, and 6 than under Protocol 
2. Given a higher Pc depicts more, economically, rational behavior than a lower 
Pc, the LSD results for P, also, imply that controllers under protocols 1,4, and 6 
behave more rationally than the controllers in Protocol 2. 
To further analyze the treatment effects, one can turn back to the ANOVA in 
Table 11 and conduct F-tests on the three treatment contrasts which were derived 
earlier. For the response variable R none of the contrasts remain statistically 
significant at either the 5% or 10% level of significance. In terms of Li. this means 
that cheap talk bargainers as a group do not, on average, bargain any more or less 
efficiently than non-cheap talk bargainers. For Pc contrasts Li and Li remain 
insignificant, as their large p-values indicate, but contrast ~ remains significant at 
the 10% level (since the p-value = 0.0688 < 0.10). This suggests that Pc results, on 
average, differ depending on who moves first in structured bargaining. Lastly, since 
the overall F-test, for TIME, fails to reject H0 : µ1 = µ2 = ·· · = µ6 , a F-test on the 
treatment contrasts for TIME remains meaningless. Nevertheless, Table 11 reports 
the F-values for each contrast under TIME and as one might suspect they remain 
highly insignificant, as their large p-values indicate. This completes the ANOVA for 
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R, Pc , and TIME. Now the discussion turns to an analysis of the constrained self-
interest weight, a. 
Recall that this analysis considers three time-dependent measures of a 
(a
50
.., , a,0.., , and a ..., ) and one time-independent measure (a,). Table 12 presents 
the ANOVA results for each measure of a. The overall F-value for a, (F = 2.41) 
remains significant at the 5% level (since the p-value = 0.0479 < 0.05) and the 
overall F-values for a 50.., (F = 2.20), a 1a... (F = 2.14), and a ..., (F = 2.13) remain 
significant at the 10% level (since the 0.05 < p-value < 0.1 O in all three cases). This 
allows one to reasonably reject H0 : µ, = µ 2 = ·· · = µ6 across all measures of a . 
Given the overall F-test for each a measure suggests that differences exist among 
the treatments for at least one pair (i , j), the analysis, once again, uses the LSD 
method to determine pairwise differences among the treatments. Figure 9 
summarizes the LSD results (at a 5% level of significance) for each a measure. For 
a , Figure 9 illustrates that µ, and µ 2 differ, µ 2 and µ4 differ, and µ 2 and µ6 differ. 
Similarly, for a 50% , a,0.., . and a..., Figure 9 shows that µ 1 and µ 2 differ, µ 2 and µ4 
differ, and µ 2 and µ6 differ. Since a ,c1» a ,,4» a ,<6» a 1<2>, the LSD results suggest 
that Protocols 1, 4, and 6 yield more rational behavior than Protocol 2 when one 
considers time-independence. The three time-dependent measures yield similar 
conclusions. Since a6 > a1> a4 > a2 across all time-dependent measures, the LSD 
results suggest that Protocols 1, 4, and 6 yield more rational behavior than Protocol 
2. 
Lastly, turn back to Table 12 and note the individual F-tests for each 
treatment contrast. Across all measures of a contrasts L, and 4 remain highly 
insignificant (since the p-value >> 0.10 for all a measures), but contrast ~ remains 
significant at the 10% level (since the p-value < 0.1 O for each a measure). This 
Table 12. Analysis of Variance for the Constrained Self-Interest Weights 
Weak Rationality High Risk Aversion Low Risk Aversion 
(time Independent, a 1) 
(50% risk premium, a 50,) (10"4 risk premium. a 10,) 
Source of Variation OF. S .S . M.S . F-value Pr > F S.S . M.S. F-value Pr > F SS. M.S F-value Pr > F 
Trealmenls s 2.087 0 417 2.41 0 0479 1 218 0244 2.20 0.0677 1.094 0219 2 14 0.0747 
Orthogonal Contrasts: 
{T2. TS, T6) vs. (T l , T2. T4)a 1 0.238 0238 1 38 0 24S7 0089 0089 0 81 0.373S 0067 0.067 065 0.4234 
{Tl . T2) vs. (T3, T4 , T S, T6)b 1 0 1SS 0.1SS 0.90 0 3483 0 12S 0 12S 1 12 0.2936 0 123 0 123 1.20 0.2774 
(T3. TS) vs. (T4, T6)c 1 0.501 0.501 2.90 0.0944 0326 0.326 2 95 0.0918 0.299 0.299 2.92 00932 
Olhers 2 t 193 O.S97 3.4S 0.678 0339 305 0.60S 0 303 2.97 
Error 54 9.342 0.173 5979 0 111 s 524 0 102 
Corrected To1a1 S9 11.429 7 197 6.6 18 
a (T2, TS. T6) vs (T 1, T3, T 4) = L,= cheap talk versus no cheap talk 
b (T 1, T2) vs (T3. T 4, TS, T6) = l,oz= free form bargaining versus slructured bargaining. 
c (T3. TS) vs. (T 4, T6) " ~ = controllef moves first versus noncontroller moves lirst. 
Risk Neutral 
( " ·' ' ) 
S.S. MS. F-value 
1.070 0 2 14 2. 13 
0062 0062 062 
0.123 0 t23 1 22 
0 293 0293 2.91 
O.S92 0296 2.93 


































































suggests that cheap talk bargainers as a group do not, on average, behave any 
more or less rational than non-cheap talk bargainers, and such an inference remains 
robust across both time-dependent and time-independent measures of a . The 
same suggestion, also, applies for a comparison of free form bargainers versus 
structured bargainers. However, when one considers who moves first in structured 
bargaining, the preceding suggestion does not apply. The significance of 4 
suggests that rational behavior differs in structured bargaining depending on who, 
the controller or noncontroller, moves first. More precisely, one can determine 
which group bargains more rationally by calculating the point estimate of 4 
( = )13. + )15. - )14. - y6. ). A negative estimate indicates that the noncontroller/first mover 
group behaves more rationally than the controller/first mover group [i.e., 
(µ 3 + µ5 )<(µ4 + µ 6 ) ] ; conversely, a positive estimate indicates the opposite result 
[i.e., (µ3 + µ 5 )>(µ4 + µ 6 )] . Across all measures of a , the point estimate for 4 is 
negative which implies that sequential (structured) bargaining yields more rational 
behavior when the noncontroller, as opposed to the controller, moves first. 
In short, the preceding results lead to conclusions regarding the three 
hypotheses-- Efficiency, Rationality, and Timing-- which appear in Section 5.2. First, 
the LSD results for reward efficiency ( R ) do not allow one to reject H
0
: µ 1 = µ; V 
i "# 1; thus, one rejects the Efficiency Hypothesis. No protocol scheme yields a 
significantly higher level of efficiency than the base group (Protocol 1 ). Second, 
none of the a measures, on average, exhibit a constrained self-interest weight near 
a value of 1 (see Figure 9). This means that bargainers, on average, did not secure 
pure self-interested agreements across all protocol schemes. Hence, one rejects 
the Rationality Hypothesis. Lastly, for the response variable TIME , a test of H
0
: 
µ1 = µ2 = · · · = µ6 cannot be rejected (recall Table 11 ). This suggests that agreement 
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times {defined as time remaining in seconds) remain independent of protocol 
scheme. Additionally, the experiment exhibits a high frequency of early agreements 
(recall Figure 7). Since the agreement times remain independent of the protocol 
scheme and do not occur near the deadline, this analysis fails to reject the Timing 
Hypothesis.71 
7 .3 Econometric Results 
Finally, to better understand the bargaining behavior in this paper's 
experiment, the analysis considers four multiple regression models. Equation (5) in 
Section 5.3 represents model 1 which, for convenience, is 
6 
y = /30 + /3,DTOK + I/3;'r; + /37GFM + /38GMF + f39GFF + /310 LOYA + £. 
i=2 
Model 2 mimics model 1 except model 2 replaces LOYA with LOYD as follows 
6 
y = /30 + /3,DTOK + I/3;'r; + [3.,GFM + f38GMF + f39GFF + /310 LOYD+ £ 
i=2 
71 As a final note, it may seem reasonable to conduct a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
which includes the four response variables, R, a, Pc . and TIME . Such an analysis reveals 
information about the correlation (if any) between the response (dependent) variables [see Stevens 
(1992)). This type of information, however, does not remain too critical for the present study because 
~everal of the response variables remain functions of each other. For example, all measures of a 
include Pc , and R depends on TIME. ; hence, the analyst already knows which variables remain 
correlated. 
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where LOYD= 1 if the controller's loyalty response from the Post 
Experimental Questionnaire is "d", and= 0 otherwise. 
An examination of the open-ended responses to choice •d" (LOYD), from the Post 
Experimental Questionnaire, reveals that 21 out of 60 controllers marked "d", and of 
these 21 controllers 9 wrote "to be fair" and 9 wrote "a & b" or "both." Clearly, these 
responses retain the same meaning; and hence, this analysis considers response 
"d" as a loyalty towards fairness. Lastly, except for the loyalty variable, all other 
variables in models (1) and (2) maintain the same definition as given in Section 5.3 
for equation (5). 
Additionally, rather than use each treatment separately as a regressor, 
models 3 and 4 partition the treatments into three groups [which coincide with the 
three treatment contrasts found in Section 7.2]. Specifically, model 3 is 
where CT= 1 if cheap talk and = O if not 
STRVCT = 1 if structured bargaining and = O if free form bargaining 
NC = 1 if noncontroller (in structured bargaining) moves first, 
and = O if controller (in structured bargaining) moves first. 
All other variables retain the same definition as given in Section 5.3 for equation (5). 
Model 4 mirrors model 3 except model 4 replaces LOYA with LOYD. 
Table 13 summarizes the regression results for the response variables R p 
I C t 
and TIME , under models 1 and 2. In this table, except for the overall F-values, all 
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Table 13. Regression Results for Three Response Variables, R . Pc . TIME : 
Models 1 and 2 
Reward E fficiency Pr(Controller Wins) Tim e Remaining 
(R) <Pel (TIME) 
Terms Model 1 Model2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept, {30 ·1.0052 ·0.9920 0.6924 . 0.9089. 246.5828. 252.0045. 
(0 8577) (0.8354) (0.0914) (0.0888) (26.1816) (25 3702) 
Difference in inital wealth , DTOK ·00373 ·0 .0389 ·0.0008 -0.0 145 ·2.3t65 ·2.6830 
(0 1024) (0.1019) (0.0109) (0.0108) (3.1254) (3.0944) 
Treatment 2, t 2 0.9248 1.0179 ·0.1718. -0.2033. 23.2984 25.4682 
(0.6625) (0.6465) (0.0706) (0.0688) (20.2212) (19.6331 ) 
Treatment 3, f3 0.1805 0.2360 ·0.11 6 1 -0.1279 •• 1.0812 2.5368 
(0.6702) (0.6661) (007 14) (0.0708) (20.4581 ) (20.2.297) 
Treatment 4. r, ·0.11 58 0 .0069 ·0.0022 0 .0192 ·1 .9553 2.3617 
(0 6622) (0.6730) (0.0706) (0.0716) (20.2138) (20.4393) 
Treatment 5. rs -07531 -0.8115 ·0.1390 •• ·0.1724. -13.1175 -15.7094 
(0 6561) (0 6635) (0.0699) (0.0706) (20.0258) (20.1506) 
Treatment 6, re 0.5058 0 .4589 -0.0109 -0.0651 9 .2346 6.5201 
(0.6498) (0.6586) (0.0692) (0.0700) (19.8344) (20.0011) 
Female-Male Genders. CF.II -0.5364 -0.55 13 0.0124 -0.0309 -16 .7561 -18.2238 
(0 6526) (0 6533) (0.0695) (0.0695) (19.9201) (19.8388) 
Male-Female Genders, G ,.,,. ·0.0345 -0.0434 -0.0592 -0.1154 0.6642 ·0.91 42 
(0 6622) (0.6610) (00706) (0.0703) (20.2126) (20.0745) 
Female-Female Genders, G,.,. ·0 .5919 ·0.5936 -0 1023 -0.1954. -1 1.0691 -13.2772 
(0.6654) (0.6578) (0 0709) (0.0700) (20.3109) (19.9762) 
Loyalty A. LOYA -0 1625 0 .1596. · 1.3671 
(0 4405) (0.0469) (13.4472) 
Loyalty D. LOYD -0.2226 -0.1626. ·10 .6910 
(0 4424) (0.0471 ) (13.4361) 
Overall F·value for m odel 1 172 t .187 3.605. 3.659. 0 .769 0 .841 
Note: the top number for each term represen ts the estimated coefficient and the bottom number in parentheses 
represents the estimate's standard error. 
• significant at the 5% level. 
··significant at the 10% level. 
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non-parenthetical numbers represent parameter estimates and all numbers in 
parentheses represent standard errors associated with the parameter estimates. 
For R and TIME. none of the regression coefficients remain significant (i.e., one 
cannot reject H0 : f3 j = O for each regressor) under models 1 and 2. Given this, it 
remains no surprise that a test for significance of regression (i.e., test H 0 : 
{3, = /32 = · .. = {310 = O) based on the overall F-value for models 1 and 2 under both R 
and TIME cannot be rejected, either. 
For Pc, the overall F-value is 3.605 and 3.659 for models 1 and 2, 
respectively. Both of these F-values remain significant at the 5% level. This means 
that at least one regressor variable in each model contributes to the significance of 
the model. Indeed, t-tests on the individual regression coefficients reveal several 
significant effects. First, a loyalty effect exists across both models, where the 
coefficients on LOYA and LOYD both remain significantly different from zero at the 
5% level. The significantly positive coefficient on LOYA indicates that Pc increases 
when controllers remain loyal to themselves, while the significantly negative 
coefficient on LOYD implies that Pc declines when controllers remain partial ly loyal 
to both themselves and the noncontroller. Second, Treatments 2 and 5 both exhibit 
significantly negative effects on Pc , across both models. Apparently, neither cheap 
talk/free form bargaining ( -r2 ) nor cheap talk/structured (with the controller as first 
mover) bargaining ( -r5 ) induce the controller to secure higher probabilities of victory. 
Thirdly, model 2 contains a gender effect. Pc tends to decline when female 
controllers bargain with female noncontrollers (see the significantly negative 
coefficient on the female-female gender variable). 
Table 14 summarizes the regression results across all measures of the 
constrained self- interest weight, a, for models 1 and 2. As in Table 13, except for 
Table 14. Regression Results for the Constrained Self-Interest Weights: Models 1 and 2 
Weak Ratt0nali ty High Risk Aversion Low Risk Aversion Risk Neutral 
(lime independent, a 1) (50% risk premium. er-) (10% risk premium. a,~) ( cr-J 
Tenns Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
lnlercept, /Jo 0.4951 . t 0313. 03791. 0 7993 . 0.3531. 0 7543 . 034n· 0.7450 . 
(0 2209) (0.2139) (0 1789) (0 1720) (0 t725) (0.1664) (0 1712) (0 1653) 
Ditterence in inttal wealth, DTOK -0.0059 -00398 -00049 -0.0314 -00044 -00298 ·0 0043 ·0.0294 
(0.0264) (0.0261) (0.0214) (0.02 10) (00206) (0.0203) (00204) (00202) 
Trea1ment 2. rz ·0.4364. ·0.5 128. ·0.3 135. -0 37 10 . -0 2890 . ·O 3448 . -0 2840 . ·O 3394. 
(0 t706) (0 1655) (0 1302) (0.133 1) (0 1332) (0 t288) (0 1322) (0.1279) 
Trealment 3, rl -0 2894 .. -0.3 177 - ·02001 -0.2209 -0 1830 ·O 2033 -0 1795 -0 1998 
(0 t 726) (0 1706) (0 1398) (0.1372) (0. t348) (0 1327) (0 1338) (0.1318) 
Trea1ment 4, r, -0 0093 00455 ·00010 0045 1 00030 0.0458 00038 00459 
(0 1705) (0 1723) (0.1381) (0 1386) (0.1332) (0 1340) (0 1322) (0.1332) 
Treatmenl 5. rs ·O 3055 •• ·03891. ·02087 -0 2756 . -0 1883 -0 25 t 7 •• ·O 1841 -0.2468 •• 
(0 1690) (0 1699) (0 t369) (0 1366) (0 t319) (0 1322) (0 13t0) (0. t313) 
Treatment 6, r, -0.055 1 -0 1900 -0 ()():JO -0 t098 00102 -00914 00129 -00876 
(0 1673) (0 t686} (O. t356) (0 t356) (0 1307) (0.13t2) (0 1297) (0 1303) 
Female-Male Genders. Gn1 00340 ·O 0736 -00327 -0.1 t 73 -0 0409 -0 12 16 ·O 0425 -0 1224 
(0 1681) (0 t673) (0.1361) (0 t345) (0 t3 12) (0 130t) (0 1303) (0 t 292) 
Male-Female Genders, G.,r -0.1224 ·026 16 -0. 1100 -0.2 t93 ·0. 1066 -0 2108 -0 1058 -0 2090 
(0.1705) (0 1693) (0.138 1) (0 1361 ) (0 1332) (O. t3 17) (0 1322) (0 t308) 
Female-Female Genders, Grr -0 2 194 -0 4500' ·O 2090 ·O 3896 ' -0 2017 -0 3742 . -0 200 1 -037 10 . 
(0.17 14) (0.1684) (0 1388) (0.1355) (0 1338) (0.1310) (0 1328) (0 130 1) 
Loyahy A, LOYA 03926 . 0.3033 . 0 2911. 0 2887 . 
(0.1134) (0.0919) (00886) (00879) 
Loyahy 0 , LOYD -0 4057 . ·O 3234 ' -0.3068 . -0 3033 . 
(0 1 t33) (0.09 11) (0.0881) (0 0875) 
Ov-.all F-value for model 3.6 15 . 3.734 . 3.271. 3.504 . 3.184. 3.363 . 3 165 . 3.332 . 
Note: the top number for each tenn represents the e stimated coefficient and lhe bottom number in parentheses represents the estimate's standard error. 
• significant a t the 5% level. 
· ' sign ificant at the 10'% level. 
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the overall F-values, all non-parenthetical numbers represent parameter estimates 
and all numbers in parentheses represent standard errors associated with the 
parameter estimates. Since the overall F-value remains significant at the 5% level 
for models 1 and 2 across all measures of a, one can reject H 0 : 
{31 = {32 = · · · = {310 = O for all the models in Table 14. These F-test results suggest that 
at least one regressor variable, in each model, makes a significant contribution to the 
model. And once again, the analysis uses r-tests on the individual regression 
coefficients to find which regressors make significant contributions. For the time-
independent measure, a1 , Table 14 reveals several ignificant effects. First, similar 
to Pc , a loyalty effect exists across both models for a,, where LOYA and LOYD 
show a significantly positive and negative effect, respectively, on rational behavior. 
This implies that rational behavior increases when controllers remain loyal to 
themselves, while rational behavior decreases when a controller•s loyalty lies 
partially with him/herself and the noncontroller. Such results remain consistent with 
theoretical expectations since one would expect self-interested feelings to increase 
rational behavior, and fairness feelings to decrease rational behavior. Second, 
Treatments 2, 3, and 5 yield significantly negative effects on a,, in both models. 
This suggests that Protocols (Treatments) 2,3, and 5 lead controllers toward less 
rational behavior. Given Protocols 3 and 5 both involve structured bargaining with 
the controller as first mover, one might speculate that having the controller move first 
induces some type of awareness (or sympathy) for the noncontroller's 
disadvantageous bargaining position; and hence, leads the controller towards less 
rational behavior. Similarly, Protocol 2 may induce, through its various modes of 
communication (e.g., verbal, written , and cheap talk), some type of intrinsic 
awareness for the noncontroller's well-being. Such explanations for the negative 
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effects of Protocols 2, 3, and 5 on rational behavior are not unrealistic if these 
Protocols cause the controller to consider how his/her actions affect the 
noncontroller's well-being (or expected utility).72 Lastly, Table 14 indicates that the 
coefficient on the female-female gender variable is negative and significant at the 
5% level. This suggests that rational behavior declines when female controllers 
bargain with female noncontrollers. 
For the time-dependent measures of a (a50._, , a,0% and a ,., ), Table 14 reports 
many of the same effects as found for a1 • Specifically, the WYA and LOYD effects 
and the female-female gender effect all appear robust across both time-independent 
and time-dependent measures of a. As for the treatment (protocol) effects, a slight 
difference occurs between a 1 and the time-dependent measures of a . Protocol 2 
and Protocol 5 (only for model 2) remain significant across all time-dependent 
measures, while Protocol 3 becomes insignificant with the incorporation of time. 
Tables 13 and 14 summarize the regression results corresponding to models 
1 and 2. For the regression results pertaining to models 3 and 4, the discussion, 
now, focuses on Tables 15 and 16. Table 15 summarizes the regression results for 
the response variables R, Pc , and TIME under models 3 and 4. The overall F-
values for R and TIME under models 3 and 4 are statistically insignificant. This 
suggests that models 3 and 4 offer no help in predicting R and TIME. 
72 Note, actions based on sympathy may not remain irrational. Sen {1977, p . 326} remarks, "It can 
be argued that behavior based on sympathy is in an important sense egoistic, for one is oneself 
pleased at others' pleasure and pained at others' pain, and the pursuit of one's own utility may thus be 
helped by sympathetic action. " An alternative explanation for Protocols 2,3 , and S's negative effect 
on rational behavior might stem from what Sen {1977) calls "commitment.• "If the knowledge of 
torture of others ... does not make you feel personally worse off, but you think it is wrong and you are 
ready to do something to stop it , it is a case of commitment" [Sen (1977, p . 326)). Even if a controller 
does not feel sympathetic towards the nonoontroller, Protocols 2,3 , and 5 might present environments 
which cause a controller to perceive the noncontroller's disadvantageous position as unjust; and 
hence, the controller may make a choice, based on commitment , which yields him'her a lower 
expected level of utility than the outside option. Such an explanation, however, would suggest that 
the experiment failed to induce a belief of morally justified unilateral property rights. 
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Table 15. Regression Results for Three Response Variables, R . Pc. TIME : 
Models 3 and 4 
Reward Efficiency Pr(Controller Wins) Time Remaining 
(R) (Pc ) (TIME) 
Terms Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept, {30 -0.4852 -0.6017 0.6183 . 0.8731 • 258.4745. 260.9889. 
(0.7795) (0.8350) (0.08 19) (0.0865) (23.1623) (24.6472) 
Difference in irntal wealth, DTOK -0.0344 -0.0184 -0.0018 -0.0171 -2.2263 -2. 1264 
(0.1048) (0.1037) (0.01 10) (0.0107) (3.1141) (3.0618) 
Ceap Talk. CT 0.2296 0.2088 -0.0710 •• -0. 1194 . 7.3255 5.6626 
(0.3944) (0.4124) (0.0414) (0.0427) (11 .7205) (12.1727) 
Structured Bargaining, STRUCT -0.7380 -0.7924 -0.0391 -0.0482 -17.5982 -19.3095 
(0 481 3) (0.4868) (0.0506) (0.0504) (14.3026) ( 14.3681) 
Noncontroller Moves First. NC 0 4682 0.5121 0. 1190. 0. 1272. 9.5268 10.9266 
(0.4827) (0 4875) (0.0507) (0.0505) (1 4.3434) (14.3895) 
Female-Male Genders. Gn• -0.7275 -0.7176 0.0256 -0.0217 -20.52 10 -2 1.31 18 
(0.6621) (0.6702) (0.0696) (0.0695) (19.6752) (19.7826) 
Male-Female Genders. GMF -0.1821 -0.1681 -00342 -0. 1020 -2.8807 -4.0199 
(0.6649) (0.6772) (0.0699) (0.0702) (19.7567) (19.9901) 
Female-Female Genders. Gu -0.6870 -0.61 59 -0.0793 -0.1902. -1 3.6502 -14.1831 
(0.6698) (0.6776) (0 0704) (0.0702) (19.9039) (20.0004) 
Loyalty A. LOYA -0.3487 0.1835 . -5.5122 
(0.4316) (0.0454) (12.8268) 
Loyalty D. LOYD -0.0775 -0.1844. -6.2948 
(0 4264) (0.0442) (12.5879) 
Overall F-value for model 0.849 0.762 4.033 . 4. 195 . 0.741 0.750 
Note: the top number for each term represents the estimated coefficient and the bottom number in parentheses 
represents the estimate's standard error. 
• significant at the 5% level. 
•• significant at the 10% level. 
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For Pc, the overall F-values under models 3 and 4 are statistically significant 
at the 5% level. This suggests that models 3 and 4 remain useful in predicting Pc · 
Additionally, individual t-tests on each coefficient in both models reveal several 
significant effects. First, cheap talk yields a significantly negative effect on Pc in 
both models--see the negative coefficients on cheap talk in models 3 and 4. This 
implies that Pc tends to decrease when bargainers exchange costless messages (in 
terms of lottery tickets) prior to bargaining. Second, a first mover effect exists in 
structured bargaining. The coefficient on the noncontroller variable is positive and 
significant (at the 5% level) for both models. This suggests that Pc increases when 
noncontrollers (as opposed to controllers) move first in structured bargaining. Third, 
similar to models 1 and 2, a loyalty effect exists in models 3 and 4. LOYA yields a 
positive and significant effect on Pc , while LOYD yields a negative and significant 
effect on Pc· Lastly, model 4 contains a female-female gender effect. The 
significantly negative coefficient on GFF suggests that Pc declines when female 
controllers bargain with female noncontrollers. 
Table 16 summarizes the regression results across all measures of the 
constrained self-interest weight, a , for models 3 and 4. The overall F-value remains 
significant at the 5% level for models 3 and 4 across all measures of a . This 
suggests that at least one regressor variable, in each model, makes a significant 
contribution to the model. Individual r-tests on the regression coefficients reveal 
which regressor variable(s) significantly affects a . First, model 4, across all a 
measures, contains an initial wealth effect. The coefficient on the difference in initial 
wealth variable is negative and significant (at the 10% level) across all a measures. 
This suggests that as the difference in initial wealth [i.e., DTOK = (Controller's initial 
wealth) - (Noncontroller's initial wealth), and DTOK > O) increases, rational behavior 
Table 16. Regression Results for the Constrained Self-Interest Weights: Models 3 and 4 
Weak Rationality H igh Risk Aversion Low Risk Aversion Risk Neutral 
(time independent. a,) (50% risk premium, a~) (t Oo/o risk premium. a,°') (a,) 
Terms Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept, {J0 0.3023 0 9358 . 0 2326 0 7295. 0 2153 0 6885 . 021 17 0.6800. 
(0.1988) (0 2098) (0 1604) (0.1677) (0 1544) (0 1619) (0 1532) (0.1608) 
Ditterence in inital wealth, DTOK ·O 0083 -0 0462 .. -0 0068 -0 0363 •• -00062 ·O 0344 •• -00061 -0.0340 •• 
(0 0267) (00261) (00216) (0 0208) (0 0208) (0 020 1} (0 0206) (0 0200) 
Cheap Talk, CT -0 1746 •• ·O 2949 • -0 1144 -02099. -0 1017 ·O 1923 • -00991 -0. 1887 . 
(0.1006) (0 1036) (0 08 12) (0.0828) (0.0781) (0 0800) (00775) (0.0794) 
Structured Bargaining, STRUCT -0.0738 ·00966 -0 0430 -0 0623 ·O 0366 ·O 0547 -0 0353 -0 053 1 
(0.1228) (0 1223) (0 0990) (0 0978) (0 0953) (0 0944) (0 0946) (0 0938) 
Noncontroller Moves First, NC 0 2610. 02816. 0 1987 •• 0 2161. 0 1887 •• 0 2048 . 0 1866 •• 0 2025. 
(0 1231) (0 1225) (0 0993) (0 0979) (00956) (0 0945) (0 0949) (0 0939) 
Female-Male Genders. Gr114 0 0723 -00453 ·O 0053 ·O 0978 ·00155 ·O 1036 ·O 0175 ·O 1047 
(0 1689) (0 1684) (0 1362) (0 1346) (0 1312) (0 1300) (0.1301) (0 1291) 
Male-Female Genders, G"'r -0 0585 ·02271 ·00610 ·O 1937 -00604 ·O 1866 ·O 0602 ·O 1851 
(0 1696) (0 1702) (0 1368) (0 1360) (0 1317) (0 1313) (0 1307) (0 1304) 
Female-Female Genders. Grr -0 1622 -0 4380. ·O 1644 ·O 3802 • ·O 1595 ·O 3651 . ·O 1584 ·0.3620 . 
(0 1709) (0 1703) (0 1378) (0 136 1) (0. 1327) (0 131 4) (0 1317) (0 1305) 
Loyalty A, LOYA 0.4556 . 0 3508 . 0 3358 . 0 3328. 
(0 11 01) (0 0888) (0.0855) (0 0848) 
Loyalty D. LOYD -0 4589 . -0 3640. -0 3455 . ·O 3417' 
(0.1072) (0 0857) (0 0827) (0 0821) 
Overall F-value for model 3.950 . 4 135. 3 6 17 . 3 986 . 3 539 . 3 842 . 3 522 . 3:809. 
No te: the top number for each term represents th e estimated coefficient and the bottom n umber in parentheses represents the estimate's standard error. 
• significant a t the 5% level. 





decreases. Such behavior is inconsistent with the concept of wealth maximization, 
but it is not inconsistent with the concept of sympathy. Second, cheap talk exerts a 
negative and significant effect on all measures of a . The implies that rational 
behavior declines when bargainers engage in costless, pre-bargain communication. 
A possible explanation for this result is that the noncontroller's cheap talk messages 
influence (in a negative direction) the controller's reservation price (i.e. , lowest 
acceptable probability of victory, Pc).73 A lower Pc yields a lower a level, in terms 
of both weak and strict rationality. Third, a first mover effect, in structured 
bargaining, appears. The coefficient on the noncontroller moves first variable is 
positive and statistically significant across all measures of rationality. This implies 
that rational behavior, in structured bargaining, increases when noncontrollers move 
first.74 Fourth, similar to models 1 and 2, a loyalty effect exists in models 3 and 4, 
across all measures of a . LOYA and LOYD yield significantly positive and 
negative, respectively, effects on all measures of rationality. Lastly, a negative and 
statistically significant female-female gender effect exists for model 4 across all 
measures of rat ionality. 
73 Given cheap talk yields a significantly negative effect on Pc (see the regression results for Pc in 
Table 15), this explanation remains plausible. 
74 Note, this result remains consistent with the treatment contrast results for L:i under all a 
measures (see Section 7.2), where the point estimates for L:i across all a measures indicate that the 
noncontroller moves first group obtains a higher level of rationality (a) than the controller moves first 
group. 
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7.4 Summary of Key Results and Economic Implications 
Sections 7.1 to 7.3 analyze the experimental results in terms of efficiency, 
distribution of wealth (i .e., rationality), and time remaining. This section summarizes 
the key results and notes the economic implications of the results. 
First, none of the protocols help the bargainers choose or create contracts 
which are more reward efficient than contracts created under the Coasian base 
group. All protocols yield an average efficiency ( R) which is negative and not 
statistically different from the base group average; hence, one rejects the Efficiency 
Hypothesis. The linear transaction costs severely inhibit the bargainers from 
capturing a positive proportion of the potential gains due to bargaining, and none of 
the protocols help counteract this effect.75 Thus, the implementation of stricter 
bargaining rules appears ineffective in reducing the efficiency costs of linear 
transaction costs. 
Second, the majority of bargainers acted neither as gamesmen nor fairmen. 
Constrained self-interest dominated the majority of bargains (recall Figures 4 and 5}; 
hence, one rejects the Rationality Hypothesis. This suggests that bargainers are 
driven by both monetary and nonmonetary concerns, as they balance the two 
extremes of pure self-interest and equity. In fact, the econometric results (in Section 
7.3) indicate what factors increase and decrease rational behavior. 
For instance, model 4's results (see Table 16) suggest that higher differences 
in initial wealth, between the controller and noncontroller, lead to lower levels of 
rat ionality. This remains consistent with the concept of sympathy, not wealth 
maximization. Additionally, cheap talk exerts a negative effect on rational play. 
75 Note, since the bargainers struck high traditional efficiency agreements (recall the tp results in 
Table 5), one can attribute the negative reward efficiency results to the linear transaction costs. 
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Controllers who bargain under cheap talk appear willing to accept lower probabilities 
of victory. A possible explanation for this effect might lie in the wording of the cheap 
talk messages which explicitly elicit "willingness to accept" and "willingness to offer• 
from both players. This wording might, somehow, enable the noncontroller to 
persuade the controller to accept a lower probability of victory. Furthermore, rational 
behavior tends to decline when female controllers bargain with female 
noncontrollers. This female-female gender effect appears consistent with social-
psychological research [see Thompson (1990)] which finds that women are less 
concerned, than are men, about winning and maximizing their outcome. A final 
factor which reduces rational behavior is loyalty towards fairness (recall the LOYD 
effect in Tables 14 and 16). Consistent with theoretical expectations, rat ional 
behavior declines when a controller remains partially loyal to both him/herself and 
the noncontroller. 
In contrast to the above factors, two other factors increase rational behavior. 
Loyalty towards oneself represents one factor. As expected, rational behavior rises 
when a controller feels loyal to him/herself (recall the LOYD effect in Tables 14 and 
16). The second factor depends on who moves first in structured bargaining. 
Rational behavior increases, in structured bargaining, when the noncontroller (as 
opposed to the controller) moves first (see Table 16). One possible explanation for 
this effect is: a noncontroller moves first rule helps justify the controller's unilateral 
property right (assuming the bargainers regard a first move as advantageous) and, 
in turn, reduces the possibility of actions based on sympathy, commitment (see 
footnote 72), or some other nonmonetary factor. 
Lastly, the time remain ing resu lts suggest that no deadline effect exists. The 
bargainers did not wait till the last minute before striking a bargain (see Figures 6 
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and 7). This suggests that lengthy bargaining delays are not preferred strategies 
among bargainers when bargaining is costly over time. Additionally, the timing 
results remain independent of protocol scheme (see Section 7.2). This implies that 
none of the protocols (including the base group) guide bargainers to quicker 
agreements than any other protocol scheme. Thus, given no deadline effect exists 
and the time remaining results remain independent of protocol scheme, this analysis 
cannot reject the Timing Hypothesis. 
In sum, th is analysis rejects both the Efficiency and Rationality Hypotheses; 




The main objective of this thesis was to further economic research into costly 
bargaining. Given the high prevalence of positive transaction costs in many "real 
life" bargaining situations [as Coase (1960) strongly acknowledges], and Shogren 
and Herriges's (1994) inefficiency results from their costly bargaining experiments, 
th is thesis investigated the usefulness of several bargaining protocols to improve 
bargaining efficiency through mutually advantageous agreements in a positive 
transaction costs environment. The protocols (treatments) considered were: (1) free 
form (Coasian) bargaining which represented the base group, (2) free form 
(Coasian) bargaining with cheap talk, (3) structured bargaining with the controller as 
the first mover, (4) structured bargaining with the noncontroller as the first mover, (5) 
the same format as protocol 3 but with cheap talk added, and (6) the same format as 
protocol 4 but with cheap talk added. Through the use of a (two-person) bilateral 
bargaining experiment, th is thesis measured the performance of each protocol in 
terms of reward efficiency ( R), distribution of wealth (a), and time remaining 
(TIME). Additionally, the analysis investigated what probability of victory (Pc ) the 
controllers secured across all protocol schemes. 
This chapter offers some concluding remarks with respect to the above 
investigation. Specifically, Section 8.1 summarizes the experimental results and 
draws several conclusions. Section 8.2 highlights this investigation's limitations and 
potential shortcomings. Lastly, Section 8.3 offers some ideas for future research. 
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8.1 Overall Summary 
Overall, the bargaining protocols did not foster efficient and mutually 
advantageous bargains. The experimental results (recall Chapter 7) revealed a 
negative mean R across all protocol schemes which were not statistically different 
from one another, and none of the protocols achieved an average a measure near 
1. Since none of the protocols guided bargainers to more reward efficient 
agreements than the Coasian base group, this analysis rejected Section 5.2's 
Efficiency Hypothesis. This meant that the protocols appeared ineffective in 
reducing the efficiency costs of positive transaction costs. As for the rationality 
results, constrained self-interest, where 0< a<1 , described the distribution of wealth 
in the majority of the bargains. That is, the majority of the controllers behaved 
neither as pure gamesmen nor as pure fairmen, but rather as rational persons 
constrained by fairness; hence, this experiment rejected the Rationality Hypothesis, 
as stated in Section 5.2. Moreover, the bargainers reached early agreements, and 
the times remaining remained independent of the protocol scheme. This meant that 
no deadline effect occurred, and costly bargaining delays did not remain a choice of 
strategy among the bargainers. Subsequently, the timing results could not reject 
Section 5.2's Timing Hypothesis. 
In addition to the above results, the econometric results suggested that 
several factors affected rational play. Among the factors which significantly reduced 
rational play were: greater differences in initial wealth, cheap talk, and a female-
female gender effect. Rational play also declined under Protocols 3 and 5 (recall 
Table 14), where the bargaining rule (protocol) designated the controller as first 
mover in structured bargaining. In contrast, rational play increased, in structured 
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bargaining, when the bargaining rule designated the noncontroller as first mover 
(recall Table 16). Lastly, the econometric results showed that rational behavior 
increased when controllers remained loyal to themselves, while rational behavior 
declined when controllers remained partially loyal to both themselves and the 
noncontroller. 76 
8.2 Limitations and Potential Shortcomings 
Similar to many other studies, this study is not immune to potential 
shortcomings, and it contains limitations. 
First, one might criticize the one-shot (i.e., nonrepeated) nature of this 
experiment's bargains. Other bargaining experiments typically use repeated trials. 
This allows subjects to gain a better understanding of the experimental procedures 
through experience. Such experience, however, can create a learning effect, and 
many experiments which use repeated trials do not account for this. As mentioned 
earlier, this experiment uses one-shot bargains to avoid a learning effect. This 
avoidance, nevertheless, may come at a cost in terms of a loss in understanding of 
the experimental instructions among the subjects. By including examples and a pre-
experimental questionnaire in the experimental instructions (recall Section 6.6), the 
current experiment hopefully evaded this potential tradeoff between understanding 
the procedures and eliminating (via one-shot bargains) the potential for a learning 
effect. Future research might replicate this experiment with repeated trials, but the 
experimental design should allow the experimenter to check for potential learning 
76 Note, the latter two loyalty effects support Shogren's {1989) loyalty explanation for the divergence 
between gamesman and fairman behavior. 
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effects. For example, some type of block or factorial design might explain any 
potential learn ing effects. 
Second, though this experiment and Shogren and Herriges's (1 994) 
experiment indicate that no deadline effect exists in costly bargaining, the current 
investigation cannot attribute this occurrence entirely to the positive transaction 
costs. Other factors may exist. For example, Shogren and Herriges ( 1994) attribute 
their early agreement results not only to transaction costs, but to the controller's right 
(via the outside option) to un ilaterally end the bargain. This explanation remains 
relevant for the current experiment, too. Another contributing factor may be the face-
to-face bargaining format. To explain, Harrison and McKee (1985) study face-to-
face bargaining in a costless transactions environment, and they report, "Very few of 
the observed outcomes were decided 'at the wire' , and this time limit did not appear 
to be a binding constraint on negotiation behavior" (p. 658}. At this point, note that 
three perspectives on the deadline effect exist: (1) RMS (1988) find a deadline effect 
based on anonymous bargaining in a costless transactions environment, {2} 
Harrison and McKee (1985} find no deadline effect in face-to-face bargaining under 
a costless transactions environment, and {3) the current investigation and Shogren 
and Herriges (1994) find no deadline effect in face-to-face bargaining under a 
positive transaction costs environment. A comparison of perspectives (2) and (3) 
suggests that face-to-face bargaining leads to early agreements, regardless of 
transaction costs, while a comparison of perspectives {1) and {2) suggests that 
anonymous bargain ing yields slower agreements than face-to-face bargaining. The 
latter comparison may simply result because communication is, in general, more 
limited or difficult under anonymous bargaining than under face-to-face bargaining. 
Although these comparisons highlight the potential influence of face-to-face 
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bargaining on early agreements, one must stress that these comparisons merely 
represent suggestions and not decisive assertions. An experiment on costly 
bargaining with deadlines, which uses both anonymous bargaining and face-to-face 
bargaining treatments, might reveal a better understanding of deadlines in costly 
bargains. 
Lastly, this investigation contains several limitations. First, one cannot 
generalize th is investigation beyond the two-person scenario. Though many 
negotiations involve disputes among two people [e.g., child custody battles], many 
others involve disputes among multitudes of people [e.g., environmental and natural 
resource disputes]. A more comprehensive study of the usefulness of protocols in 
costly bargains might involve multilateral, as well as bilateral team, bargains. 
Second, the results of this investigation evolve from linear transaction costs. Given 
Shogren and Herriges (1994) report that bargaining behavior differs across various 
cost structures [e.g., linear versus nonlinear costs], this investigation's protocols may 
or may not foster efficient and mutually advantageous bargains in other cost 
structures. Third, the cheap talk phase only lasts for 20 seconds [i.e., two 10 second 
rounds]. Ten seconds may not be long enough for bargainers to think clearly about 
their responses. Longer cheap talk rounds would give bargainers more time to think 
which, in turn , might bring about greater pre-bargain coordination; and hence, trigger 
quicker and less costly bargains. Lastly, this experiment's memorization game may 
not remain an appropriate way to distribute property rights. Future research might 
use an auction (e.g., a second-price sealed bid auction) to distribute property rights. 
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8.3 Future Research Ideas 
Although the protocols, considered here, exhibit little success in improving the 
efficiency results of Coasian bargaining under positive transaction costs, the case for 
protocols is far from closed. This investigation only scratches the surface. Other 
protocols may exist which lessen the negative effects of transaction costs. This 
section offers some ideas for future research into bargaining protocols. 
The first idea involves the use of an arbitrator. An arbitrator is a neutral third 
party who reviews each parties' arguments, and then makes a binding decision 
which settles the dispute. Ashenfelter and Currie (1990) and Ashenfelter, Currie, 
Farber, and Spiegel [1992] (hereafter, ACFS) define three types of arbitration 
systems: 
(i) conventional arbitration (CA) where the arbitrator can impose any 
settlement he/she prefers, 
(ii) final-offer arbitration (FOA) where the arbitrator must choose one of 
the final offers of the parties without any compromise, and 
(iii) tri-offer arbitration (TRI) where the arbitrator must choose one 
outcome from three possibilities--one or the other of the parties' final 
offers or the recommendation of a neutral fact-finder. 
Typically, the negotiation process involves arbitration only if an impasse exists at a 
designated deadline. Given this, any experimental test of the usefulness of 
arbitration, as a viable protocol, in costly bargaining must consider several issues. 
First, if the transaction costs remain relatively high, such that the potential gains from 
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bargaining diminish to zero or some small amount by the deadline, then an 
arbitration settlement will not yield an efficient result. In this situation, the 
experimenter might consider different time mechanisms for implementing arbitration. 
Potential mechanisms might include sending negotiations to arbitration after X 
minutes of an impasse or after X amount of offers and counteroffers occur without 
an agreement. Another issue involves the choice of arbitration system(s) . Mixed 
results exist on the effectiveness of alternative arbitration systems to stimulate 
settlements. ACFS (1992) find, through computer aided experiments, that the 
anticipation of CA, FOA, and TRI lead to higher dispute rates than bargaining without 
arbitration. These results support the so-called "chilling effect", which asserts that 
anticipated arbitration leads to higher dispute rates because it increases the 
incentives for bargainers to make extreme offers. In contrast, experiments by 
Grigsby and Bigoness (1982) do not support the chilling effect for FOA. Additionally, 
Coleman, Jennings, and Mclaughlin (1993) present a mathematical model and 
empirical evidence which illustrate that anticipated FOA leads to a convergence of 
offers; and hence, exhibits no chilling effect. Overall, the case for arbitration, as a 
useful protocol in costly bargaining, involves defining an optimal time mechanism for 
intervention and an effective arbitration system. 
Another protocol idea involves the use of a mediator. Similar to an arbitrator, 
a mediator is a neutral third party who reviews each parties' arguments. However, 
unlike an arbitrator, a mediator cannot make binding decisions regarding a 
settlement. The key role of a mediator is to help bargainers reach a mutually 
acceptable resolution to a dispute [see Mernitz (1980, pp. 39-42) for more details]. 
Additionally, Evarts (1988) views mediation as a variant of Coasian bargaining: 
"Mediation is a variant of the negotiation processes discussed by the great 
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economist Ronald Coase, who relies on the assumption that, in certain disputes, the 
parties can discover their mutual interdependence and resolve their own 
disagreements without resorting to court processes" (p.70). Given a Coasian 
solution relies on a discovery of mutual interdependence among the disputing 
parties, one can envision the potential usefulness for mediation (as a bargaining 
protocol) in costly negotiations. In particular, mediation could be useful if it can help 
bargainers realize their mutual interdependence in a more efficient and timely 
manner than if the bargainers are left alone. 
Implementation of a mediation protocol, however, requires several 
considerations. First, since mediator services are not free [Mernitz (1980)), one 
must consider who will pay the mediator. Should both parties or just one party bear 
the costs, or can one expect an outside source (such as a state or local government) 
to pay the mediator's bill? For environmental disputes, Bingham (1986) reports that, 
during the 1970's, mediator bills were typically paid by outside sources, but the 
future trend remains unclear on who will be willing to pay for the mediator. Second, 
one must consider the entry time for a mediator. In economic terms, one might 
suggest that the optimal entry time exists where the marginal costs of mediation 
equal the marginal benefits of mediation. Though this economic rule appears clear, 
no universal agreement exists concerning the optimal entry time for a mediator. For 
example, Hiltrop (1985) advocates late entry, Prudencio (1982) and Mernitz {1980) 
advocate entry when negotiations reach an impasse, and Simkin {1971) advocates 
that the optimal entry time exists in an "optimum time spectrum" which begins after 
trouble seems certain to the negotiators and ends before a deadlock on issues is 
firm . A third concern in mediation involves mediator bias. For instance, laboratory 
work conducted by Welton and Pruitt ( 1987) shows that, "Disputants who perceived 
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the mediator as biased against their side were less accepting of the mediator and 
less influenced by the mediator than disputants who perceived the mediator as 
neutral" (p. 123). Lastly, future research on mediation protocols might address the 
effectiveness of mediation when property rights are well-defined. 
In sum, th is section offers two ideas for future research into bargaining 
protocols. Either one might prove effective in guiding bargainers towards efficient 
and mutually advantageous agreements, in a positive transaction costs environment. 
And since the laboratory can offer a "realistic• test of social behavior [Smith (1976)), 
the laboratory represents a possible method for testing these (and other) protocols. 
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APPENDIX A : 










Event Summary Sheet 
Event 
Random pairing--you will be randomly paired with another person. 
Play matching game to detennine the controller [note: you receive 
1 token (valued at $2/token) for each match] . 
Before bargaining place the required tokens (controller 5, non-
controller 1, monitor 4) on the table. 
Bargain--recall that you have 5 minutes. 
After bargaining there will be a random draw based on the distribution of 
lottery tickets to detennine the winner. 
Complete the "Post Experimental Questionnaire". 
Receive payment consisting of hourly payment ($2/hour), reward (if 





You are about to participate in an experiment in decision making. The purpose of this 
experiment is to gain insight into certain features of economic processes. If you follow the 
instructions care fully, you might earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid in 
cash at the end of the experiment. An hourly payment ($2/hour) wilJ be paid regardless of 
your success in bargaining. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This experiment involves several basic steps (see the handout entitled "Event 
Summary Sheet"). First, you will be randomly paired with another per on. Secondly, you 
and this other person will play a matching game to determine who earns the right to be the 
controller--an explanation of the controller and the matching game occurs below. This yields 
a situation where one player is the controller and the other player is the non-controller. 
Next. you will participate in one bargaining session with the other player. The 
sess ion involves two choices-(!) selecting a number that represents the chance to win a 
reward, and (2) deciding how to distribute the chances between the two players. For 
example, consider the lottery schedule on the blackboard. If number 3 is selected, then 
player A has 50 out of 100 lottery tickets giving him or her a 50% chance to win the reward; 
and player B has 30 lottery tickets giving him or her a 30% chance to win the reward. Note 
that there is also a 20% chance neither party will win. 
The size of the reward depends on the time spent bargaining. Although you have 5 
minutes to complete each bargain, the reward decreases as bargaining time increases. The 
rate at which the reward decreases will be explained below. 
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Finally, the last few steps include a determination of the winner (by a random draw as 
explained below) and a cash payment to each player. 
CONTROLLER 
One of you will earn the right to be the "controller" at the outset of the session. The 
controller has the right to unilaterally select a number by himself or herself and inform the 
monitor, who will stop the bargaining session. The other participant can attempt to 
influence the controller to reach a mutually acceptable joint decision; i.e., the other 
participant may offer to give either part or all of his or her chances of winning (lottery 
tickets) to the controller. How the controller is determined is explained below. 
HOW TO DETERMINE THE CONTROLLER 
After you are paired with another person, you will play a matchin2 2ame to 
determine who will be the controller. Nineteen cards lay on the table. Nine matching pairs 
exist (9x2 = 18 cards) with one card left over (18+1=19 cards). Player A starts first by 
flipping over two cards so both players can see them. If they match, player A keeps the cards 
and earns 1 token valued at $2; otherwise, player A turns the cards face down. Player B then 
turns over two cards; and so on. (Note that player A and player B alternate in talcing turns.) 
The game ends when one card is left on the table. The person with the most matches wins 
the game, and has earned the right to be the contro11er. Remember that each match is worth 
1 token valued at $2. 
For example , if player A finds 5 pairs and player B finds 4 pairs, A earns the right to 




After the controller has been determined, the bargaining session begins. During the 
bargaining session, you may arrive at two agreements with the other player: 
(1) which number to choose, 
(2) how to allocate the chances (lottery tickets) of winning the reward. 
(Note: you are not allocating the reward.) 
If a joint agreement is reached, both parties must sign an agreement form stating both the 
chosen number and how many lottery tickets will be transferred from one participant to the 
other. No physical threats are allowed. If a joint agreement is made and the form is signed, 
the monitor will terminate the session. The signed agreement will be upheld in all cases. 
DIBAGREEMENTOUTCOME 
If you cannot come to an agreement before the end of the session both participants 
receive zero payoff. 
CONTROLLER'S RIGHT 
Remember that the controller can end the session at any time without the agreement 
of the other party. The controller can select a number and inform the monitor, who will then 
end the session. No signatures are necessary if I.he controller ends the session. 
THE REWARD 
The maximum reward for bargaining will be 10 tokens. Each token is worth $2.00. 
The 10 token reward is derived as follows-I.he controller contributes 5 tokens, the non-
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controller contributes 1 token, and the monitor contributes 4 tokens (5+ 1 +4 = 10). The 
controller and non-controller ll..l!.S1 in all cases contribute the required tokens. 
BARGAINING TIME 
The bargaining session lasts 5 minutes. The maximum 10 token reward decreases 
over time. If no agreement is reached after 5 minutes, the reward equals zero. The 10 token 
reward decreases according to the reward schedule below. For example, if it took 1 minute 
to reach an agreement, then 4 minuLes would be left and the reward would be worth 8 tokens. 

























As soon as both parties sign the agreement form, or the controller chooses to end the session, 
the time and the value of the decreasing reward is noted by the monitor. [Note: since each 
token is worth $2, the $20 (=10 tokens X $2) reward declines by $ 1 every 15 seconds.] 
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EXAMPLE 
Assume that A is the controller and that A and B have the following schedule of 
lottery tickets reflecting the chances of winning the reward: 
Example of Lottei:y Ticket Distribution Schedule 
Number A's Chance to Win(%) B's Chance to Win(%) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 
80 0 
2 m w 
3 ~ ~ 
4 ~ ~ 
5 30 70 
6 0 80 
You and the other participant may arrive at two agreements: 
(1) which number to choose, and 
(2) how to allocate the lottery tickets. 
Referring to the example schedule above, first A and B agree to select a number. If A and B 
agree to select number 3, then A has 50 chances out of 100 (50%) to win, B has 30 chances 
out of 100 (30%) to win, and there are 20 chances out of 100 (20%) that neither A nor B will 
win. If they agree to select number 5, A has 30 chances out of 100 (30%) to win and B has 
70 chances out of 100 (70%) to win, and there is 0 chances (0%) neither A nor B will win. 
Suppose A and B agree to select number 5. 
Second, A and B then agree how to allocate the lottery tickets. Suppose A and B 
agree that B will transfer 40 lottery tickets to A, then A has 70 tickets and B has 30 tickets. If 
they agree that B will transfer 20 lottery tickets to A, then both A and B have 50 tickets. If 
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they agree that B will transfer 60 tickets, then A will have 90 tickets and B will have 10 
tickets. 
After the bargaining session, the monitor will determine the winner by drawing a 
lonery ticket. The composition of lonery tickets will correspond to the agree-upon 
distribution of lottery tickets. The amount of the reward will depend on the bargaining time. 
Recall that if the time elapses (5 minutes) before the agreement is signed, then it will be 
considered that you have not reached an agreement, and the reward is zero for both 
parties. 
A~reement Form <Example) 
A and B agree to set the number at ___ _ 
A and B agree that ___ lottery tickets will be transferred from ___ to __ 
Signed: A:---------
B: ---------








You will be more successful in bargaining and have higher chances of winning larger 
rewards if you thoroughly understand the experiment. Please, do not hesitate to ask 
questions before the bargaining session! Use the example schedule on the blackboard to 
answer the following questions. 
1. Number __ gives me the greatest chance to win. 
2. Number __ gives me the smallest chance to win. 
3. If the other participant is the controller and he picks number 3, (a) I have __ 
chances out of __ to win. (b) I must contribute _ _ tokens if I am the 
noncontroller. 
4. If I am the controller and I select number 4, (a) there are __ chances out of 
__ that neither party will win. (b) I must contribute _ _ tokens if I am the 
controller. 
5. If the other participant and I agree to select Number 2 and I agree to transfer 10 
lottery tickets to the other party: (a) I have __ chances out of __ to earn 
10 tokens; I have __ chances out of __ not to earn 10 tokens. 
6. The reward will increase or decrease as bargaining time elapses? ____ _ 
7. I am indifferent between receiving (circle one) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
tokens with 100% certainty and playing a lottery where there is an 80% chance 
of winning 10 tokens and a 20% chance of winning 0 tokens. (Note there is no 
"correct" answer to this question. Please just give your best response.) 
8. What do you think is the most likely outcome (state answer in terms of a split 
in lottery tickets)? And what do you think is the probability of its 
occurrence? __ (Note there is no "correct" answer to this question. Please 
just give your best response.) 
9. The time limit for bargaining is __ minutes. 
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Agreement Form 
A and B agree to set the number at ___ _ 
A and B agree that ___ lottery tickets will be transferred from ___ to __ 
Signed: A:---------
B: ---------







Player _ _ is the controller. 
Lottery Tickets 
Accept Offer? Player Makin~ the Offer Number A B 
1. A B Yes No 
2. A B Yes No 
3. A B Yes No 
4. A B Yes No 
5. A B Yes No 
6. A B Yes No 
7. A B Yes No 
8. A B Yes No 
9. A B Yes No 
10. A B Yes No 
11. A B Yes No 
12. A B Yes No 
13. A B Yes No 
14. A B Yes No 
15. A B Yes No 
16. A B Yes No 
17. A B Yes No 
18. A B Yes No 
19. A B Yes No 
20. A B Yes No 
21. A B Yes No 
Lottery Schedule 









































Post Experimental Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. 
1. I was player (e.g. , A1) __ _ 
2. Sex ___ _ 
3.Age ___ _ 
4. Major ___ _ 
5. Did you know the other person? __ _ 
6. During the bargaining session I felt loyal to __ _ 
a) myself 
b) the other player 
c) the monitor 
d) someone or something else (please indicate) ___ _ 
'Than!( you for your participation. 
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$$$'Earn 'Ettfra CJZISJ{ 6y Participating in 
an 'Economic 'Ezyeriment $$$ 
Features: 
-involves NO physical discomfort (such as electric shocks)! 
- requires about 1 hour or 1 & a half hours (approximately) 
-each participant has the opportunity to earn up to $28 
-additionally, get $2/hr. for participating 
-experiments will be held on campus in Atrium I (room 220) on the 2nd 
floor of Memorial Union 
-experiments will take place at three different times (9:00, 12:00, and 
2:30)on Friday 12/3, Monday 12/6, and Wednesday 12/8 
-work around your class schedule--choose one of the above times 
and date 
-we need 120 people to finish the experiment 
-we prefer people to sign-up in advance, but walk-ins are welcome 
Please come to Room #318 of Lippitt Hall or call 792-0386 after 6:00 
pm. Ask for Michael. Also look for our sign-up booth in Memorial Union 





SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR TREATMENT 1 
You and the other player may make written offers at any time. Bargaining procedure 
remains at the discretion of the bargainers. The only restrictions include the time limit (5 
minutes) and the prohibition of physical threats. You can talk, but verbal offers are not 
binding. 
There is no time limit for making an offer. However, note that the entire bargaining 
session maintains a~ minute limit and the controller at any time can end the bargaining. 
Again, no physical threats are allowed. 
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Questions for Specific Instructions (Treament 1) 
I can make an offer at any time, true or false? ____ _ 
The time limit for bargaining is ___ __ minutes. 




SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR TREATMENT 2 
You and the other player may make written offers at any time. Bargaining procedure 
remains at the discretion of the bargainers. The only restrictions include the time limit (5 
minutes) and the prohibition of physical threats. You can talk, but verbal offers are not 
binding. 
There is no time limit for making an offer. However, note that the entire bargaining 
session maintains a five minute limit and the controller at any time can end the bargaining. 
Again, no physical threats are allowed. 
Before bargaining begins, you will be given the chance to communicate (nonverbally) 
with the other player. This communication will occur in two rounds. First, each of you will 
have a slip of paper which reads: 
ts! Round Response: 
"The minimum I am willing to~ is __ ." 
"The maximum I am willing to .o1Tur is __ ." 
2!lll Round Response: 
''The minimum I am willing to~ is __ ." 
"The maximum I am willing to .Qffur is __ ." 
You will have~ seconds to write your first response. Write this response in the appropriate 
space provided under the section entitled " lfil Round Response". If you choose n.Q1 to 
respond, simply write "NR" in either of these spaces. Do not write any other comments on 
the paper. Whe n ten seconds have e lapsed, the monitor will announce "switch". At this 
time, exchange papers with the other player. This marks the end of round 1 and the 
beginning of round 2. 
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Once again, you will have~ seconds to respond. Write your response in the 
appropriate space provided under the section entitled "2llil Round Response". If you choose 
not to respond, simply write "NR" in either of these spaces. Any other comments are strictly 
prohibited. When ten seconds have elapsed, the monitor will announce "switch". At this 
time, exchange papers with the other player. This ends the communication rounds, and 
marks the start of the bargaining session. Recall you have ~ minutes to bargain. 
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Questions for Specific Instructions (Treatment 2) 
I can make an offer at any time, true or false? ____ _ 
_____ offers are binding. 
(a) Verbal 
(b) Written 
I can verbally communicate with the other player before bargaining begins, 
true or false? ----
Pre-bargaining communication will occur in ____ rounds and each round 
lasts for seconds. 
If I choose not to respond in one of the pre-bargaining communication rounds, 
then I ----
(a) leave the paper blank 
(b) write "NR" 
Bargaining begins ____ after the last round of pre-bargaining communication. 
(a) 1 O seconds 
(b) immediately 
169 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR TREATMENT 3 
You and the other player will make alternating offers in writing. No talking is 
allowed. The bargaining session begins with the controller making the first offer. The 
noncontroller can either accept this offer, or reject the offer and counter with a new offer. 
The number of offer and counteroffers is unrestricted within the 5 minute time limit. 
There is no time limit for making an offer. However, note that the entire bargaining 
session maintains a five minute limit and the controller at any time (whether in tum or out of 
turn) can end the bargaining. Again, no physical threats are allowed. 
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Questions for Specific Instructions (Treatment 3) 
I can talk to the other player, true or false? ___ _ 
If I am the controller then I can unilaterally select a number at any time and inform 
the monitor, who will stop the bargaining session. However, I must wait my turn 
when I make offers to the other player, true or false? ___ _ 
When the bargaining session begins, the ____ makes the first offer. 
(a) controller 
(b) non-controller 
When receiving an offer, I can _ __ _ 
(a) accept it 
(b) reject it and make a counter-offer 
(c) do nothing 
(d) any of the above 
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SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR TREATMENT 4 
You and the other player will make alternating offers in writing. No talking is 
allowed. The bargaining session begins with the noncontroller making the first offer. The 
controller can either accept this offer, or reject the offer and counter with a new offer. The 
number of offer and counteroffers is unrestricted within the 5 minute time limit. 
There is no time limit for ma.king an offer. However, note that the entire bargaining 
session maintains a~ minute limit and the controller at any time (whether in turn or out of 
tum) can end the bargaining. Again, no physical threats are allowed. 
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Questions for Specific Instructions (Treatment 4) 
I can talk to the other player, true or false? ___ _ 
If I am the controller then I can unilaterally select a number at any time and inform 
the monitor, who will stop the bargaining session. However, I must wait my turn 
when I make offers to the other player, true or false? ___ _ 
When the bargaining session begins, the ____ makes the first offer. 
(a) controller 
(b) non-controller 
When receiving an offer, I can ___ _ 
(a) accept it 
(b) reject it and make a counter-offer 
(c) do nothing 
( d) any of the above 
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SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR TREATMENTS 
You and the other player will make alternating offers in writing. No talking is 
allowed. The bargaining session begins with the controller making the first offer. The 
noncontroller can either accept this offer, or reject the offer and counter with a new offer. 
The number of offer and counteroffers is unrestricted within the 5 minute time limiL 
There is no time limit for making an offer. However, note that the entire bargaining 
session maintains a five minute limit and the controller at any time (whether in tum or out of 
tum) can end the bargaining. Again, no physical threats are allowed. 
Before bargaining begins, you will be given the chance to communicate (nonverbally) 
with the other player. This communication will occur in two rounds. First, each of you will 
have a slip of paper which reads: 
Jfil Round Response: 
"The minimum I am willing to accept is __ ." 
"The maximum I am willing to Q.f.Tur is __ ." 
ind Round Response: 
"The minimum I am willing to accept is __ ." 
"The maximum I am willing to Qffer is __ ." 
You will have kn seconds to write your first response. Write this response in the appropriate 
space provided under the section entitled "lfil. Round Response". If you choose !1fil to 
respond, simply write "NR" in either of these spaces. Do not write any other comments on 
the paper. When ten seconds have elapsed, the monitor will announce "switch". At this 
time, exchange papers with the other player. This marks the end of round 1 and the 
beginning of round 2. 
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Once again, you will have ~seconds to respond. Write your response in the 
appropriate space provided under the section entitled "2llii Round Response". If you choose 
not to respond, simply write "NR" in either of these spaces. Any other comments are strictly 
prohibited. When ten seconds have elapsed, the monitor will announce "switch". At this 
time, exchange papers with the other player. This ends the communication rounds, and 
marks the start of the bargaining session. Recall you have ~ minutes to bargain. 
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Questions for Specific Instructions {Treatment 5) 
I can make an offer at any time, true or false? ____ _ 
_____ offers are binding. 
(a) Verbal 
(b) Written 
I can verbally communicate with the other player before bargaining begins, 
true or false? ----
Pre-bargaining communication will occur in ___ _ rounds and each round 
lasts for seconds. 
If I choose not to respond in one of the pre-bargaining communication rounds, 
then I ___ _ 
(a) leave the paper blank 
(b) write "NR" 
Bargaining begins ____ after the last round of pre-bargaining communication. 
(a) 1 O seconds 
(b) immediately 
I can talk to the other player, true or false? ___ _ 
If I am the controller then I can unilaterally select a number at any time and inform 
the monitor, who will stop the bargaining session. However, I must wait my turn 
when I make offers to the other player, true or false? _ __ _ 
When the bargain ing session begins, the ____ makes the first offer. 
(a) controller 
(b) non-controller 
When receiving an offer, I can ___ _ 
(a) accept it 
(b) reject it and make a counter-offer 
(c) do nothing 
( d) any of the above 
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SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR TREATMENT 6 
You and the other player will make alternating offers in writing. No talking is 
allowed. The bargaining session begins with the noncontroller making the fust offer. The 
controller can either accept this offer, or reject the offer and counter with a new offer. The 
number of offer and counteroffers is unrestricted within the 5 minute time limit. 
There is no time limit for making an offer. However, note that the entire bargaining 
session maintains a fiye minute limit and the controller at any time (whether in tum or out of 
tum) can end the bargaining. Again, no physical threats are allowed. 
Before bargaining begins, you will be given the chance to communicate (nonverbally) 
with the other player. This communication will occur in two rounds. First, each of you will 
have a slip of paper which reads: 
ts! Round Response: 
"The minimum I am willing to accept is __ ." 
"The maximum I am willing to offer is __ ." 
znd Round Response: 
"The minimum I am willing to accept is __ ." 
"The maximum I am willing to .QfTur is __ ." 
You will have ren seconds to write your first response. Write this response in the appropriate 
space provided under the section entitled "Ifil Round Response". If you choose IlQ1 to 
respond, simply write "NR" in either of these spaces. Do not write any other comments on 
the paper. When ten seconds have elapsed, the monitor will announce "switch". At this 
time, exchange papers with the other player. This marks the end of round 1 and the 
beginning of round 2. 
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Once again, you will have~ seconds to respond. Write your response in the 
appropriate space provided under the section entitled "2illl Round Response". If you choose 
not to respond, simply write "NR" in either of these spaces. Any other comments are strictly 
prohibited. When ten seconds have elapsed, the monitor will announce "switch". At this 
time, exchange papers with the other player. This ends the communication rounds, and 
marks the start of the bargaining session. Recall you have~ minutes to bargain. 
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Questions for Specific Instructions (Treatment 6) 
I can make an offer at any time, true or false? ____ _ 
_____ offers are binding. 
(a) Verbal 
(b) Written 
I can verbally communicate with the other player before bargaining begins, 
true or false? ----
Pre-bargaining communication will occur in ____ rounds and each round 
lasts for seconds. 
If I choose not to respond in one of the pre-bargaining communication rounds, 
then I ----
(a) leave the paper blank 
(b) write "NR" 
Bargaining begins ____ after the last round of pre-bargaining communication. 
(a) 1 O seconds 
(b) immediately 
I can talk to the other player, true or false? ___ _ 
If I am the controller then I can unilaterally select a number at any time and inform 
the monitor, who will stop the bargaining session. However, I must wait my turn 
when I make offers to the other player, true or false? ___ _ 
When the bargaining session begins, the ____ makes the first offer. 
(a) controller 
(b) non-controller 
When receiving an offer, I can ___ _ 
(a) accept it 
(b) reject it and make a counter-offer 
(c) do nothing 





Definitions of notation used in list of data set: 
PA= Pr(A wins) 
PB = Pr(B wins) 
PQ = Pr(house wins) 
PCONT = Pr(controller wins) 
TIME= Time (Seconds) Remaining 
GA = A's amount of tokens 
GB = B's amount of tokens 
TREAT = Treatment (Protocol) 
SA = A's sex 
SB = B's sex 
LA = A's loyalty response 
LB = B's loyalty response 
NET = Remaining Reward, Z(t) 
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List of Data Set 
OBS PA PB PO PC ONT TIME GA GB TREAT SA SB LA LB NET 
1 0 . 57 0 . 28 0.15 0 . 57 183 5 4 1 F F A B 6 . 0 
2 0 . 30 0.65 0.05 0 . 65 229 4 s 4 F H A A 7 . 5 
3 o . so 0 . 50 o.oo o . so 267 4 5 3 F F D D 9 . 0 
4 0 . 15 o.85 o.oo 0 . 85 261 3 6 1 H F c A 8.5 
5 0.15 o . 85 o.oo o.8S 297 4 5 6 F H A A 10 . 0 
6 0.80 0 . 15 0.05 0 . 80 219 6 3 4 H F D D 7 . 5 
7 0 . 50 o.so o . oo 0.50 272 s 4 2 H H D A 9.0 
8 0 . 40 0.60 o . oo 0 . 60 182 4 s 4 H H D D 6 . 0 
9 0.30 0.65 o . os 0.65 215 4 5 2 F F A A 7.0 
10 o.so o.so o.oo o.so 181 1 8 1 F F A D 6 . 0 
11 O. lS 0 . 85 o.oo 0.85 270 3 6 4 F H D D 9 . 0 
12 0.67 0 . 33 o . oo 0.67 158 6 3 3 F H D D 5.5 
13 0 . 60 0.40 0.00 0.60 254 s 4 6 F H D D 8 . 5 
14 o.so 0.50 o . oo 0 . 50 242 2 7 3 F F A 8 8.0 
IS 0 . 9S o.os o.oo 0.95 240 6 3 1 F H A A 8. 0 
16 o . oo 0 . 90 0.10 0.90 216 4 5 s H F 8 B 7 . 0 
17 0 . 35 0 . 6S o . oo 0 . 65 180 1 8 4 H F D D 6.0 
18 0 . 50 0 . 50 o . oo 0.50 286 2 7 2 F F A B 9.5 
19 0 . 10 0 . 90 o . oo 0 . 90 195 3 6 1 F H A A 6.5 
20 0 . 30 0.70 o . oo 0.70 282 3 6 2 F F A B 9 . 5 
21 0 . 40 0 . 55 o.os 0 . 55 254 4 5 5 F H A A 8 . 5 
22 0 . 50 0 . so o . oo o.so 214 s 4 6 F F B B 7 . 0 
23 0 . 50 o . so o . oo 0.50 253 6 3 3 H H D c 8.5 
24 0.55 0.30 0 . 15 0.30 190 2 7 s F H D B 6.5 
25 0.30 0 . 65 0 . 05 0.30 281 s 4 2 H F D B 9.S 
26 0.40 o.ss o.os 0.40 184 6 3 5 F H A A 6.0 
27 0.40 0 . 60 o . oo 0.60 172 3 6 s H F A A 5 . S 
28 0.15 0.85 o.oo 0.85 257 4 5 6 F H A 8 8.S 
29 0.55 0 .45 0.00 0 . 55 181 8 1 4 H H D A 6 . 0 
30 o.so 0 . 45 0.05 0 . 50 145 5 4 3 F H D D s . 0 
31 0 . 90 o.oo 0.10 0.90 293 7 2 5 H H A A 10 . 0 
32 0.95 0.05 o.oo 0 . 95 224 8 1 4 F H B B 7 . S 
33 0 . 55 0.30 0 .15 0.55 266 5 4 s F F 8 A ' . o. 
34 o . so 0.50 o.oo 0 . 50 271 6 3 6 H F B B 9 . 0 
35 0 .80 0.15 o . os 0 . 80 181 6 3 5 F H A c 6 . 0 
36 0.50 0.50 o.oo o.so 250 6 3 5 F H D D 8 . 5 
37 o.so o.so o.oo 0.50 266 4 5 l F F B B 9 . 0 
38 0 . 40 0.55 0.05 0 . 55 266 4 5 2 H F B B 9.0 
39 0 . so 0.50 o.oo 0 .so 20 6 3 2 F H B 8 8.5 
40 o . so o.so o.oo 0.50 229 6 3 6 H F 8 8 7.S 
41 0 . 50 o.so o.oo o.so 266 6 3 6 F F c B 9 . 0 
42 0 . 50 0.50 o.oo 0.50 272 5 4 4 F F D D 9.0 
43 0.40 0.55 0.05 0 . 40 260 5 4 4 F F D D 8.5 
44 0 . 90 o.oo 0.10 0.90 298 s 4 6 H F A A 10.0 
'45 0 . 15 0.85 o.oo 0.15 272 6 3 2 H F D D 9.0 
46 0.15 o.es o . oo 0.85 255 3 6 3 H H A A 8.5 
47 0.55 0.45 o.oo o.ss 177 6 3 2 H F D A 6 . 0 
48 0.50 o . so o.oo o . so 260 0 9 3 H F B 8 8.5 
49 0.50 o.so o.oo 0.50 225 1 8 3 F F 8 B 7.5 
so 0.50 0.50 o . oo o.so 265 4 5 2 H F D D 9 . 0 
51 0 . 40 0 . 50 0 . 10 0.50 220 3 6 3 F F B B 7 .s 
52 0.40 0.55 0.05 0.55 157 4 5 5 F F A c 5 . 0 
53 0 .15 0 . 85 o . oo 0.85 255 4 5 6 M M A A 8 . 5 
54 0 .15 0 . 85 o . oo 0.85 242 3 6 1 F H 8 8 8 . 0 
55 0 . 60 0 . 40 o.oo 0.60 267 6 3 3 H F A 8 9.0 
56 0.55 0 . 30 0.15 0.55 275 5 4 1 F F D D 9.0 
57 0 . 75 0 . 25 o.oo 0.75 275 5 4 1 H F D D 9.0 
58 o.eo 0.15 0 . 05 0 . 80 128 5 4 6 F F A c 4 . 5 
59 0.90 o.oo 0.10 0.90 282 5 4 4 F H A D 9.5 
60 0 . 50 o . so o.oo 0.50 207 3 6 1 F H 8 8 7.0 
